J-A17038-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JUAN CARLOS GARCIA
Appellant No. 3050 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 21, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0000448-2014;
CP-46-CR-0008438-2014
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED OCTOBER 03, 2016
Appellant, Juan Carlos Garcia, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, following his
open guilty plea to three counts each of first-degree robbery and conspiracy
to commit robbery.1 We affirm.
The sentencing court stated the relevant facts of this case as follows:
The charges stemmed from [Appellant]’s participation in
armed robberies at three separate restaurants while they
were occupied by employees and/or patrons.
More specifically, [Appellant] admitted for purposes of the
case indexed at [CP-46-CR-0000448-2014 (“No. 448-
2014”)], that, on November 4, 2013, he entered the
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1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3701(A)(1)(ii) and 903(A)(1), respectively.
_____________________________
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Whitpain Tavern in Montgomery County and threatened
eight individuals inside with serious bodily injury, placing
them in fear for their lives while taking or attempting to
take property from them. [Appellant] admitted that he
possessed a BB gun during the robbery, while his co-
conspirator, Tyrice Griffin, possessed a firearm. He also
admitted that he conspired with Griffin to commit the
robbery.
[Appellant] admitted in the case indexed at [CP-46-CR-
0008438-2014] (“No. 8438-2014”)] that he and Griffin
conspired to and did commit robberies at the Belvedere
Inn in Lancaster County and Arooga’s Tavern in
Cumberland County by placing the individuals inside in fear
for their lives.³ [Appellant] again possessed a BB gun and
Griffin had a firearm during both of the robberies.
³ The Belvedere Inn and Arooga’s Tavern robberies
occurred on or about October 8 and October 12,
2013, respectively. [Appellant] admitted that three
individuals were inside the Belvedere Tavern and 10
individuals were inside Arooga’s Tavern.
(Sentencing Court Opinion, filed on December 1, 2015, at 1-2) (most
footnotes and citations to record omitted). The BB gun Appellant wielded
during the robberies was black and appeared to be a real gun. Appellant
pointed the BB gun at victims of the robberies.
Procedurally, on January 12, 2015, Appellant entered an open guilty
plea to one count each of first-degree robbery and conspiracy to commit
robbery at No. 448-2014 and two counts each of first-degree robbery and
conspiracy to commit robbery at No. 8438-2014. As a condition of the plea,
Appellant agreed to testify truthfully against his co-defendant. In exchange
for Appellant’s plea, the Commonwealth agreed to have hundreds of
remaining charges nolle prossed.
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With the benefit of a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report, the
court conducted Appellant’s sentencing hearing on August 21, 2015. At the
conclusion of the hearing, the court sentenced Appellant to consecutive
terms of ten (10) to twenty (20) years’ imprisonment for first-degree
robbery and ten (10) to twenty (20) years’ imprisonment for first-degree
conspiracy at No. 448-2014. At No. 8438-214, the court imposed terms of
ten (10) to twenty (20) years’ imprisonment each for one of the two first-
degree robbery and conspiracy charges, respectively, to run concurrent with
the sentence at No. 448-2014. The court also imposed consecutive terms of
ten (10) years’ probation each for the remaining first-degree robbery and
conspiracy charges at No. 8438-2014. In total, the court sentenced
Appellant to twenty (20) to forty (40) years’ imprisonment plus (20) years’
probation.
On August 26, 2015, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion,
which asked the court to reconsider and modify the sentence because the
sentence exceeded the sentencing guidelines and was unduly harsh and
excessive under the circumstances. The court denied the motion on
September 15, 2015. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on October 8,
2015. On October 13, 2015, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b);
and Appellant timely complied on October 28, 2015.
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
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DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR [AND/OR] ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN IMPOSING AN UNREASONABLE SENTENCE
THAT FELL OUTSIDE THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES?
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND/OR ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN FAILING TO CONSIDER ALL OF THE
SENTENCING FACTORS ENUMERATED IN 42 PA.C.S.[A.] §
9721(B)?
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
In his issues combined, Appellant contends his sentence is
unreasonable in light of the sentencing guidelines. Specifically, Appellant
submits the sentence of ten to twenty years the court imposed for each of
two robbery charges is nearly double the aggravated sentencing guideline
range; and the sentence of ten to twenty years for the two conspiracy
charges is more than double the aggravated sentencing guideline range.
