In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554
PAULA Y. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUDGE OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS and
MICHAEL ROHAN,
Defendants‐Appellees.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:13‐cv‐1116 — Jorge L. Alonso, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED APRIL 5, 2016 — DECIDED OCTOBER 11, 2016
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and WILLIAMS, Cir‐
cuit Judges.
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. Paula Williams was told she was
fired from her position as a probation officer for abandoning
her job. She brought this lawsuit alleging that she was actually
fired for contesting a workers’ compensation claim, reporting
another employee’s misconduct, being African‐American,
and reporting co‐workers for racial hostility. Because Wil‐
liams has failed to establish a material factual dispute as to
any of her claims, we affirm the district court’s grant of sum‐
mary judgment to the defendants.
2 Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554
I. BACKGROUND
Williams began working for the Juvenile Probation De‐
partment of the Office of the Chief Judge of Cook County
(OCJ) in November 1995. OCJ has more than two thousand
employees and seven departments, one of which is the Juve‐
nile Division. At the time she was fired, OCJ was run by Mi‐
chael Rohan, who had the final say in all termination deci‐
sions. Starting in 2008, Williams had a series of interactions
with the personnel department which she contends caused
her termination.
A. Race Discrimination Complaint
In December 2008, Williams, who is African American, re‐
ported an incident of racial intimidation by two white co‐
workers. She wrote a memorandum to Charles Young, the
deputy director of the Juvenile Probation Department, stating
that one of the co‐workers called her over and the other said
to her, “When you go black you never go back and when you
are white, you are always right.” Williams found this com‐
ment to be “venomous.” Two days later, Williams received a
memo from Rohan acknowledging receipt of her report, apol‐
ogizing for the behavior she described, and informing her that
he was opening an investigation into the matter. Williams
claims that later that month, Rohan approached her at the
Probation Department’s holiday party, and instructed her not
to mention her memorandum to anyone outside of the build‐
ing. Rohan does not recall such a conversation.
Eventually (the timing is disputed), the co‐workers were
interviewed, denied that their remarks were racially moti‐
vated, and were counseled not to make such remarks again.
Over a year after the investigation was finished, Young cre‐
ated a memorandum of his investigation and placed it in Wil‐
liams’s personnel file. He testified he forgot to do so right after
he finished his investigation.
Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554 3
B. Complaint to Office of Inspector General
In March 2010, Williams reported a supervisor in her de‐
partment who was making phone calls about union matters
to her work phone and to her parents’ home. The Office of the
Inspector General investigated the report as a potential mis‐
use of County resources to support union candidates. The su‐
pervisor was eventually disciplined with a short suspension.
C. Workers’ Compensation Dispute
In May 2010, Williams was injured at work by Anthony
Jordan, a co‐worker. Jordan yanked a door open while Wil‐
liams was holding it, causing her to injure her shoulder. Dur‐
ing the incident, he yelled, “Why don’t you report this too,
b**ch?” She took a medical leave for the injury, filed a work‐
ers’ compensation claim, and began receiving temporary total
disability (TTD) benefits. At the start of her leave, Rose
Golden, the director of Human Resources for the department,
sent Williams a letter asking her to let Golden know when she
was able to return.
In December 2010, Williams received an independent
medical evaluation (IME) from the Cook County Medical Of‐
fice, which determined she was capable of returning to work.
No one noticed the report until June 2011, when Jason
Henschel, a claims adjuster for the risk management depart‐
ment, saw the report in Williams’s workers’ compensation file.
Henschel informed Golden about the IME, and Golden sent
Williams a letter asking her to return to work on August 2. It
also directed her to obtain a return to work certification from
the Medical Office and a release to return to work from her
personal physician. The letter warned that if Williams failed
to return to work, the Department would consider it an im‐
plied resignation, which was grounds for termination.
Williams went to the Medical Office for an evaluation on
August 1. The county doctor approved Williams to return to
work, but the form releasing her to return to work also noted
4 Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554
that her personal physician provided a note stating that she
was not able to return to work.
Meanwhile, Williams’s attorney, Jason Marzal, was nego‐
tiating her TTD benefits with Andrew Schwartz, an attorney
for the risk management office. Based on the IME, Schwartz
informed Marzal that the County would only pay benefits
through August 2. Marzal responded with a letter from Wil‐
liams’s personal physician stating she was unable to work un‐
til August 10. On August 16, Marzal sent Schwartz a new note
from Williams’s physician, stating she would be allowed to
return to work on September 3. On approximately August 22,
the attorneys discussed the case at the Illinois Workers’ Com‐
pensation Commission, and Marzal testified that the two
orally agreed that Williams would return to work on Septem‐
ber 6. Schwartz denies reaching this agreement, and says the
conversation was only about settling the benefits dispute. A
couple of days later, Marzal sent Schwartz a fax informing
him that Williams would return to work on September 6 and
demanding reinstatement of her benefits.
