In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 16‐1307
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
JUSTIN WYKOFF,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 14 CR 105 — Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge.
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SUBMITTED SEPTEMBER 7, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 6, 2016
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Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and POSNER and EASTERBROOK,
Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Circuit Judge. Justin Wykoff pleaded guilty to
wire‐fraud charges growing out of his having solicited
bribes and kickbacks while a Bloomington, Indiana, official.
The district judge sentenced him to 55 months in prison and
to pay restitution of $446,335 to Bloomington and a $1,100
assessment, with both payments “to begin immediately.”
2 No. 16‐1307
The judge added what she called a “special instruction”:
“Any unpaid restitution balance during the term of supervi‐
sion [i.e., the period following release from prison when the
defendant would be subject to the conditions of supervised
release imposed by the judge at sentencing] shall be paid at a
rate of not less than 10% of the defendant’s gross monthly
income.”
Soon after the entry of judgment, the government ap‐
plied to the judge for a writ of garnishment pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 3205(b)(1). The judge issued the writ to the Indiana
pension system because it had an account in Wykoff’s name
(for remember that he’d been an Indiana official) worth
$47,937. Wykoff requested a hearing under 28 U.S.C.
§ 3202(d) to determine whether any of the money in the ac‐
count was exempt. In addition he opposed garnishment on
the ground that he had already forfeited two of his homes
and the government had seized money from his prison ac‐
count, and although these assets were not enough to pay all
the restitution he owed he argued that the balance should be
deferred to his release. He based the argument on the
judge’s “special instruction,” which he interpreted as limit‐
ing his restitution payments to 10 percent of his monthly in‐
come. But the instruction doesn’t say that; it says that 10 per‐
cent is the minimum amount he must pay to complete restitu‐
tion. United States v. Fariduddin, 469 F.3d 1111, 1113 (7th Cir.
2006).
In fact he has no legal leg to stand on. The federal crimi‐
nal code requires that restitution be paid immediately unless
the district court provides otherwise, 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1),
which it did not. In United States v. Sawyer, 521 F.3d 792, 795
(7th Cir. 2008), we pointed out that at the start of incarcera‐
No. 16‐1307 3
tion “any existing assets should be seized promptly. If the
restitution debt exceeds a felon’s wealth, then the Mandato‐
ry Victim Restitution Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A, 3664,
demands that this wealth be handed over immediately.”
This is an important rule—for who knows what might hap‐
pen to Wykoff’s assets during his years of imprisonment. He
or members of his family or for that matter the Indiana state
pension fund might decide that there are better things to do
with those not inconsiderable assets than give them to
Bloomington.
In short, his claim is groundless, and so the district
court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
United States v. Justin Wykoff
Combined Opinion