Although these individual sentences are “arguably reasonable,” Appellant
maintains the aggregate sentence is unreasonable because the court
imposed consecutive excessive incarceration terms.
Appellant also avers the sentencing court failed to consider mitigating
factors under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b), such as the circumstances of
Appellant’s childhood, his age at the time of the offenses, and his
rehabilitative needs. Appellant asserts the court focused almost exclusively
on the gravity of the offenses. Appellant concludes the court abused its
discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive and unreasonable sentence.
Appellant’s challenge is to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793 A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 2002) (stating claim
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that sentence is manifestly excessive challenges discretionary aspects of
sentencing). See also Commonwealth v. Dodge, 77 A.3d 1263, 1268
(Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 625 Pa. 648, 91 A.3d 161 (2014) (stating
argument that court disregarded factors, such as rehabilitation and nature
and circumstances of offenses, implicates discretionary aspects of
sentencing).2
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an
appellant to an appeal as of right. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d
910 (Pa.Super. 2000). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary
sentencing issue:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether
appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
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2
“[W]hile a guilty plea which includes sentence negotiation ordinarily
precludes a defendant from contesting the validity of his…sentence other
than to argue that the sentence is illegal or that the sentencing court did not
have jurisdiction, open plea agreements are an exception in which a
defendant will not be precluded from appealing the discretionary aspects of
the sentence.” Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 n.5
(Pa.Super. 2005) (emphasis in original). “An ‘open’ plea agreement is one
in which there is no negotiated sentence.” Id. at 363 n.1. Here, Appellant’s
plea was “open” as to sentencing, so he can challenge the discretionary
aspects of his sentence.
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Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (internal citations omitted).
Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if
they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or raised in a motion to modify
the sentence imposed at that hearing. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d
788 (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 759, 831 A.2d 599 (2003).
When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant
must invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a
separate concise statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the
appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing Code.
Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f). “The requirement that an appellant separately set forth the
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal ‘furthers the purpose evident in
the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any challenges to the trial court’s
evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging on the sentencing decision
to exceptional cases.’” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 103, 112
(Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 174 L.Ed.2d
240 (2009) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 562 A.2d 1385, 1387
(Pa.Super. 1989) (en banc) (emphasis in original)).
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830
A.2d 1013 (Pa.Super. 2003). A substantial question exists “only when the
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appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions
were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing
Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the
sentencing process.” Sierra, supra at 912-13 (quoting Commonwealth v.
Brown, 741 A.2d 726, 735 (Pa.Super. 1999) (en banc), appeal denied, 567
Pa. 755, 790 A.2d 1013 (2001)).
A claim that a sentence is manifestly excessive might raise a
substantial question if the appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently
articulates the manner in which the sentence imposed violates a specific
provision of the Sentencing Code or the norms underlying the sentencing
process. Mouzon, supra at 435, 812 A.2d at 627. Nevertheless, as a
general rule, “[a]n allegation that a sentencing court ‘failed to consider’ or
‘did not adequately consider’ certain factors does not raise a substantial
question that the sentence was inappropriate.” Commonwealth v. Cruz-
Centeno, 668 A.2d 536, 545 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 544 Pa. 653,
676 A.2d 1195 (1996) (quoting Commonwealth v. Urrutia, 653 A.2d 706,
710 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied, 541 Pa. 625, 661 A.2d 873 (1995)).
See also Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 335-36 (Pa.Super. 2010),
appeal denied, 612 Pa. 689, 29 A.3d 796 (2011) (stating claim that
sentencing court failed to consider factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9721(b)
does not raise substantial question). But see Commonwealth v. Felmlee,
828 A.2d 1105, 1107 (Pa.Super. 2003) (en banc) (stating substantial
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question exists where appellant alleges sentencing court imposed sentence
in aggravated range without adequately considering mitigating
circumstances). Where the sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI,
however, the law presumes the court was aware of and weighed relevant
information regarding a defendant’s character along with mitigating
statutory factors. Tirado, supra at 366 n.6.
