[Cite as State v. Teets, 2016-Ohio-7274.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
PICKAWAY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 15CA31
v. :
DECISION AND
PAUL WESLEY TEETS, : JUDGMENT ENTRY
Defendant-Appellant. : RELEASED 10/04/2016
APPEARANCES:
Paul Wesley Teets, Orient, Ohio, pro se appellant.
Judy C. Wolford, Pickaway County Prosecuting Attorney, Circleville, Ohio, for appellee.
Hoover, J.
{¶1} Paul Wesley Teets (“Teets”) appeals from the Pickaway County Court of
Common Pleas’ denial of his motion for re-sentencing based on void sentence, which was
construed by the trial court as an untimely petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Teets
contends that (1) the trial court rendered a void judgment when it put in its sentencing entry that
he would be subject to a five year period of post-release control; (2) the trial court rendered a
void judgment when it failed to notify him at sentencing that he could be required to perform
community service if he failed to pay the costs of prosecution, and that his trial counsel and
appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to previously raise this issue; and (3) he received
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.
{¶2} Because we find merit to Teets’s argument that a portion of his sentence was
rendered void by the trial court’s imposition of post-release control, we sustain his first
Pickaway App. No. 15CA31 2
assignment of error. However, because the arguments raised under Teets’s second assignment of
error are barred by res judicata, his second assignment of error is overruled. Moreover, because
post-conviction relief is not the appropriate avenue to file a claim for ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, we find no merit to Teets’s third assignment of error; and it is therefore
overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part, reversed in part; and
this matter is remanded for the trial court to correct the sentencing entry.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶3} On January 19, 2001, Teets was indicted by the Pickaway County grand jury on
one count of aggravated murder, an unspecified felony in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A). On May
3, 2001, a hearing was conducted on Teets’s motion to suppress evidence. The trial court denied
the motion on July 3, 2001.
{¶4} A jury trial commenced on September 24, 2001; and thereafter Teets was found
guilty of aggravated murder. A presentence investigation report was ordered; and Teets was
sentenced on December 12, 2001. At that time, the trial court sentenced Teets to life
imprisonment. Additionally, the trial court notified Teets that he would be subject to five years
of post-release control and ordered that he pay the costs of prosecution. Teets appealed his
conviction and sentence to this Court, raising two assignments of error. See State v. Teets, 4th
Dist. Pickaway No. 02CA1, 2002-Ohio-6799. We overruled both of his assignments of error and
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Id.
{¶5} On March 19, 2015, Teets filed a motion for re-sentencing based on void
judgment with the trial court. The trial court denied the motion on April 3, 2015, on the basis that
it was untimely filed, and also lacked merit. This appeal followed.
Pickaway App. No. 15CA31 3
II. Assignments of Error
{¶6} Teets assigns the following errors for our review:
Assignment of Error I:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW AND ENTERED A
VOID JUDGMENT ON DECEMBER 14TH, 2015 [sic], WHEN IT IMPOSED
THE WRONG POST-RELEASE CONTROL FOR THE OFFENSE OF
AGGRAVATED MURDER PURSUANT TO O.R.C. §2903.01 (A) WHICH IS
A MANDATORY FIVE (5) YEARS POST-RELEASE CONTROL, BY LAW
TO A FELONY SF DEGREE OFFENSE, THAT IS STATUTORY REQUIRED
TO SPECIFY THE MANDATORY NATURE OF POST-RELEASE
CONTROL, PURSUANT TO O.R.C. §2929.19 (B)(3)(c) THROUGH (e), AND
O.R.C. §2967.28.
Assignment of Error II1:
TRIAL COUNSEL & APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
NOT OBJECTING AND BRIEFING THAT THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED
O.R.C. §2947.23 (A)(1)(a), WHEN THE COURT FAILED TO NOTIFY THE
DEFENDANT AT “SENTENCING” ON DECEMBER 12TH, 2001 AND
ENTERED ON DECEMBER 14TH, 2001 THAT FAILURE TO PAY COURT
COSTS OF THIS PROSECUTION COULD RESULT IN THE TRIAL COURT
ORDERING THE DEFENDANT TO PERFORM COMMUNITY SERVICE.
