FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 24 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JIMMIE L. EVANS, No. 14-17228
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-01396-CMK
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Commissioner
of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Craig Kellison, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 20, 2016**
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges, and COLLINS,*** Chief
District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Raner C. Collins, Chief United States District Judge for
the District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
Claimant Jimmie L. Evans appeals the district court’s judgment affirming
the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income under Titles II and XVI of the
Social Security Act. Reviewing the district court’s decision de novo and the
administrative law judge’s ("ALJ") decision for substantial evidence, Rounds v.
Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1002 (9th Cir. 2015), we affirm.
1. Claimant waived his argument that the ALJ failed to properly consider the
Social Security Administration’s Program Operations Manual System ("POMS")
by failing to raise the argument to the district court. Whittaker Corp. v. Execuair
Corp., 953 F.2d 510, 515 (9th Cir. 1992). Even if Claimant did not waive the
argument, POMS "does not impose judicially enforceable duties on either this
court or the ALJ." Kennedy v. Colvin, 738 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
2. The ALJ did not err in making her residual functional capacity ("RFC")
determination. The assessment adequately accounts for the opinion of Dr. Miles
White that Claimant is "unrestricted" in his ability to carry out simple job
instructions but that he faces a number of moderate functional restrictions, as well
as more "severe[]" restrictions in his ability to interact with coworkers, by
concluding that Claimant is capable of simple, repetitive tasks but "cannot interact
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with coworkers and would function best in an independent separate work area."
See Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[A]n ALJ’s
assessment of a claimant adequately captures restrictions related to concentration,
persistence, or pace where the assessment is consistent with restrictions identified
in the medical testimony."). The RFC likewise accounts for the opinion of Dr.
Anita Kemp that Claimant would function "best in [a] minimal interpersonal
interaction type job."
AFFIRMED.
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