“[U]nder the Sentencing Code an appellate court is to exercise its
judgment in reviewing a sentence outside the sentencing guidelines to
assess whether the sentencing court imposed a sentence that is
‘unreasonable.’” Commonwealth v. Walls, 592 Pa. 557, 568, 926 A.2d
957, 963 (2007). In making this “unreasonableness” inquiry, this Court
must consider four factors:
§ 9781. Appellate review of sentence
* * *
(d) Review of record.—In reviewing the record the
appellate court shall have regard for:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant.
(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to
observe the defendant, including any presentence
investigation.
(3) The findings upon which the sentence was
based.
(4) The guidelines promulgated by the
commission.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d)(1)-(4). The Walls Court explained, “the concept of
unreasonableness” is “inherently a circumstance-dependent concept that is
flexible in understanding and lacking precise definition.” Id. at 568, 926
A.2d at 963.
Thus, given its nature, we decline to fashion any concrete
rules as to the unreasonableness inquiry for a sentence
that falls outside of applicable guidelines under Section
9781…. We are of the view, however, that the Legislature
intended that considerations found in Section 9721 inform
appellate review for unreasonableness. That is, while a
sentence may be found to be unreasonable after review of
Section 9781(d)’s four statutory factors, in addition a
sentence may also be unreasonable if the appellate court
finds that the sentence was imposed without express or
implicit consideration by the sentencing court of the
general standards applicable to sentencing found in
Section 9721…. Moreover, even though the
unreasonableness inquiry lacks precise boundaries,
we are confident that rejection of a sentencing
court’s imposition of sentence on unreasonableness
grounds would occur infrequently, whether the
sentence is above or below the guideline ranges,
especially when the unreasonableness inquiry is
conducted using the proper standard of review.
Id. at 568-69, 926 A.2d at 964 (emphasis added). Whether the offense is
violent or nonviolent and the degree of financial loss that resulted from the
offense both inform the reasonableness of the sentence. Dodge, supra at
1275 (recognizing imposition of effective life sentence for nonviolent
offenses with limited financial impact was unreasonable).
Moreover, a generic challenge to the imposition of consecutive
sentences does not raise a substantial question:
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Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721, the court has discretion
to impose sentences consecutively or concurrently
and, ordinarily, a challenge to this exercise of
discretion does not raise a substantial question.
Commonwealth v. Pass, 914 A.2d 442, 446-47
(Pa. Super. 2006). The imposition of consecutive,
rather than concurrent, sentences may raise a
substantial question in only the most extreme
circumstances, such as where the aggregate
sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of
the crimes and the length of imprisonment. Id.
(holding challenge to court’s imposition of sentence
of six (6) to twenty-three (23) months[’]
imprisonment and sentence of one (1) year
probation running consecutive, did not present
substantial question).
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171-72 (Pa.Super. 2010).
Preliminarily, we observe Appellant did not raise in his post-sentence
motion and Rule 1925(b) statement several of the arguments he now raises
on appeal. Specifically, Appellant failed to raise, in his post-sentence motion
and Rule 1925(b) statement, his claim that the aggregate sentence is
excessive and harsh because the court imposed consecutive
sentences. In his post-sentence motion, Appellant also did not claim the
court failed to consider all the factors in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Thus,
Appellant waived these challenges to his sentence for purposes of our
review; and we will not consider them. See Mann, supra; Evans, supra.
Moreover, the sentencing court reasoned as follows:
[T]he aggregate sentences are not excessive. This court
considered [Appellant’s] age, along with a number of other
factors, and balanced his rehabilitative needs against the
seriousness of his offenses and the protection of the
public. Indeed, this court could have chosen to run all of
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the sentences consecutively, but exercised its discretion
otherwise. [Appellant], therefore, cannot demonstrate
that his sentence is excessive under the circumstances.
Even had [Appellant] raised a substantial question
regarding his sentence, he is not entitled to relief. This
court amply set forth on the record the bases for the
sentence imposed. In particular, this court stated:
…I was the [judge at the Griffin trial] and I will note
for the record that [Appellant] did in fact cooperate
and according to the District Attorney [Appellant]
cooperated fully, and my understanding is
[Appellant’s] cooperation was very helpful in the
prosecution of [his] co-defendant. So I will take that
under consideration on sentencing here.
