IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1353
Filed October 26, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF G.F. AND A.S.,
Minor Children,
A.M., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachael E. Seymour,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals an order terminating her parental rights to two children.
AFFIRMED.
Erin M. Carr of Carr & Wright, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Michelle R. Becker, of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, guardian ad litem
for minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
2
TABOR, Judge.
This termination-of-parental-rights appeal involves two children: nine-year-
old A.S. and three-year-old G.F. Their mother, Stephanie, appeals the juvenile
court’s order severing her legal ties to the children.1 Stephanie alleges the State
failed to prove the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing
evidence and contends termination is not in the best interests of her daughters.
She alternatively asks for an additional six months to work toward reunification.
After our independent review2 of the record, we concur with the thorough
and well-written decision of the juvenile court. Given her unresolved substance
abuse and domestic violence issues, Stephanie was not in a position to safely
resume care of her daughters at the time of the hearing and waiting beyond the
statutory time frames for resolution would be harmful to the children’s welfare.
Accordingly, we affirm the termination of Stephanie’s parental rights.
I. Facts and Proceedings
The present child-welfare case opened in April 2015 when police arrested
Stephanie and G.F.’s father, Y.F., for domestic abuse assault. Stephanie
described what happened: “There was a domestic incident between [the father]
and I. We were using drugs, and the kids were in their room. And the neighbors
heard us yelling at each other and called the police.”
1
The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s fathers, but they
are not parties to this appeal.
2
We review termination proceedings de novo, which means we examine both the facts
and law and judge anew those issues properly preserved and presented. See In re
M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016); In re L.G., 532 N.W.2d 478, 480 (Iowa Ct. App.
1995). We give weight to the juvenile court’s fact-findings, especially when it comes to
assessing the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. See In re D.W., 791
N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010).
3
Both parents had been using methamphetamine, and the girls tested
positive for the drug. The children were removed from the parents’ care and
adjudicated as children in need of assistance (CINA) in May 2015.
Throughout the ensuing year, Stephanie made little progress in
addressing her methamphetamine addiction or in recognizing the danger posed
to her children by her involvement with Y.F., who was a domestic abuser and a
convicted sex offender. On the substance-abuse front, Stephanie tested positive
for methamphetamine in both February and March of 2016. She also tested
positive for marijuana in February 2016. As for her association with Y.F.,
Stephanie testified she ended their relationship in September 2015, when she
learned why he was on the sex offender registry. But the juvenile court found
that testimony lacked credibility because the State’s evidence showed their
relationship continued through the time of the termination trial. Stephanie also
stopped working with a domestic-violence advocate in August 2015.
Stephanie’s visitation with her daughters was inconsistent. For example,
she missed four visits in December 2015, missed five visits in January 2016, and
cancelled two visits in February 2016. The children, especially A.S., suffered
distress from Stephanie’s inconsistency. Moreover, Stephanie did not stay
abreast of A.S.’s therapy.
In April 2016, the State filed a petition to terminate Stephanie’s parental
rights, relying on Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2015) for A.S., section
232.116(1)(h) for G.F., and section 232.116(1)(i) for both children. In May, the
court held a hearing at which Stephanie provided testimony. She emphasized
she recently had found stable housing and was employed. In July 2016, the
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court issued its termination order, finding the State had proven the grounds
alleged in the petition by clear and convincing evidence. Stephanie challenges
that order in her petition on appeal.
II. Analysis
A. Statutory Grounds
The State bears the burden to prove the allegations in its petition by clear
and convincing evidence. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f), (h). The clear-and-
convincing standard requires more than a preponderance of evidence but less
than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See L.G., 532 N.W.2d at 481. “It means
there must be no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of a
particular conclusion drawn from the evidence.” Id. When the juvenile court
terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the
order on any ground supported by clear and convincing evidence. See D.W.,
791 N.W.2d at 707.
In this case, because A.S. is over age four and G.F. is under age four, we
choose to address Iowa Code section 232.116(f)3 and (h).4 Stephanie
challenges just one element of both provisions—that the children could not be
returned to their mother’s custody without risking the kind of harm that led to their
3
That provision requires proof of four elements: (1) the child is four years old or older;
(2) the child has been adjudicated to be a CINA; (3) the child has been removed from
the parent’s physical custody for at least twelve of the last eighteen months, or for the
last twelve consecutive months and any trial period in the home has been less than thirty
days; and (4) clear and convincing evidence exists that at the present time the child
cannot be returned to the custody of her parents as provided in section 232.102.
