UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4745
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARKIE DEVON JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:15-cr-00089-BO-1)
Submitted: September 29, 2016 Decided: October 3, 2016
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert J. Higdon, Jr., WILLIAMS MULLEN, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Markie Devon Jones pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
(2012). Based on Jones’ North Carolina breaking and entering
convictions, the district court designated Jones an armed career
criminal, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012), and sentenced him to the
statutory minimum 180 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Jones
argues that the district court erred in denying his pre-plea
motion for a continuance and in designating him an armed career
criminal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Jones asserts that the district court violated his due
process rights by denying his motion for a continuance at his
arraignment. “When a defendant pleads guilty, he waives all
nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings conducted prior to
entry of the plea,” aside from a claim that the plea was
invalid. United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 279 (4th
Cir. 2010). Jones, who does not dispute that his plea was
valid, has therefore waived review of this issue.
Jones also argues that his North Carolina breaking and
entering convictions do not qualify as predicate offenses to
support his armed career criminal sentence. This argument is
foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Mungro, 754 F.3d
267, 272 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that North Carolina breaking
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and entering categorically qualifies as burglary under 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
Finally, Jones claims that the district court erred in
failing to state which offenses were ACCA predicates. We reject
this argument because Jones’ counsel expressly noted at
sentencing that Jones “ha[s] three breaking and entering
offenses that alone qualify” as ACCA predicates.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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