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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
HADDRICK BYRD
Appellant No. 849 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order March 4, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-1114802-1974
BEFORE: OTT, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED OCTOBER 31, 2016
Haddrick Byrd (Appellant) appeals from the March 4, 2016 order
denying as untimely his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
Following a jury trial in September of 1976, Appellant was found guilty
of robbery, possessing an instrument of crime, four counts of aggravated
assault, and five counts of simple assault.1 Appellant had robbed a Miles-
David clothing store at 639 South Street in Philadelphia. Appellant was
sentenced to thirty-three and one-half to sixty-seven years’ incarceration.
Appellant’s post-sentence motions were denied.
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1
Respectively, see 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701, 907, 2702, and 2701. Appellant is
also serving a life sentence for an unrelated case.
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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We reversed Appellant's judgment of sentence on direct appeal,
finding a violation of his right to a speedy trial under former Pa.R.Crim.P.
1100.2 Commonwealth v. Byrd, 378 A.2d 921 (Pa. Super. 1977). Our
Supreme Court reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
Commonwealth v. Byrd, 425 A.2d 722 (Pa. 1981). On remand, the trial
court found no violation of Rule 1100, and we affirmed on March 18, 1987.
Commonwealth v. Byrd, 526 A.2d 811 (Pa. Super. 1987). Appellant's
petition for allocatur was denied on October 19, 1987. Commonwealth v.
Byrd, 535 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1987) (table). Appellant did not petition the United
States Supreme Court for review.
On October 18, 1994, Appellant pro se filed his first petition for relief
under the PCRA alleging, inter alia, that the trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction because the charges against him were dismissed prior to trial.
Newly appointed counsel reviewed the record and filed a "no merit'' letter
pursuant to Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super 1988).
After an independent review of the record, the PCRA court dismissed the
petition without hearing. We affirmed on March 19, 1996, save vacating his
one- and two-year sentences for simple assault. Commonwealth v. Byrd,
678 A.2d 824 (Pa. Super. 1996). Appellant did not seek allocatur.
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2
See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 credits (“renumbered Rule 600 and amended March
1, 200, effective April 1, 2001.”).
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In the matter instantly before this Court, Appellant pro se filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 4, 2014, asserting that he was
being illegally held because the charges against him were dismissed prior to
trial.3 That same day, Appellant’s petition was transferred to the
Philadelphia Criminal Trial Division.4 The Honorable Jeffrey P. Minehart
concluded Appellant’s claims were cognizable under the PCRA and untimely
filed.5 On August 21, 2015, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice
of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. Appellant filed
a timely response.
In March of 2016, the court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely
by order and opinion and noted that the issues therein were previously
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3
The lower court criminal docket reflects the filing date of February 4, 2014,
however a civil docket report within the certified record notes January 17,
2014 as the original filing date.
4
Appellant subsequently filed a second habeas corpus petition on January
16, 2015, which was also transferred to the Philadelphia Criminal Trial
Division on February 3, 2015.
5
A review of this Court’s database reveals the instant PCRA petition may be
Appellant’s third, as his second was internally docketed at No. 880
Philadelphia 1997. In said appeal, styled as a writ of habeas corpus,
Appellant raised the constitutionality of his imprisonment given that a grand
jury did not indict him. In our memorandum of April 27, 1998, we
concluded the appeal was properly treated as a PCRA, and affirmed the
dismissal of his PCRA as previously litigated. For reasons unknown to this
court, the 880 Philadelphia 1997 disposition does not appear in the instant
record of our court nor the record of the lower court. Whether or not this is
Appellant’s second or third PCRA petition is of no moment in our instant
disposition.
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litigated. Appellant timely appealed pro se and filed a court-ordered
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
Appellant presents the following questions for our review:
1. Did the PCRA court commit error and abuse its discretion in
treating Appellant’s habeas corpus petition under 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
6501-6505 as a petition under the PCRA 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-
9546 and dismissing it as untimely filed without an evidentiary
hearing when the claims raised are not cognizable under the
PCRA?