Assignment of Error III:
APPELLATE COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT ADVISING THE
DEFENDANT WHEN THE TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS WAS FILED, AND BY
O.R.C. §2953.21 THE APPELLANT HAD ONLY 180 DAYS TO FILE A
CONVICTION [sic].
III. Law and Analysis
A. Void v. Voidable
1
We note that a slightly different version of this assignment of error appears in the “Table of Contents” portion of
Teets’s appellate brief. Specifically, the version in the “Table of Contents” does not include the argument that trial
counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective, but simply argues that the trial court erred by failing to notify him of
the possibility of community service.
Pickaway App. No. 15CA31 4
{¶7} In his first two assignments of error, Teets argues that the trial court erred in
imposing his sentence, thus rendering his sentence or portions of his sentence void. Teets claims
that because his sentence or portions of his sentence are void, he can challenge it at any time and
the principle of res judicata does not apply.
{¶8} “ ‘In general, a void judgment is one that has been imposed by a court that lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or the authority to act. Unlike a void judgment, a
voidable judgment is one rendered by a court that has both jurisdiction and authority to act, but
the court’s judgment is invalid, irregular, or erroneous.’ ” (Internal citation omitted.) State v.
Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010–Ohio–6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Simpkins,
117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008–Ohio–1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 12. Typically, “sentencing errors are
not jurisdictional and do not render a judgment void.” Id. at ¶ 7. However, “a sentence that is not
in accordance with statutorily mandated terms is void.” Id. at ¶ 8. A void sentence “is not
precluded from appellate review by principles of res judicata, and may be reviewed at any time,
on direct appeal or by collateral attack.” Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶9} In contrast, arguments challenging the imposition of a voidable sentence are
barred by the doctrine of res judicata if not raised on a direct appeal. See State v. Payne, 114
Ohio St.3d 502, 2007–Ohio–4642, 873 N.E.2d 306, ¶ 30. The doctrine of res judicata bars claims
that the defendant raised or could have raised on direct appeal. In re B.C.S., 4th Dist. Washington
No. 07CA60, 2008–Ohio–5771, ¶ 14. “[T]he doctrine serves to preclude a defendant who has
had his day in court from seeking a second on that same issue. In so doing, res judicata promotes
the principles of finality and judicial economy by preventing endless relitigation of an issue on
which a defendant has already received a full and fair opportunity to be heard.” State v. Saxon,
Pickaway App. No. 15CA31 5
109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006–Ohio–1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, ¶ 18. Accord State v. Miller, 4th Dist.
Lawrence No. 11CA14, 2012-Ohio-1922, ¶ 5.
B. Imposition of Post-Release Control
{¶10} In his first assignment of error, Teets contends that the trial court erred when
imposing post-release control, thus rendering that portion of his sentence void. In particular,
Teets argues that the trial court failed to notify him that he is subject to a mandatory period of
post-release control. We agree that the trial erred in imposing post-release control, thus rendering
that portion of his sentence void, albeit for reasons that differ from those advanced by Teets.
{¶11} In the case sub judice, Teets was convicted of aggravated murder, “ ‘ which is an
unclassified felony to which the post-release control statute does not apply.’ ” State v. Lofton, 4th
Dist. Pickaway No. 11CA16, 2012-Ohio-2274, ¶ 8, quoting State v. Silguero, 10th Dist. Franklin
No. 11 AP-274, 2011-Ohio-6293, ¶ 8; see also State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-
3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 36 (“[A]n individual sentenced for aggravated murder * * * is not
subject to postrelease control, because that crime is an unspecified felony to which the
postrelease-control statute does not apply.”). “ ‘Instead of postrelease control, when an offender
convicted of an unclassified felony is released from prison he or she is subject to parole.’ ” Id.,
quoting State v. Evans, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 95692, 2011-Ohio-2153, ¶ 7, in turn citing Clark
at ¶ 36; R.C. 2967.13. “Therefore, the trial court erred when it imposed postrelease control.” Id.,
citing Silguero at ¶ 8. Moreover, the error renders the post-release control portion of the sentence
void. Id. at ¶ 10. We note, however, because only the post-release control portion of the sentence
is void, as opposed to the entire sentence, “the proper remedy ‘is to remand the matter for the
trial court to correct the sentencing entry to eliminate the postrelease control language.’ ” Id.,
quoting Evans at ¶ 9.
