MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Oct 05 2016, 9:19 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT I.A. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Gregory F. Zoeller
Special Asst. to the State Public Attorney General of Indiana
Defender
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Robert J. Henke
Brooklyn, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT D.A.
Mark Small
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Involuntary October 5, 2016
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of D.D.A. and 11A01-1604-JT-877
N.A. (Minor Children) Appeal from the Clay Circuit
and Court
The Honorable Joseph D. Trout,
I.A. (Mother) and D.A. (Father), Judge
Trial Court Cause Nos.
Appellants-Respondents, 11C01-1510-JT-190, -191
v.
The Indiana Department of
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Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] I.A. (“Mother”) and D.A. (“Father”) (collectively “the Parents”) each appeal
the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating their parental relationship with
their minor children D.D.A. and N.A. (collectively “the Children”). We
affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] The facts as found by the trial court during the termination of parental rights
hearings held on January 12 and February 9, 2016, follow: 1
1. The child D.D.A was born on December 17, 2011.
2. The child N.A. was born on February 6, 2014.
1
The trial court refers to the parties by their full names. We use “Mother,” “Father,” and each child’s initials
where appropriate. At times, the trial court uses “DCS” in reference to the Indiana Department of Child
Services. We will do so as well.
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3. Both children’s biological mother is Mother.
4. Both children’s biological father is Father.
5. The [C]hildren were found to be Children in Need of Services
[(“CHINS”)] by the Clay Circuit Court in Cause numbers
11C01-1402-JC-00019 (D.D.A.) & 11C01-1402-JC-00020 (N.A.)
on or about April 15, 2014.
6. A dispositional decree was entered in the afore-mentioned
CHINS matters on or about May 20, 2014.
7. The [C]hildren were removed from their parents’ home on
February 12, 2014 and CHINS Petitions were filed on February
14, 2014.
8. The [C]hildren have not been returned to their parents[’] care
since February 12, 2014.
9. The conditions of the family’s home were deplorable and unfit
for human habitation.
10. There were a dozen animals in the home, and one dead dog.
11. There was dog feces on the floor of the home.
12. There were piles of trash in the home, dirty diapers, dirty
clothes and general severe unhygienic conditions.
13. The house itself was in disrepair, including broken windows,
holes in the floor and gaps around the door.
14. There was no running water in the home, and an insufficient
heat source.
15. DCS put services in place to assist [P]arents with home
conditions, maintaining cleanliness and parenting skills.
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16. Parents made some improvements to the house, but never
made sufficient improvements on their own, to make the home
sufficiently safe and clean to allow the [C]hildren to return.
17. For a short time, a family member moved into the home and
made significant improvements to the home conditions.
However, after a short stay, [P]arents evicted said person, and the
home conditions returned to deplorable, unlivable condition.
18. These parents have more concerns than just maintaining safe
and suitable housing. They both have emotional or mental
health concerns. They both have no desire to pursue a suitable
income and instead survive on a few hundred dollars a month in
SSI. They even have a lack of priority when it comes to how to
spend the little money they have and often face dire
circumstances in regard to necessary utilities for the home.
19. They developed a deep dislike and anger for one another
which has stifled any possibility of them working together to
parent these children. The [P]arents split up in early April, 2015
with Father filing for divorce on April 14, 2015. They [sic] court
takes notice of Cause Number 11C01-1504-DR-00240 in that I
was the presiding judge for that divorce case which was finalized
on June 26, 2015. Father was awarded the marital residence in
the divorce but abandoned it and both parties moved to different
residences with Father moving in with his girlfriend.
20. Prior to and especially after his divorce, Father has been
incarcerated on criminal offenses and probation violations and
has tested positive for methamphetamine.
21. Mother … moved to a residence on Knight Street then she
moved to Vandalia Street, and then approximately January of
2016, moved back to Knight Street. Despite extensive services
provided to Mother, she has not been able to obtain a home and
keep it clean and stable. In regard to homemaking and parenting
skills, the service providers testified that these parents simply do
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not retain any training. They may make progress for a short
period of time but then go right back to their prior shortcomings
in providing a suitable, clean home for children with appropriate
emphasis on safety and supervision.