During these negotiations, Williams did not inform
Golden of her new return to work date. Golden testified that
she did not know the negotiations were taking place at all.
After consulting with Rohan, Golden sent Williams a termi‐
nation letter on August 30, stating that based on Williams’s
failure to communicate any intent to return to work, and the
apparent expiration of her workers’ compensation benefits,
OCJ was terminating her for implied resignation.
On September 6, Williams went to Golden and told her she
did not think she was supposed to return to work until that
day. Surprised, Golden called Schwartz to ask if he had au‐
thorized a September 6 return to work date, and he denied
doing so. Golden reaffirmed the termination decision. On
September 22, Marzal and Schwartz finalized a settlement
agreement which provided Williams a lump‐sum award and
6 weeks of TTD benefits for her workers’ compensation claim.
Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554 5
That agreement listed Williams’s return to work date as Sep‐
tember 6.
D. Proceedings Below
Williams brought this suit alleging that OCJ and Rohan
terminated her for a variety of unlawful reasons. She sued un‐
der the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, the Illinois Whis‐
tleblower Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. She also brought breach of contract
and promissory estoppel claims. At the close of discovery, she
moved for summary judgment on her workers’ compensation
claim, and the defendants moved for summary judgment on
all of her claims. The district court granted the defendants
summary judgment on all of her claims, and she appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Williams argues that the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to the defendants on each of her
claims, and by denying her summary judgment on her work‐
ers’ compensation claim. We review a district court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo, and construe all facts and draw
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non‐moving party. El‐
lis v. DHL Express, Inc., 633 F.3d 522, 525 (7th Cir. 2011).
A. Williams Failed to Meet Causation Requirement of
Workers’ Compensation Retaliation Claim
The Illinois Supreme Court has recognized a common‐law
cause of action for retaliatory discharge when an employee is
terminated because of his actual or anticipated exercise of
workers’ compensation rights. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384
N.E.2d 353, 357 (Ill. 1978). That cause of action is codified un‐
der the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 305/4(h). In order to prevail on a retaliatory discharge
claim, an employee must show (1) that he was an employee
before the workplace injury, (2) that he exercised a right
granted by the Act, and (3) that he was discharged for a reason
that was causally related to his filing a claim under the Act.
6 Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554
Clemons v. Mech. Devices Co., 704 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998). For example, a discharge based on a dispute about the
extent or duration of a compensable injury can be retaliation
under the Act. Id; see also Hollowell v. Wilder Corp. of Del., 743
N.E.2d 707, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (holding employer may not
discharge an employee by unilaterally relying on independ‐
ent physician’s favorable diagnosis while at the same time dis‐
missing employee’s unfavorable diagnosis by his own physi‐
cian). Even when an employee’s filing of a claim only proxi‐
mately causes the discharge, the employee can sustain a retal‐
iatory discharge claim. Clark v. Owens‐Brockway Glass Con‐
tainer, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 743, 746 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). But that
does not mean an employer can never discharge an employee
who has filed a claim. So long as the reason for a discharge is
wholly unrelated to an employee’s claim for benefits, the em‐
ployer is not liable for retaliatory discharge. See id.; see also
Horton v. Miller Chem. Co., Inc., 776 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir.
1985) (termination based on employer’s incorrect assumption
that employee could never perform job duties again not retal‐
iatory); Thomas v. Zamberletti, 480 N.E.2d 869, 871 (7th Cir.
1985) (no retaliatory discharge when plaintiff discharged for
failing to report to work); Marin v. Am. Meat Packing Co., 562
N.E.2d 282, 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (employer may fire em‐
ployee for absenteeism, even if absenteeism is caused by an
injury which is compensable by workers’ compensation).
