UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4071
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES BRIAN CURTIN, a/k/a White Boy Brian, a/k/a B,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge.
(8:14-cr-00467-TDC-1)
Submitted: September 29, 2016 Decided: October 3, 2016
Before SHEDD, KEENAN, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles N. Curlett, Jr., LEVIN & CURLETT LLC, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland; Leah Bressack, Arun G. Rao,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Joseph Ronald Baldwin, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Brian Curtin pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine,
in violation 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012), and possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012). The district court sentenced Curtin to 200 months’
imprisonment, a sentence below his 262- to 327-month advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range. On appeal, counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal.
Curtin was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief but he did not file one. The Government declined to file
a brief.
Because Curtin did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, we review the guilty plea hearing for
plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th
Cir. 2002). “To establish plain error, [Curtin] must show that
an error occurred, that the error was plain, and that the error
affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Muhammad,
478 F.3d 247, 249 (4th Cir. 2007). Even if Curtin satisfies
these requirements, “correction of the error remains within our
discretion, which we should not exercise . . . unless the error
seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation
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of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that
the district court fully complied with Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure in accepting Curtin’s guilty plea,
which Curtin entered knowingly and voluntarily.
Next, we review Curtin’s sentence for procedural and
substantive reasonableness under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). We must first ensure that the district court did not
commit any “significant procedural error,” such as failing to
properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) sentencing factors, or
failing to adequately explain the sentence. Id. If we find the
sentence procedurally reasonable, we then consider its
substantive reasonableness. Id. at 328. We presume on appeal
that a sentence within or below the properly calculated
Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014). Such a presumption
is rebutted only when the defendant shows “that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”
United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2006).
We discern no procedural or substantive sentencing error by
the district court. The district court correctly calculated
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Curtin’s advisory Guidelines range, heard argument from counsel,
provided Curtin an opportunity to allocute, and considered the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. We have reviewed the record and
conclude that Curtin’s below-Guidelines sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this
case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. This
court requires that counsel inform Curtin, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Curtin requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Curtin.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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