22. Since the split up with Father, Mother has never lived in one
place for more than a few months at a time and in each residence
she lives in, the conditions eventually become too unfit to allow
children to reside in. She has no written lease at her current
residence and can be evicted at any time and has been evicted
from this same home once before.
23. Mother also has anger control problems that she has never
been able to adequately address. DCS put psychological
assistance in place for her to help her address her anger, but she
has not benefitted from said assistance or substantially reduced
her anger-control problem. She has been at times non-compliant
in regard to her medications and in fact, sold her Adderall.
Mother has been diagnosed with ADHD, major depressive
disorder, bi-polar disorder, borderline personality disorder and
mild mental handicap.
24. Mother did present evidence at the trial that her home was
clean for the snapshots in question, however, the Court is more
convinced of the prior facts in that once again, she has never
been able to maintain her homemaking skills for very long and
ultimately the home becomes unfit to live in.
25. According to the evidence, Father was in jail for a few weeks
after April 2014; he was in jail from August to November of
2014; once again he was in jail from August of 2015 and was
incarcerated at the time of the trial. These criminal activities
which have led to his incarceration has severely hampered his
ability to improve his general parenting skills, his homemaking
skills, finding employment or suitable income, participating in
treatment and services, and fulfilling his obligation as a parent.
Although Father, when available, did visit with the [C]hildren,
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he missed many visits because of incarceration.
26. Father’s relationship after his split with Mother has been a
disaster resulting in positive methamphetamine tests,
incarceration, and an inability to meet goals for reunification
with his children.
27. Both parents have a lack of education, are low functioning,
and have an inability to understand and comprehend information
and maintain it.
28. In regard to visitations, the visitation supervisor expressed
concerns in regard to Mother, in regard to any real evidence to
bonding by her with the [C]hildren. While Father was scheduled
to be released soon after the termination trial, his history proves
he’s highly unlikely to remain free for long. He has 11 criminal
convictions, including six felony convictions. He has been on
probation multiple times and has violated probation multiple
times. Further there is no evidence he has seriously addressed his
methamphetamine problem.
29. Both parents have failed to benefit from the services DCS put
in place and has [sic] not improved their parenting abilities,
income producing abilities, or abilities to maintain any safe and
stable housing. This Court sees no clear path that these parents
will achieve safe, stable housing at any time in the future.
30. The Court Appointed Special Advocate recommends
termination of parental rights based on the evidence presented at
the trial as well as the evidence in the underlying CHINS
matters.
31. The Children’s well-being would be seriously and
permanently threatened if they were to be returned to their
parents whether immediately or at any time in the future.
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Mother’s App. at 73-76.
[3] Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that: (1) there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s
removal from and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied
by either Mother or Father; (2) there is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship between the Children and both
Mother and Father poses a threat to the well-being of the Children; (3)
termination of the parent-child relationship between both parents and the
Children is in the Children’s best interests; and (4) DCS has a satisfactory plan
for the care and treatment of the Children, which is adoption. Accordingly, the
trial court determined that DCS had proven the allegations of the petitions to
terminate parental rights by clear and convincing evidence and therefore
terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Each parent appeals.
Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
[4] “The purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish the parents but,
instead, to protect their children. Thus, although parental rights are of a
constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights
when the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental
responsibilities.” In re A.P., 882 N.E.2d 799, 805 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citation
omitted). “[T]ermination is intended as a last resort, available only when all
other reasonable efforts have failed.” Id. A petition for the involuntary
termination of parental rights must allege in pertinent part:
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(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement
outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child.
…
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS must prove “each and every element” by
clear and convincing evidence. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Ind. 2009);
Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. If the trial court finds that the allegations in a petition
are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-
35-2-8(a).
[5] “We have long had a highly deferential standard of review in cases involving
the termination of parental rights.” C.A. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d
85, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
We neither reweigh evidence nor assess witness credibility. We
consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences favorable to
the trial court’s judgment. Where the trial court enters findings
of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard
of review: we first determine whether the evidence supports the
findings and then determine whether the findings support the
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judgment. In deference to the trial court’s unique position to
assess the evidence, we will set aside a judgment terminating a
parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.
Id. at 92-93 (citations omitted). “A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings
do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not support
the judgment.” In re R.J., 829 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
[6] Mother and Father filed separate briefs on appeal raising different issues.
