MEMORANDUM DECISION FILED
Oct 05 2016, 8:33 am
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
precedent or cited before any court except for the Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ruth A. Johnson Gregory F. Zoeller
Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Lyubov Gore
Deputy Attorney General
Timothy J. Burns
Indianapolis, Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Christina D. Pace
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Devell L. Coleman, October 5, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1601-CR-183
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court.
The Honorable Allan Reid,
State of Indiana, Commissioner.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Cause No. 49G10-1507-CM-023468
Shepard, Senior Judge
[1] A security guard for an apartment complex called the police and reported that
Devell Coleman was trespassing on the property. Coleman was charged, tried,
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and convicted of criminal trespass as a Class A misdemeanor. He appeals,
arguing insufficient evidence. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] CSI Protective Services, LLC (“CSI”) is a private company that provides
security services to apartment complexes in Indianapolis. Chad Butts is the
owner and an employee of the company. In May of 2013, the company that
managed the Strawbridge Green Apartments contracted with CSI to provide
security services for the complex. Butts served as the guard.
[3] The complex had an anti-loitering policy. On June 27, 2015, Butts saw a group
of people, including Coleman, loitering on the property. When Butts told the
group to disperse, Coleman became upset and began to “voice his opinion.”
Appellant’s Br. p. 6. Butts told Coleman “that [he] knew he wasn’t a resident
of the community” and that he would consider him a trespasser if he did not
“go inside [of an apartment], or start walking or do something other than the
loitering . . . .” Tr. pp. 15-16. When Coleman did not comply, Butts decided
he was a trespasser and called the police.
[4] Butts soon cancelled the call to police because an individual led Coleman into
an apartment, and Butts was unable to give the police an exact location for
Coleman. As Coleman walked away, however, Butts verbally informed him
that he was considered a trespasser, stating: “[A]s an agent of the property, you
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are hereby trespassed from Strawbridge Green Apartments . . . – that includes
all building[s], sidewalks, yards and grass of the community.” Id. at 17.
[5] On July 4, 2015, Butts again encountered Coleman on the property and advised
him that he was trespassing. Coleman ignored Butts, proceeded to place items
in a trash dumpster, and then retreated to an apartment. Butts called the police.
An officer with the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department arrived at the
complex, entered the apartment to which Coleman had retreated, and arrested
Coleman for trespassing.
1
[6] Coleman was charged with Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass.
Following a bench trial, Coleman was found guilty as charged.
Issues
[7] Coleman presents two issues:
I. Whether sufficient evidence was presented to establish an
agency relationship between CSI and the owner of the
apartment building; and
II. Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove Coleman
did not have a property interest in the apartment in which
he was found.
1
Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1) (2014).
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Discussion and Decision
[8] When reviewing sufficiency claims, we consider only the probative evidence
and reasonable inferences supporting the judgment, without reweighing the
evidence or reassessing witness credibility. Morgan v. State, 22 N.E.3d 570 (Ind.
2014). We affirm if there is substantial evidence of probative value such that a
reasonable trier of fact could have concluded the defendant was guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003 (Ind. 2009).
[9] To convict Coleman of criminal trespass, the State needed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Coleman (1) did not have a contractual interest in the
apartment complex property, and (2) knowingly or intentionally entered the
property (3) after having been denied entry by the owner of the apartment
complex or the owner’s agent. See Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1).
I. Agency Relationship
[10] Coleman first contends that Butts was without authority to deny him entry to
the apartment complex because the evidence at trial did not adequately
establish an agency relationship between CSI and the owner of the complex.
We disagree.
[11] The evidence was that the property management company overseeing the
complex contracted with CSI to provide security services at the Strawbridge
Green Apartments. Butts testified that he signed the contract and that under
the contract, he had the authority to act as the apartment complex’s agent.
Butts further testified that one of his duties was to prevent loitering. From this
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evidence, a reasonable fact-finder could determine that Butts had the authority
to act on behalf of the complex and that Coleman was barred from entering by
an agent of the owner.
II. Contractual Interest
[12] Coleman next argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to show
he lacked a contractual interest in the apartment in which he was found. He
maintains that the renter of the apartment gave him permission to stay there
and that he had been on home detention at that location. He contends that his
reasonable belief that he had a right to be in the apartment should have
precluded prosecution for criminal trespass.
[13] A “contractual interest,” as it is used in the criminal trespass statute, refers to
the right to be present on another’s property, arising out of an agreement
between at least two parties that creates an obligation to do or not to do a
particular thing. A.E.B. v. State, 756 N.E.2d 536, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). In
proving the lack of a contractual interest, the State need not “disprove every
conceivable contractual interest” that a defendant might have obtained in the
real property at issue. Fleck v. State, 508 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Ind. 1987). The State
satisfies its burden when it disproves those contractual interests that are
reasonably apparent from the context and circumstances under which the
trespass is alleged to have occurred. Lyles v. State, 970 N.E.2d 140 (Ind. 2012).
[14] Sufficient evidence was presented that Coleman had no contractual interest in
the apartment in which he was found, and that his belief that he had a right to
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be in the apartment was not reasonable. Coleman was not listed on the lease of
the apartment and Coleman had previously been warned by Butts that his
presence on the apartment complex property was considered a trespass. See
Myers v. State, 190 Ind. 269, 272, 130 N.E. 116, 117 (1921) (belief that one has a
right to be on the property of another “must have a fair and reasonable
foundation”). There was no evidence that Coleman had any enforceable right
against the actual renter, and Coleman’s act of listing the address as his location
for home detention likewise did not create any enforceable obligation. Lyles,
970 N.E.2d at 143 (defendant lacking a contractual interest held to be
trespasser).
Conclusion
[15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[16] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Riley, J., concur.
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