J-S34018-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
STEVENS & LEE, P.C., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
TED A. CRESSWELL,
Appellant No. 1832 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered September 21, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County
Civil Division at No: 15-12326
BEFORE: PANELLA, STABILE, and JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 01, 2016
Appellant, Ted A. Cresswell (“Cresswell”), appeals from the September
21, 2015 order of the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County (“trial court”),
granting Stevens & Lee, P.C.’s (“S&L”) motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Upon review, we affirm.
The trial court provided the following factual and procedural history:
[S&L] brought suit against [] Cresswell, Appellant, on May
18, 2015[,] for two counts of [b]reach of [c]ontract. [S&L]
alleged that [Cresswell], a former client, failed to pay legal
bills after hiring [S&L] to represent him on one criminal
and two civil matters. [Cresswell] signed two engagement
letters after hiring [S&L] in 2013 agreeing to specified
hourly rates and retainers. See Complaint Exhibit A and B.
[S&L] alleges that [Cresswell] has paid only $25,000.00 of
his legal bills, leaving an unpaid balance of $133,549.79.
[Cresswell] filed an answer to [S&L’s] [c]omplaint on June
29, 2015[,] after which [S&L] filed a [m]otion for
[j]udgment on the [p]leadings which was granted by [the
trial court] on September 21, 2015.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/10/15, at 1. This appeal followed.
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On appeal, Cresswell raises two intertwined issues for review.
I. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in granting [j]udgment on
the [p]leadings when there was clearly a dispute as to
material facts when [Cresswell] denied with sufficient
specificity the allegations in the [c]omplaint in civil action?
II. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred in granting [j]udgment on
the [p]leadings by finding that [Cresswell’s] denials were not
sufficiently specific such that they would be deemed an
admission?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
This Court’s standard of review of an order granting judgment on the
pleadings is well established.
Appellate review of an order granting judgment on the
pleadings is plenary and we apply the same standard
employed by the trial court. Our review is confined to the
pleadings and relevant documents. We must accept as
true all well pleaded statements of facts, admissions, and
any documents properly attached to the pleadings
presented by the party against whom the motions is filed,
considering only those facts that were specifically
admitted.
Southwestern Energy Prod. Co. v. Forest Res., LLC, 83 A.3d 177, 185
(Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “The grant of a motion for judgment
on the pleadings will be affirmed by an appellate court only when the moving
party’s right to succeed is certain and the case is so free from doubt that a
trial would clearly be a fruitless exercise.” Swift v. Milner, 538 A.2d 28, 31
(Pa. Super. 1988) (citation omitted).
Due to the interconnected nature of Cresswell’s issues, this Court will
first address Cresswell’s second issue: whether the trial court erred by
finding that Cresswell’s denials were not sufficiently specific and deemed an
admission. Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1029, requires that:
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(a) A responsive pleading shall admit or deny each
averment of fact in the preceding pleading or any part
thereof to which it is responsive. A party denying only
a part of an averment shall specify so much of it as is
admitted and shall deny the remainder. