Case: 15-20684 Document: 00513730371 Page: 1 Date Filed: 10/24/2016
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
United States Court of Appeals
No. 15-20684
Fifth Circuit
FILED
October 24, 2016
BRADLEY JARED BARTON, Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Petitioner-Appellant
v.
LORIE DAVIS, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION,
Respondent-Appellee
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:15-CV-587
Before CLEMENT, PRADO, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: *
Bradley Jared Barton, Texas prisoner # 1680744, who stands convicted
of capital murder, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the
district court’s order staying and abating his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding until
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ruled on his second state habeas petition.
The district court’s order also granted the respondent’s summary judgment
motion in part to the extent it argued that Barton’s claims were unexhausted.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH
CIR. R. 47.5.4.
Case: 15-20684 Document: 00513730371 Page: 2 Date Filed: 10/24/2016
No. 15-20684
Barton argues that the district court erred in staying the case pending
exhaustion and that it should have excused the requirement that he exhaust
his state court remedies because the state habeas process was ineffective.
Barton’s motion for a COA is DENIED AS UNNECESSARY. See Young
v. Stephens, 795 F.3d 484, 494 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1453
(2016). Moreover, because the TCCA has now ruled on Barton’s second state
habeas petition and the district court is no longer holding the case in abeyance
pending exhaustion, the issue of whether the district court should have stayed
the case or excused the exhaustion requirement is now moot. See United States
Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 395-96 (1980); Motient Corp. v.
Dondero, 529 F.3d 532, 537 (5th Cir. 2008). The appeal is therefore
DISMISSED AS MOOT.
2