Williams argues that her doctor’s opinion about her return
to work date caused her to believe she was permitted to stay
off work until September 6. So, she argues, the conflict be‐
tween her personal doctor’s opinion and the IME caused her
termination. In support of this argument, she relies heavily on
Grabs v. Safeway, 97 N.E.2d 122 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009), an Illinois
appellate case which held that an employer may not rely
solely on an IME in terminating an employee for failing to call
in his absences. There, the plaintiff was injured and filed a
claim with his employer, which was initially approved. His
Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554 7
physician ordered him to continue off work, but an independ‐
ent examiner disagreed. Id. at 125–26. Grabs followed his phy‐
sician’s advice, but as a result of the IME, his employer re‐
coded his absence in the attendance system, which imposed a
new requirement on him to call in to work, a requirement
from which he was exempt while on workers’ compensation
leave. Because Grabs was unaware of the change, he failed to
call in to report his absences, and was fired. The court held
that it would be improper for the employer to take an employ‐
ment action (recoding the plaintiff’s attendance status) based
on a medical report that was disputed by other physicians. Id.
at 124. But it also noted that a plaintiff cannot use his workers’
compensation claim as a shield from compliance with other
personnel rules. Id. at 134 (citing Finnerty v. Personnel Bd. of the
City of Chi., 707 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)).
We see a critical difference between Grabs and this case. In
Grabs, a decision‐maker acted improperly on the knowledge
of the disputed IME by recoding the plaintiff’s work status in
the attendance system. That improper act caused the plain‐
tiff’s termination. There is no evidence here that Golden acted
with knowledge that Williams disputed her return to work date.
In fact, Golden testified she had no idea Williams believed her
return to work date was September 6. From Golden’s vantage
point, Williams simply decided not to return to work.
The facts here are more akin to Beatty v. Olin, 693 F.3d 750
(7th Cir. 2012), where the decision‐maker who fired the plain‐
tiff had no knowledge of his return to work status. Id. at 751–
52. We held there that firing someone based on incomplete or
inaccurate information is legally insufficient to make out a re‐
taliatory discharge claim—rather, a plaintiff must provide ev‐
idence that her employer was motivated to fire her for exercis‐
ing her workers’ compensation rights. Id. at 754. We also re‐
quired that a plaintiff who argues that a decision‐maker is ly‐
ing about his ignorance of an underlying workers’ compensa‐
tion dispute provide evidence to support that position. Id.
Similar to the plaintiff in Beatty, Williams failed to provide
8 Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554
any evidence that Golden knew that there was a dispute about
her readiness to return to work. She argues that Marzal told
Schwartz that she would return on September 6, who in turn
said he would pass the message to “his client.” But there is no
evidence that Schwartz meant he would tell Golden about the
return to work date, and he denies talking to Golden about
the matter prior to Williams’s termination. A fact‐finder could
not reasonably leap from Schwartz’s nebulous assurance to
Marzal to the inference that Golden knew about the disputed
return‐to‐work date when she fired Williams.
To surmount this obstacle, Williams draws on Illinois case
law that notice to an attorney constitutes notice to her client.
Segal v. Ill. Dep’t of Ins., 938 N.E.2d 192, 195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010);
Williams v. Dorsey, 652 N.E.2d 1286, 1290 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995);
Eckel v. Bynum, 608 N.E.2d 167, 174 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). But
each of these cases deals with notice of judicial proceedings,
not notice of the contents of every discussion between attor‐
neys during a settlement negotiation. While we agree with the
district court that the lack of coordination between depart‐
ments is unfortunate, “the retaliatory‐discharge cause of ac‐
tion is narrow and requires evidence of retaliatory motive, not
just sloppy personnel practices.” Beatty, 693 F.3d at 754 (em‐
phasis in original). Employees can avert the danger of falling
victim to disjointed intra‐agency communications by keeping
decision‐makers informed of the status of their claims.
B. No Breach of Contract or Estoppel
Williams’s second argument on appeal is that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants
on her breach of contract and promissory estoppel claims. She
argues that by firing her, OCJ breached a verbal contract
formed by Marzal and Schwartz regarding her return date.
Under Illinois contract law, which applies here, a plaintiff
must show evidence of offer and acceptance to sustain a
breach of contract claim. Ass’n Benefit Servs., Inc. v. Caremark
RX, Inc., 493 F.3d 841, 849 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing MC Baldwin
Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554 9
Fin. Co. v. DiMaggio, Rosario & Veraja, LLC, 845 N.E.2d 22, 30
(Ill. App. Ct. 2006)). For an oral contract to exist, the parties
must have a meeting of the minds with respect to the terms of
the agreement and must intend to be bound by the agreement.
Podolsky v. Alma Energy Corp., Inc., 143 F.3d 364, 369 (7th Cir.
1998).