Being the [t]rial [j]udge, I had an opportunity of
seeing [Appellant] in action, not only testifying, but
also on the videotapes of these…robberies. And all I
can say is [Appellant is] a real pro…at robbing
people. [Appellant] might have had a tough
upbringing. It’s a consideration, but albeit a minor
one because at this point in [Appellant’s] life prior to
these robberies [Appellant] ha[s] already been in the
state prison system. [Appellant] ha[s] been arrested
before for conspiracy, criminal trespass, where [he]
did time. [Appellant] w[as] convicted of robbery
back in 2012. That previous one was in 2012 as
well. [Appellant] did time. Access device fraud.
And before I continue with [Appellant’s] adult record,
December 2010 as a juvenile [Appellant] w[as]
adjudicated or it says pled guilty to robbery and
criminal conspiracy, and possession of an offensive
weapon. The first one was in 2010. The possession
of offensive weapon was 2011.
[Appellant] violated the [D]rug [A]ct back in 2013.
[Appellant] went to jail for that. And that brought us
up to where we are today. So I could see where
[Appellant] got [his] practice from, watching
[Appellant] on the videotape was frightening.
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I don’t know how this brings closure to the victims in
this case. Can you imagine you are in a restaurant
and you are getting a drink and the next thing you
know you are being herded up and told to get on
your knees, and they are pointing a gun to the back
of someone’s head, these people. I saw their faces.
I don’t see how that brings closure. I can’t imagine
how [Appellant] ha[s] ruined and the extent
[Appellant] ha[s] ruined these people’s lives.
* * *
[W]hen I was reading over [Appellant’s] file this
week in preparation for today, I looked at the PSI. I
considered the information there and the guidelines,
the fact that what I saw [Appellant] do on videotape,
looking at the victims in this case, and I had an idea
of where this was going [to go]. I thought about
sending [Appellant] something like 40 years in jail.
That’s what I was thinking about. Based upon
[Appellant’s] record, the violence and the damage
that’s occurred in this case, it didn’t bother me at all
thinking in those terms. …
What [Appellant] had to say didn’t move me at all.
What [Appellant] did have to say in the courtroom
was important to me, though, and…I will give
[Appellant] credit for…testif[ying] against someone
who is even nastier than [Appellant is].
* * *
[I]n this case, both cases, for 8438 of 2014 and 448
of 2014, I have considered [Appellant’s] age, the
information that [Appellant] presented about
[him]self today, and the information in [Appellant’s
PSI], as well as the evidence of the circumstances of
the offense[s]. The facts as to [Appellant’s] personal
background and circumstances [are] not in dispute.
After considering these factors, the [c]ourt finds
there is an undue risk that during the period of
probation or partial confinement [Appellant] will
commit another crime. A lesser sentence would
depreciate the seriousness of [Appellant’s] crime and
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I therefore find that a sentence of total confinement
is proper.
I think this falls…beyond the aggravated range that
we found in the guidelines….
* * *
So [Appellant is] looking at 20 to 40 years. I have
to balance what’s best for society and [Appellant’s]
rehabilitative needs, and what [Appellant] has
demonstrated from [his] sordid prior history, the
violence involved in this case, the use of a gun,
whether or not it was a BB gun, the victims didn’t
know that. They had no idea what was sticking in
the back of their head except a gun.
(N.T. [Sentencing Hearing], 8/21/15, pp. 9-13, 15-16).
(Sentencing Court Opinion, filed on December 1, 2015, at 4-7) (some
brackets in original). The record supports the sentencing court’s reasoning.3
Thus, even if Appellant had properly preserved all of his claims, and the
claims had raised substantial questions, we would rely on the court’s
analysis and deny relief. Based upon the foregoing, we conclude Appellant’s
sentences should remain undisturbed. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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3
We note Appellant’s sentence does not violate 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 906, where
each conspiracy count culminated in a discrete robbery. See
Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 614 Pa. 664, 666, 39 A.3d 977 (2012).
Additionally, our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v.
Kingston, ___ Pa. ___, ___ A.3d ___, (August 15, 2016) does not affect
Appellant’s sentence because his sentence pertains to multiple counts of the
same inchoate crime, i.e., conspiracy to commit robbery.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/3/2016
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