2. Did the PCRA court commit error and abuse its discretion in
failing to address whether the district attorney’s office
perpetrated a fraud on the court in proceeding to trial against the
Appellant while knowing the charges were dismissed and thus the
trial court lacked statutory and constitutional authority to proceed
in this case and impose a void judgement/sentence and
commitment order in violation of due process?
Appellant’s Brief at viii.
In his first issue, Appellant contends the PCRA court erred when it
reviewed his petition for writ of habeas corpus under the PCRA. Appellant’s
Brief at 3-7. Appellant’s contention is incorrect.
The PCRA is the “sole means of obtaining collateral relief and
encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same
purpose…, including habeas corpus.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Both the PCRA and
the state habeas corpus statute contemplate that the PCRA subsumes the
writ of habeas corpus in circumstances where the PCRA provides a remedy
for the claim. Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 722 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. 1998).
Here, Appellant challenges the legality of his sentence. Such a claim is
cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (providing that “persons
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serving illegal sentences” may obtain relief under the PCRA); see also
Commonwealth v. Beck, 848 A.2d 987, 989 (Pa. Super 2004) (“Issues
concerning the legality of sentence are cognizable under the PCRA.”).
Additionally, the PCRA specifically provides relief for individuals serving
sentences resulting from constitutional violations and sentences imposed by
courts without jurisdiction. 42 Pa.C.S § 9543(a)(2)(i), (viii).
We review an order denying a petition under the PCRA to determine
whether the findings of the PCRA court are supported by the evidence of
record and free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169,
1170 (Pa. 2007). We afford the court’s findings deference unless there is no
support for them in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Brown, 48
A.3d 1275, 1277 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citing Commonwealth v. Anderson,
995 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Pa. Super. 2010)). Because the PCRA provides a
remedy for Appellant’s claims, the lower court was correct in treating the
petition as a request for relief under the PCRA.
We must next address the PCRA timeliness requirements. The
timeliness of Appellant’s petition implicates jurisdiction and may not be
altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of his claim.
Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the
PCRA, all petitions seeking collateral relief must be filed within one year of
the date the judgment of sentence becomes final. Id. A judgment of
sentence becomes final at conclusion of direct review or at expiration of time
for seeking that review. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3).
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Here, Appellant’s judgement of sentence was affirmed on March 18,
1987, and our Supreme Court denied allocator on October 19, 1987.
Appellant had ninety days to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allocatur. Sup. Ct. R.
13. Thus, his sentence became final on January 17, 1988.6 42 Pa.C.S.
§9545(b)(3). The instant PCRA was filed on January 17, 2014, more than
twenty-six years after his judgment of sentence became final. The
Appellant’s petition is patently untimely, and for this Court to have
jurisdiction to review the merits of Appellant’s claims, he must prove the
applicability of one of the exceptions to the timeliness requirement.
There are three statutory exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
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6
We note that Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final prior to the
amendments to the PCRA enacted November 17, 1995, however this has no
bearing on the instant analysis, as the instant petition is not Appellant’s first.
Commonwealth v. Fenati, 732 A.2d 625, 627 (Pa. Super. 1999) (where a
defendant's judgment of sentence became final before the effective date of
the amendments, his first PCRA petition will be considered timely if it is filed
within one year of the effective date of the amendments [January 16,
1996]); Act of November 17, 1995, P.L. 1118, No. 32 (Spec. Sess. No. 1) §
3(1).
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). Appellant has the burden of proving an exception
to the time bar. Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa.
2008). In addition, a petition seeking relief pursuant to a statutory
exception must adhere to the additional requirement of filing the claim
within 60 days of the date the claim could have been first presented. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, Appellant’s petition does not plead or prove an exception to the
timeliness requirement. Consequently, the PCRA court did not have
jurisdiction to review the merits of Appellant’s claims. See Commonwealth
v. Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. Super. 1999) (“Although the legality of a
sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must first
satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions thereto.”). Thus, we
affirm the PCRA court’s denial of Appellant’s untimely PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/31/2016
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