Father alleges that his due process rights were violated because DCS allegedly
failed to give him adequate notice of the reasons for termination. Because he
did not raise this due process claim to the trial court, he attempts to avoid
waiver of his argument on appeal by asserting that fundamental error occurred.
Mother asserts that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusions
that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the
Children’s removal from and placement outside the home will not be remedied
or that continuation of the parent-child relationship between Mother and the
Children poses a threat to the Children’s well-being. Mother also challenges the
trial court’s conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in the
Children’s best interests. We will address these arguments in turn.
Section 1 – Father has not established that fundamental error
occurred.
[7] Father alleges that his due process rights were violated because the termination
petitions filed by DCS failed to give him adequate notice of the reasons for
termination. Father concedes that he failed to bring this issue to the trial court’s
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attention at any time prior to or during the termination hearing, so to avoid
waiver of his argument on appeal, he maintains that DCS’s alleged failure
constituted fundamental error. The fundamental error doctrine is a narrow
exception to the waiver doctrine and applies to an “error that was so egregious
and abhorrent to fundamental due process that the trial judge should or should
not have acted, irrespective of the parties’ failure to object or otherwise preserve
the error for appeal.” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1167 n.8 (Ind. 2014). For an
appellate court to overturn a trial court ruling based on fundamental error, the
error must have been “a clearly blatant violation of basic and elementary
principles, and the harm or potential for harm therefrom must be substantial
and appear clearly and prospectively.” S.M. v. Elkhart Cnty. Office of Family &
Children, 706 N.E.2d 596, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted).
[8] It is well settled that when the State seeks to terminate the parent-child
relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due
process. J.T. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children. 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264
(Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied (2001). “Due process has never been defined,
but the phrase embodies a requirement of ‘fundamental fairness.’ ” In re C.G.,
954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated, “the
fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 333 (1976). “The process due in a termination of parental rights proceeding
turns on the balancing of three factors: (1) the private interests affected by the
proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure; and (3)
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the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged
procedure.” C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917. Because both a parent’s and the State’s
countervailing interests are substantial, when faced with a claim of denial of
due process in a termination of parental rights, we focus on the second factor,
the risk of error created by the State’s chosen procedure in the case. Id. at 918.
[9] Father asserts that the termination petitions filed by DCS here merely tracked
the statutory language of Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) regarding the
requirements for termination of parental rights. He argues that the trial court,
sua sponte, should have required DCS to amend the termination petitions to
state the specific reasons that DCS was seeking termination of his parental
rights. First, Father cites no authority, and we are unaware of any, that
requires a termination petition to be drafted with the specificity that Father
desires in order to comply with due process. Moreover, we conclude that the
risk of error created by DCS’s chosen procedure here was slight. Father admits
that he was on notice of the reasons for the Children’s initial removal from the
home and their adjudications as CHINS, and we disagree with his assertion
that “the reasons for the [C]hildren’s removal were quite different from the
reasons for their remaining outside the home” and therefore he was never put
on notice of these new reasons for which DCS was seeking termination.
Father’s Br. at 12.
As we will discuss more fully below, the reasons for the Children’s removal and
their adjudication as CHINS was due to the Parents’ inability to provide a safe
and stable home as evidenced by the deplorable conditions of the home.
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Although additional underlying issues came to light following the initial
removal and CHINS adjudication, the same overriding parenting inadequacies
resulted in the Children’s continued placement outside the home and the
subsequent filing of the termination petition, namely the Parents’ lack of
parenting skills and their inability to provide a safe and stable environment
within which to raise the Children. Father was properly on notice of the
reasons for the Children’s removal and their continued placement outside the
home, and it is evident that he was given the opportunity to be heard on these
issues at the termination hearing. Therefore, he has not established that the
lack of specificity of the termination petitions filed by DCS created a risk of
error or that the harm or potential for harm was substantial. In other words,
Father has demonstrated neither a due process violation, nor that fundamental
error occurred. 2
Section 2 – The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion
that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the Children’s removal from and continued
placement outside the home will not be remedied.