Williams needed to put forth evidence to create a factual
dispute about the following two issues: first, that Schwartz
entered into an agreement with Marzal about Williams’s re‐
turn date, and second, that OCJ authorized him to do so. Dan‐
ziger v. Pittsfield Shoe Co., 68 N.E. 534, 535–36 (Ill. 1903). To sup‐
port Schwartz’s authority to enter into the agreement, Wil‐
liams provides Marzal’s deposition testimony that he regu‐
larly negotiated return to work dates with attorneys in
Schwartz’s office, and argues that Golden would not have
called Schwartz to inquire about whether he had altered her
return to work date if he lacked the authority to do so. To sup‐
port the fact that Schwartz actually bound OCJ to the Septem‐
ber 6 return date, she points to Marzal’s deposition testimony
that on August 22, he had a conversation with Schwartz in
which Schwartz agreed to let Williams return on September
6, and to the written settlement agreement, which listed her
return to work date as September 6.
At his deposition, Marzal testified that his understanding
from verbal conversations with Schwartz was that Williams
was authorized to return to work on September 6. When
asked why he believed this, he testified it was because “ver‐
batim I can’t tell you, but basically [Schwartz] was in concur‐
rence with her returning back to work on the 6th, and he would
communicate that to his client.” He also stated that
“[Schwartz] represented that [Williams returning to work on
September 6] is a problem and that we have to resolve it in
Paula Williams’s favor.” When pressed as to how OCJ would
resolve it in Williams’s favor, Marzal stated, “[Schwartz] said
that Dr. Labanauskis is releasing her to go back to work and
we will let her go back to work on the 6th. Basically that’s what
10 Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554
he’s saying. I didn’t write down my conversation with him.”
A reasonable jury could conclude that saying “we will let her
go back to work on the 6th” was a clear, unambiguous promise
from Schwartz to Marzal that Williams could return to work
on August 6. So it seems that Williams has mounted her first
hurdle.
The trickier question is whether Schwartz was actually au‐
thorized to bind OCJ to such a promise. Whether an agency
relationship exists is generally a fact question, although a
court may decide it as a question of law if only one conclusion
may be drawn from the undisputed facts. Churkey v. Rustia,
768 N.E.2d 842, 845 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). A party can establish
an implied agency relationship through circumstantial evi‐
dence. C.A.M. Affiliates, Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 715
N.E.2d 778, 783 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). When settlements are
made out of court, Illinois law does not presume that an at‐
torney has authority to bind his client, and assigns the burden
of proof to the party alleging authority. Brewer v. Nat’l R.R.
Passenger Corp., 649 N.E.2d 1331, 1334 (Ill. 1995) (citing Dan‐
ziger, 68 N.E. at 535–36). In the absence of proof of express au‐
thority, an attorney’s representations are not binding when
they are later invoked against his client. Id.
The two pieces of evidence that Williams provides—Mar‐
zal’s testimony that he regularly negotiated return dates with
Cook County state’s attorneys, and Golden’s testimony that
she checked with Schwartz about promising Williams a later
return date—could not lead a reasonable fact‐finder to con‐
clude that OCJ expressly authorized Schwartz to determine
Williams’s return date. She also points to the settlement agree‐
ment the attorneys eventually entered with the Commission
on November 26, which states that Williams was temporarily
totally disabled through September 6. But the same document
states that Williams was terminated on August 30 for alleged
job abandonment. So the document cannot reasonably sup‐
port an inference that OCJ authorized Schwartz to permit Wil‐
liams to return to work on September 6.
Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554 11
As an alternative to her contract theory, Williams advances
an estoppel theory. (She does not specify if it is an equitable
or promissory estoppel theory, but she appears to advance ar‐
guments under both doctrines, and similar considerations ap‐
ply for each under our analysis. Matthews v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
51 N.E.3d 753, 780 n. 11 (Ill. 2016)). She argues that regardless
of whether Schwartz was expressly authorized by OCJ to set
her return to work date, she reasonably relied on his promise
that she could return to work on September 6 and was detri‐
mentally impacted as a result. Schwartz is not a named de‐
fendant in this lawsuit, so we assume that OCJ and Rohan are
the targets of her estoppel claim.
Under Illinois law, to obtain equitable estoppel against a
municipality, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) the munic‐
ipality affirmatively acted, (2) the affirmative act induced sub‐
stantial reliance, and (3) the aggrieved party substantially
changed its position as a result of its justifiable reliance. Mor‐
gan Place of Chi. v. City of Chi., 975 N.E.2d 187, 195 (Ill. App. Ct.