4
That provision requires proof of four elements: (1) the child is three years old or
younger; (2) the child has been adjudicated to be a CINA; (3) the child has been out of
the parent’s custody for at least six of the last twelve months or the last six consecutive
months and any trial period in the home has been less than thirty days; and (4) clear and
convincing evidence exists that the child cannot be returned to the custody of her
parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.
5
CINA adjudications. She contends the State’s allegations concerning substance
abuse, domestic violence, and lack of stability were unsubstantiated.
The record debunks the mother’s position on appeal. Stephanie admitted
being dishonest about her past methamphetamine use. She relapsed just three
months before the termination hearing and had not completed a treatment
program since the relapse. The mother’s unresolved methamphetamine
addiction was a barrier to reunification. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 776
(Iowa 2012) (recognizing “an unresolved, severe, and chronic drug addiction can
render a parent unfit to raise children”). In addition, during her testimony
Stephanie could not explain why she was willing to jeopardize reunification with
her daughters by maintaining a relationship Y.F., given his physical abuse toward
her and given her knowledge he was on the sex offender registry for abusing a
child. Due to the mother’s lack of insight, returning the girls would be contrary to
their welfare. See In re T.S., 868 N.W.2d 425, 435 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015)
(upholding termination when record disclosed mother had gained little
understanding about domestic violence issues or dangers they posed to her
children).
Finally, while it is encouraging for Stephanie that she has been able to
secure her own residence and a job in hotel housekeeping, those were fledgling
developments at the time of the termination hearing and would not ensure the
safety of the children if returned to her care. We note the guardian ad litem
favored termination, telling the court “the evidence presented makes it clear that
these girls would be at significant risk if returned to the custody of their mother
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today.” Reviewing the record in its entirety, we find clear and convincing
evidence to support termination under subsections (f) and (h).
B. Best Interests and Parent-Child Bond
After affirming the statutory grounds, we have more work to do. Questions
remain on whether termination is in the children’s best interests under Iowa Code
section 232.116(2) and whether factors exist under section 232.116(3) that allow
the court to abstain from terminating the parent’s rights. See In re P.L., 778
N.W.2d 33, 37–38 (Iowa 2010) (setting out three-step framework in termination
cases). Here, Stephanie points to the girls’ bond with her and asserts the record
contains no evidence “anyone else stood in a better position than [she] to provide
life-long love and affection for these children.”
Section 232.116(2) directs the juvenile court to give primary consideration
to the safety of the children; the best placement for furthering their long-term
nurturing and growth; and their physical, mental, and emotional condition and
needs. Id. at 37. Because of her preoccupation with a dangerous partner and
relapse into methamphetamine abuse, the mother has not consistently met the
children’s physical, mental, and emotional needs. We agree with the juvenile
court that the best interests of A.S. and G.F. would be served by terminating
Stephanie’s rights and allowing them to move into a pre-adoptive foster care
placement.
Section 232.116(3)(c) allows the juvenile court to refrain from terminating
parental rights if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination
would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-
child relationship.” This factor is permissive, not mandatory. See M.W., 876
7
N.W.2d at 225. Under the facts before us, we do not find the closeness of the
relationship between the girls and their mother outweighs their need for a
permanent placement. As one example, A.S.’s therapist reported that A.S. was
“working hard to cope with the uncertainty in her life and to find healthy ways to
get her needs met.” The therapist recommended “permanency be established as
soon as possible so [A.S.] can be reassured that she has a place to grow up and
consistent adults to care for her.” Taking that recommendation to heart, we
reach the same conclusion as the district court, finding no basis under section
232.116(3) to forgo termination of these children.
C. Additional Time
Finally, Stephanie asserts that—assuming she is not presently able to
care for the children in a safe manner—she will be able to do so after a six-month
extension. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b).5 For the reasons discussed above,
we decline to defer the children’s placement. While Stephanie may be able to
achieve greater stability in her housing and employment over time, her testimony
provides little hope she will appreciate the peril posed by her continued
association with Y.F. or will fully address her methamphetamine addiction.
Because the children had been out of the home for twelve months at the time of
the hearing, “we view the proceedings with a sense of urgency.” See In re
A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 93 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005). From our de novo review of the
5
That section reads, in relevant part:
[T]o continue placement of the child for an additional six months at which
time the court shall hold a hearing to consider modification of its
permanency order. An order entered under this paragraph shall
enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral
changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for
removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end
of the additional six-month period.
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record, we are unable to make a finding the need for removal would no longer
exist after a six-month extension.
AFFIRMED.