[10] Mother asserts that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion
that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the
children’s removal from and continued placement outside the home will not be
2
While Father briefly states that he has “made considerable progress” since the Children’s removal from the
home and that his current incarceration alone “is not sufficient to support termination of [parental rights],”
Father’s Br. at 13, he makes no claim that DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence on any
statutory element or that the trial court’s judgment terminating his parental rights is clearly erroneous.
Therefore, we do not address the evidence supporting the termination of Father’s parental rights.
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remedied. In determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that led to a child’s removal and continued placement outside the
home would not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. K.T.K. v. Ind.
Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). First, “we must
ascertain what conditions led to their placement and retention in foster care.”
Id. Second, “we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those
conditions will not be remedied.’” Id. (citing In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1132, 1134
(Ind. 2010) (citing In re A.A.C., 682 N.E.2d 542, 544 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997))). In
the second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness at the time of the
termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed
conditions, and balancing a parent’s recent improvements against “‘habitual
pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of
future neglect or deprivation.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014)
(quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “We entrust that delicate balance to the
trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior history more heavily
than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. Although trial courts
are required to give due regard to changed conditions, this does not preclude
them from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of their
future behavior. Id.
[11] The Children were initially removed from Mother’s care due to the deplorable
conditions of the home. The home was filled with piles of trash, dozens of
animals, and the carcass of a dog, and the home was littered with dirty diapers,
dirty clothes, and dog feces. The home was in terrible disrepair with broken
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windows, holes in the floors, gaps around doors, no running water, and an
insufficient heat source. Following the initial removal of the Children, DCS
became aware of Mother’s anger management issues as well as her complex
mental health and low cognitive functioning issues. Mother has been
diagnosed with ADHD, major depressive disorder, and bipolar disorder. The
record shows that since removal, Mother has been inconsistent with taking
prescribed medications to address her mental health issues, and has even sold
her medications. During the pendency of this matter, Mother visited
inconsistently with the Children and often displayed agitation and
inappropriate parenting during visits. Service providers also noted that Mother
has demonstrated and continues to demonstrate a lack of bonding with the
Children.
[12] The biggest issue that service providers attempted to address was Mother’s
inability to appropriately care for herself and for the Children. Mother has
shown a lack of significant progress in this area, as the overwhelming consensus
of service providers is that Mother is seemingly unwilling or unable to retain
and implement newly learned hygiene, homemaking, and parenting skills.
Based upon this evidence, the trial court concluded that there is a reasonable
probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal from and
continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.
[13] Mother ignores the lion’s share of the evidence and focuses solely on her
housing at the time of the termination hearing, maintaining that she had
obtained housing that was safe and stable. Specifically, Mother argues that she
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presented evidence to the trial court to show that the home that she resided in at
the time of the termination hearing was clean and suitable for the Children.
Mother’s argument misses the mark.
[14] The record indicates that during the two years after the Children were removed
from her care, Mother changed residences numerous times, essentially from one
unfit home to another. Service providers testified that while Mother would
improve her living conditions for very brief periods of time with the help of
others, due to her complete lack of homemaking skills, deplorable conditions
would quickly return. Her claimed “safe and suitable” housing arrangement at
the time of termination had been in place for a mere few weeks, and she
admittedly had been evicted from that same residence once before. The trial
court determined that Mother’s habitual pattern of conduct regarding her
inability to provide safety and stability for the Children was far more indicative
of her future behavior than her recent minimal progress. This was the trial
court’s prerogative, and we will not second-guess that determination. We
conclude that the evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that there is a
reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children’s
removal from the home and continued placement outside of Mother’s care will
not be remedied. 3
3
Mother also contends that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that there is a
reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of
the Children. However, we need not address that argument. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is
written such that, to properly effectuate the termination of parental rights, the trial court need only find that
one of the three requirements of subpart (b)(2)(B) has been established by clear and convincing evidence.
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Section 3 – The evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion
that termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the
Children’s best interests.
[15] Finally, we address Mother’s assertion that the evidence does not support the
trial court’s conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in the
Children’s best interests. In determining the best interests of a child, the trial
court must look beyond the factors identified by DCS and consider the totality
of the evidence. In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “In doing
so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the
child.” Id. Children have a paramount need for permanency, which our
supreme court has deemed a central consideration in determining a child's best
interests. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 647-48. As noted earlier, courts need not wait until
a child is harmed irreversibly before terminating the parent-child relationship.