2012) (holding that plaintiffs’ reliance on assertions by city of‐
ficials about building permits did not warrant equitable es‐
toppel against city). Justifiable reliance means that a plaintiff
cannot “shut his eyes to obvious facts, or neglect to seek in‐
formation that is easily accessible, and then charge his igno‐
rance to others.” Village of Wadsworth v. Kerton, 726 N.E.2d 156,
164‐65 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
Equitable estoppel is generally disfavored against munic‐
ipal bodies, unless “it is necessary to prevent fraud and injus‐
tice.” Halleck v. Cnty. of Cook, 637 N.E. 2d. 1110, 1114 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994). The affirmative act must be made by the body itself,
such as by a legislative enactment. See Schivarelli v. Chi. Transit
Auth., 823 N.E.2d 158, 167‐68 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). Unauthor‐
ized acts of ministerial officers or misinterpretations generally
do not meet the affirmative act requirement. Id. (finding no
estoppel against transit authority board when it did not ap‐
prove an agreement made between one of its employees and
12 Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554
plaintiff). Representations by an attorney have been held in‐
sufficient to bind a municipality under the doctrine of estop‐
pel. Hamwi v. Zollar, 702 N.E.2d 592, 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)
(finding no estoppel where department attorney represented
that plaintiff’s disciplinary record would be expunged and
department later denied his expungement application); Marx
v. State Dept. of Revenue, 519 N.E.2d 82, 84 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(representations of Attorney General’s office regarding mon‐
etary penalty did not work an estoppel against the state when
it imposed greater penalties).
However, occasionally, Illinois courts have found circum‐
stances to be unjust enough to warrant estoppel. The general
disfavoring of estoppel against a municipality is “qualified to
enable a party to invoke [estoppel] where his action was in‐
duced by the conduct of a municipal official, and where, in
the absence of such relief, he would suffer a substantial loss.”
Chicago v. Miller, 188 N.E.2d 694, 696 (Ill. 1963). For example,
erroneous conferral of public benefits is not normally a
ground for estoppel, but at least one appellate court has held
that the Illinois Department of Public Aid can be estopped
from recouping benefits from a plaintiff when one of its em‐
ployees repeatedly miscalculated a claimant’s benefits over
the course of five years. Kruse v. Dep’t of Pub. Aid, 596 N.E.2d
743, 745‐46 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Similarly, while injury stem‐
ming from the issuance of an unauthorized permit does not
typically warrant estoppel, where a municipal body “ratifies”
the issuance by failing to revoke the permit for an extended
period of time, estoppel has been found appropriate. Cities
Service Oil Co. v. Des Plaines, 171 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ill. 1961);
Hagee v. Evanston, 414 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
It is hard to draw a clear line from this precedent to delin‐
eate where under Illinois law, an injustice is severe enough,
and unfair enough, to warrant estoppel. But we find even tak‐
ing all of Williams’s factual allegations as true, they are insuf‐
ficient to justify estoppel. Here, Marzal testified that Schwartz
agreed to the September 6 return date and that he explicitly
Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554 13
promised to convey the new date to “his client.” But distinct
from the rare cases in which Illinois courts have applied es‐
toppel, there is no evidence that Schwartz’s misrepresentation
was ratified by OCJ. In the absence of proof that he was au‐
thorized to give Williams a new return to work date,
Schwartz’s promises regarding Williams’s return date must be
viewed as ultra vires acts by a municipal employee. When OCJ
discovered that he may have promised Williams a different
return date, it did not permit Williams to return to work, or
otherwise ratify his misrepresentation. To the contrary,
Golden sent Williams home, and later reaffirmed her termi‐
nation. Williams was misled by Schwartz, but not by OCJ.
While it is a close question, we find estoppel to be an inappro‐
priate remedy for the factual circumstances before us.
C. Williams Has Failed to Produce a Material Factual
Dispute About Race Discrimination or Retaliation
Williams next argues that she provided enough evidence
to create a material factual dispute about whether she was
fired because of her race, in violation of Title VII. We recently
discarded the direct and indirect methods of proof for retali‐
ation claims, and held that a plaintiff can surmount summary
judgment if a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the
plaintiff’s race caused the discharge. Ortiz v. Werner Enters.,
No. 15‐2574, 2016 WL 4411434, at *4 (7th Cir. Aug. 9, 2016),
slip op. 10. We must consider evidence as a whole, rather than
by asking whether any particular piece of evidence proves the
case by itself. Id.
