UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-6434
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PAULETTE MARTIN, a/k/a Paulette Murphy, a/k/a Paulette
Akuffo, a/k/a Paula Murphy, a/k/a Auntie,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:04-cr-00235-RWT-1)
Submitted: September 15, 2016 Decided: October 4, 2016
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit
Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Baltimore, Maryland; Sapna
Mirchandani, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. Debra Lynn Dwyer, Assistant United
States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Paulette Martin appeals the district court’s order denying
her 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) motion seeking a sentence reduction
under Amendment 782. The parties dispute Martin’s eligibility
for a sentence reduction and whether such a reduction is
warranted in light of the § 3553(a) factors and Martin’s
postsentencing conduct. In denying the motion, the court simply
checked the “DENIED” box on the form order, offering no reason
for the denial. Martin contends that the court procedurally
erred in failing to identify a reason for denying her sentence
reduction motion. Under the unique circumstances of this case,
we agree.
“We review a district court’s grant or denial of a
§ 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion. But the question
of whether a court ruling on a § 3582(c)(2) motion must provide
an individualized explanation is one of law that we consider de
novo.” United States v. Smalls, 720 F.3d 193, 195 (4th Cir.
2013) (citation omitted). In deciding whether to grant a motion
for a sentence reduction, the court must first determine whether
the defendant is eligible for the reduction, consistent with
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.10 and then “consider
whether the authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole
or in part, according to the factors set forth in § 3553(a),”
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 826 (2010), “to the
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extent that they are applicable,” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The
court may also consider “post-sentencing conduct of the
defendant that occurred after imposition of the term of
imprisonment” in determining whether, and to what extent, a
sentence reduction is warranted. USSG § 1B1.10 cmt.
n.1(B)(iii).
Martin argues that it is impossible to determine whether
the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion
for a sentence reduction because it provided no reason for the
denial. We have held that, absent a contrary indication, it is
presumed that the district court has considered the § 3553(a)
factors and other “issues that have been fully presented for
determination.” United States v. Legree, 205 F.3d 724, 728-29
(4th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover,
“in the absence of evidence a court neglected to consider
relevant factors, the court does not err in failing to provide a
full explanation for its § 3582(c)(2) decision.” Smalls, 720
F.3d at 196. However, the sole issue in Legree and Smalls was
not the defendant’s eligibility for the reduction but whether
the district court abused its discretion in assessing the
§ 3553(a) factors and the defendant’s postsentencing conduct.
Martin’s case is of an entirely different species. Here,
we cannot determine in the first instance whether the court
concluded that Martin was ineligible for a sentence reduction
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or, alternatively, whether the court decided that such a
reduction was unwarranted in light of the § 3553(a) factors and
Martin’s postsentencing conduct. Because the parties presented
fully developed, nonfrivolous arguments as to both steps of the
sentence reduction inquiry, we can only speculate as to the
basis for the district court’s decision.
Ultimately, the district court’s sparse order leaves us
unable to assess whether the court abused its discretion in
denying Martin’s motion. While we take no position as to
whether Martin can or should receive a sentence reduction under
Amendment 782, we vacate the district court’s order and remand
for further consideration consistent with this opinion. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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