Id. The recommendations of the case manager and the court-appointed special
advocate, in addition to evidence that there is a reasonable probability of non-
remedied conditions, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that
termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests. J.S., 906 N.E.2d at
236.
A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. Therefore, as we
have already determined that sufficient evidence supports the conclusion that the conditions that resulted in
the removal of the Children will not be remedied, we need not address any argument as to whether sufficient
evidence supports the conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the
well-being of the Children.
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[16] Here, Court-Appointed Special Advocate Shannon Wilmore opined that
termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests
based upon the evidence underlying the CHINS adjudications as well as the
evidence presented at the termination hearing. She noted that although
Mother had made some progress to improve her ability to provide a safe and
stable home for the Children, such progress was very minimal. Wilmore
described Mother’s progress as “couple steps forward, few steps back.” Tr. at
299. She observed that Mother appeared to be unable to retain or implement
parenting skills that she had been taught. Wilmore stated that, based upon the
evidence, she did not believe that Mother “could ever safely parent” the
Children. Id. Wilmore also noted Mother’s anger issues and refusal to
consistently take her needed medications. Wilmore emphasized the substantial
amount of time that the Children had been in foster care while waiting for
Mother to demonstrate an ability to safely and adequately provide for them, but
that Mother had failed to demonstrate that ability, and the Children’s need for
stability at this point was paramount.
[17] Similarly, Family Case Manager Diana Thompson opined that termination of
Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. She described
Mother’s continued unsafe and unstable housing situation as well as Mother’s
significant problems with anger management and with accepting services. At
the time of the termination hearing, Thompson believed that Mother had not
made sufficient improvements in her ability to safely parent the Children and
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that Mother’s lack of significant progress was due to Mother’s belief that there
was nothing “we could teach her that she felt was of value.” Tr. at 72.
[18] Mother does not challenge the evidence supporting these opinions, but claims
instead that DCS did not offer evidence to show that the Children had been
harmed by their relationship with Mother, or how the Children’s circumstances
had greatly improved since their removal from Mother’s care. Although she
concedes that the record indicates that the Children have been doing quite well
in foster care, she maintains that DCS “failed to show that the [C]hildren would
not be doing just as well developmentally if they had remained in [her] care.”
Mother’s Br. at 21.
[19] We remind Mother that the trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly
harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Moreover, DCS is
under no obligation to prove, and the trial court is under no obligation to
conclude, that the Children would not be doing well developmentally had they
remained in Mother’s care. Rather, as stated above, the trial court considers the
totality of the evidence to determine if it is no longer in the child’s best interests
to maintain the parent-child relationship. Here, there is ample evidence in the
record, when considered in its totality, which supports the trial court’s
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conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights in in the best interests of
the Children. 4
[20] In sum, we will reverse a termination of parental rights only upon a showing of
clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. C.A., 15 N.E.3d at 92-93. Based on the record before
us, we cannot say that the trial court’s termination of both Mother’s and
Father’s parental rights to the Children was clearly erroneous. We therefore
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
[21] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and May, J., concur.
4
Mother challenges the trial court’s finding number 18, in which the court noted that Mother lives off SSI
and has “no desire to pursue a suitable income” with which to support the children. Mother’s Br. at 15-16.
Mother argues that the parental participation order required her to secure and maintain a legal and stable
source of income which could include public assistance. See State’s Ex. 8. She asserts that the trial court
appears to be punishing her for being legally disabled and unable to work. However, our review of the
challenged finding reveals that the trial court was taking issue with Mother’s “lack of priority when it comes
to how to spend the little money” she has, rather than her unemployment status and receipt of SSI. Mother’s
App. at 31. Further, even assuming that the trial court’s finding is erroneous, any such error was harmless
and does not call into question the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental
rights was in the Children’s best interests. See Matter of A.C.B., 598 N.E.2d 570, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)
(affirming termination of parental rights despite erroneous findings because error was “not of such magnitude
that it calls into question the court’s conclusion” that termination was in child’s best interests).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 11A01-1604-JT-877| October 5, 2016 Page 19 of 19