There is simply not enough evidence for a reasonable fact‐
finder to rule in favor of Williams. Her only evidence is that a
white employee was given several chances to return to work
after taking a similar leave. But to prevail by showing differ‐
ential treatment of a similarly situated employee, a plaintiff
must identify a comparator who is “directly comparable to
her in all material respects … to eliminate other possible ex‐
planatory variables.” Perez v. Thorntons, Inc., 731 F.3d 699, 704
14 Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554
(7th Cir. 2013). Here, the record evidence shows that the white
employee repeatedly contacted Golden to keep her abreast of
her extension requests. Golden testified that Williams was not
fired for asking for extensions of leave, but for failing to get in
touch at all. This was a material difference between the two
employees, which prevents Williams from arguing she was
treated differently when all things were “in fact equal.” Filar
v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 526 F.3d 1054, 1061 (7th Cir. 2008).
Williams has not identified a similarly situated employee,
which is fatal to her discrimination theory.
Williams also argues that she was fired for reporting racial
discrimination by her white co‐workers, in violation of 42
U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a). To overcome summary judgment on this
claim, she needs to show that she was fired, that she engaged
in protected activity, and that the latter caused the former.
Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013).
In support of her retaliation claim, Williams offers that Rohan
instructed her not to talk about the incident outside of the
building, that the department’s investigation into the incident
lagged after she made the initial report, that a copy of her re‐
port was placed into her personnel file but not her co‐work‐
ers’, and that Rohan reviewed her personnel file before decid‐
ing to fire her. Again, Williams has not met her summary
judgment burden. Williams made the report close to three
years before she was terminated. The handling of the report
did not create an inference of retaliation. While there may
have been some delays in the investigation, there is no evi‐
dence that the delays were in any way related to Williams’s
eventual termination. The most nefarious inference that can
be drawn from Williams’s version of the facts is that the de‐
partment felt the need to get Williams’s personnel file in order
before terminating her. That still does not support an infer‐
ence that her report of racial harassment caused her termina‐
tion. And a reasonable factfinder could not infer that Rohan’s
comment three years before Williams’s termination to keep
Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554 15
the matter confidential was evidence that he planned to fire
her.
Williams also asks us to overrule our own precedent and
find that Rohan can be held liable for race discrimination and
retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. We decline to do so. See
Campbell v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook Cnty., 752 F.3d 665, 671
(7th Cir. 2014) (§ 1981 does not create a private right of action
against state actors).
D. No Illinois Whistleblower Act Violation
Williams’s final theory of liability against the defendants
is that they violated the Illinois Whistleblower Act by termi‐
nating her for reporting unlawful misconduct against her co‐
workers and for reporting misconduct by a supervisor to the
OIG. The parties dispute whether Williams brought this claim
in time to avoid the one year statute of limitations for tort ac‐
tions against governmental entities. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/8‐
101(a). It is unclear under Illinois law whether this statute of
limitations applies to retaliatory discharge claims under the
Illinois Whistleblower Act, although one appellate court
seemed to suggest that it might. See Taylor v. City of Chi., 10
N.E.3d 383, 395 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). Rather than attempting to
resolve this question, we conclude that even if the claim was
timely, it did not meet the summary judgment standard for
whistleblower claims. In order to show whistleblower retalia‐
tion, a plaintiff must provide some evidence that the em‐
ployer had a retaliatory motive. See Michael v. Precision Alli‐
ance Grp., LLC, 952 N.E.2d 682, 688 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). There
is no evidence of a retaliatory motive here. Williams points to
Anthony Jordan’s remark (“Why don’t you go report this too,
b**ch?”), indicating that others knew about her prior reports.
But Jordan was not a decision‐maker at OCJ, and there is no
evidence that his views of Williams’s whistleblowing activi‐
ties—or anyone else’s—influenced Rohan or Golden’s deci‐
sion to fire her.
16 Nos. 15‐2325 & 15‐2554
E. No Abuse of Discretion to Award of Costs to OCJ
Finally, Williams argues that the district court abused its
discretion by awarding the defendants costs. A district court
should provide an explanation for its decision to award or
deny costs. Rivera v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 631, 636 (7th Cir.
2006). It only abuses its discretion in reviewing a bill of costs
if “no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the
trial court.” Id. The district court evaluated the documentation
that Williams provided and found that she had more than suf‐
ficient income to pay the bill of costs. While Williams refer‐
enced an outstanding medical bill, she did not provide any
documentation or explanation for the bill and its impact on
her ability to pay the bill of costs. Under an abuse‐of‐discre‐
tion standard, there is no basis for vacating the award.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
grant of summary judgment.