UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4724
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
THOMAS LESLIE SNEAD, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00053-CCE-2)
Submitted: September 20, 2016 Decided: October 5, 2016
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Brian Michael Aus, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Clifton Thomas Barrett, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas Leslie Snead, Jr., pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to conspiracy to manufacture
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2012). The
district court sentenced Snead to 160 months’ imprisonment. In
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
Snead’s counsel has filed a brief certifying that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the
district court procedurally erred in calculating Snead’s
criminal history category and in failing to give Snead credit in
the criminal judgment for pretrial detention. We affirm the
district court’s judgment.
We review a defendant’s sentence “under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007). Under this standard, a sentence is reviewed for
both procedural and substantive reasonableness. Id. at 51. In
determining procedural reasonableness, we consider whether the
district court properly calculated the defendant’s advisory
Sentencing Guidelines range, gave the parties an opportunity to
argue for an appropriate sentence, considered the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors, and sufficiently explained the
selected sentence. Id. at 49-51. Because Snead did not object
in the district court to the procedural errors he raises on
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appeal, our review is for plain error. United States v. Moore,
810 F.3d 932, 939 (4th Cir. 2016) (providing standard).
We conclude that the district court did not procedurally
err in imposing Snead’s sentence. Counsel first questions
whether the court properly applied two points to Snead’s
criminal history score for having committed the instant offense
while on probation. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 4A1.1(d) (2014). Because Snead failed to object to the
presentence report’s factual findings that a codefendant began
purchasing pseudoephedrine for him in 2012 or to object on the
basis that he was only on probation until June 2012, the
district court was entitled to accept the PSR’s factual findings
in applying the two points under § 4A1.1(d). See United States
v. Terry, 916 F.2d 157, 162 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that, in
absence of affirmative showing that information contained in PSR
is unreliable, district court is free to adopt PSR’s factual
findings).
Counsel next questions whether the district court erred in
failing to credit Snead for pretrial detention. However, it is
the Attorney General’s obligation, not the district court’s, to
calculate such credit. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329,
334-35 (1992). Moreover, a federal prisoner must challenge the
calculation of his sentence via the appropriate administrative
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channels, and if necessary, in a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. See United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 489-90 (4th
Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Snead, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Snead requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Snead.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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