Pickaway App. No. 15CA31 6
{¶12} Based on the foregoing, we sustain Teets’s first assignment of error and conclude
that the portion of Teets’s sentence imposing post-release control is void.
C. Failure to Give Community Service Notification
{¶13} In his second assignment of error, Teets contends that his sentence is void, and
that the trial court erred by denying his motion for re-sentencing because at his sentencing in
2001 the court failed to notify him of the possible penalty for failing to pay the costs of
prosecution – specifically, that he could be required to perform community service if he failed to
pay those costs. He also argues that his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for
failing to previously raise this issue.
{¶14} Teets’s argument that the trial court should have alerted him of the possibility of
community service pursuant to R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a), if meritorious, would only render the
judgment voidable, not void. State v. Wolke, 4th Dist. Adams No. 15CA1008, 2016-Ohio-1134,
¶¶ 8-9; State v. Bennett, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 15CA3682, 2015-Ohio-3832, ¶¶ 17-18; State v.
McCreery, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 15CA10, 2015-Ohio-5453, ¶¶ 16-19. Because Teets failed to
raise this argument in his direct appeal, it is now barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and Teets
cannot now challenge his sentence on that basis collaterally through a motion for re-sentencing.
Additionally, his argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
imposition of costs and to the trial court’s failure to give the necessary community service
notification is also barred by the doctrine of res judicata, because Teets failed to raise this
argument in his direct appeal. Wolke at ¶¶ 10-11, citing McCreery at ¶¶ 20-21. To the extent that
Teets raises claims of ineffective assistance of appellant counsel, we conclude that the argument
is meritless for the reasons discussed more fully below.
{¶15} Accordingly, Teets’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Pickaway App. No. 15CA31 7
D. Assistance of Appellate Counsel
{¶16} In his third assignment of error, Teets claims that he received ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel. We find no merit to this assertion. The proper vehicle to raise
this issue is an App.R. 26(B) application to reopen the appeal. State v. Ulmer, 4th Dist. Scioto
No. 15CA3708, 2016-Ohio-2873, ¶ 16; State v. Vincent, 4th Dist. Ross No. 09CA3135, 2010-
Ohio-3261, ¶ 9; State v. Davis, 4th Dist. Highland No. 09CA19, 2009-Ohio-7083, ¶¶ 13-15; see
also State v. Bradley, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 95CA2364, 1996 WL 718261, * 12 (Dec. 2, 1996) (“*
* * we find that post-conviction relief is not the appropriate avenue to file a claim for ineffective
appellate counsel * * *”). Furthermore, Teets has failed to show prejudice. The basis of his
ineffective assistance claim is that his original appellate counsel failed to inform him of the filing
deadlines to file a post-conviction motion, and had they done so, he would have timely filed his
motion for re-sentencing and the trial court would have reviewed the motion on its merits. This
argument is misplaced, however, because in addition to denying the motion for re-sentencing as
untimely, the trial court also found that the motion lacked merit. Accordingly, we overrule
Teets’s third assignment of error.
IV. Conclusion
{¶17} Having overruled Teets’s second and third assignments of error, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court in part; however, having sustained his first assignment of error, we
also reverse the judgment of the trial court in part. Consequently, we remand this matter and
instruct the trial court to correct the December 14, 2001 Entry of Sentence by removing all
references to post-release control. Lofton, supra, at ¶ 11.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART,
REVERSED IN PART,
Pickaway App. No. 15CA31 8
AND CAUSE REMANDED.
Pickaway App. No. 15CA31 9
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN
PART and that the CAUSE IS REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. Appellant and appellee shall split the costs.
The Court finds that reasonable grounds existed for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Pickaway County
Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously posted. The
purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme Court of Ohio an
application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court. If a stay is continued by
this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the sixty day period, or the failure of
the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day
appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Additionally, if the Supreme Court of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days,
the stay will terminate as of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Abele, J., and McFarland, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ____________________________
Marie Hoover, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and
the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.