FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 24 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SAAHDI COLEMAN, No. 14-16455
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00136- JAM-
GGH
v.
DERRAL G. ADAMS, Warden; MEMORANDUM*
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
Respondents-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 17, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: KLEINFELD, TASHIMA, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
In 2007, Saadhi Coleman filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the
district court dismissed as untimely. Years later, Coleman unsuccessfully sought
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
relief from this dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Coleman
now challenges the district court’s denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253, and we affirm.
A district court’s denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) is reviewed for abuse
of discretion. See Casey v. Albertson’s Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004).
In relevant part, Rule 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or misconduct by
an opposing party,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), or for “any other reason that justifies
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). As to timing, “[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must
be made within a reasonable time—and for reasons [under subdivisions] (1), (2),
and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of
the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1).
The timeliness of Coleman’s motion turns on whether he sought relief from
the district court under Rule 60(b)(3) for “fraud . . . misrepresentation, or
misconduct,” or, alternatively, under the catchall provision of Rule 60(b)(6). If the
former, then Coleman’s motion is subject to Rule 60(c)(1)’s one-year statute of
limitations. And, because Coleman’s motion was initially filed on January 10,
2014 – more than four years after the district court dismissed his § 2254 petition –
it would be time-barred. On the other hand, if Coleman’s motion sought relief
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under Rule 60(b)(6), then the relevant inquiry should have considered whether the
motion was filed “within a reasonable time.” Id.
It is clear from the record that Coleman sought relief under Rule 60(b)(3).
His primary argument is that Appellees defrauded him out of a full and fair hearing
on his § 2254 petition, and that they achieved this end by lying on official
documents, presenting false evidence, withholding relevant information, and
otherwise generally misleading the district court. In short, there is little doubt that
Coleman’s motion falls within the heartland of Rule 60(b)(3). As such, the motion
cannot be construed as one seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Lafarge
Conseils Et Etudes, S.A. v. Kaiser Cement & Gypsum Corp., 791 F.2d 1334, 1338
(9th Cir. 1986) (“Clause 60(b)(6) is residual and ‘must be read as being exclusive
of the preceding clauses.’”).
Coleman’s motion was filed several years after the statutory limitations
period had expired. It was therefore time-barred and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying it.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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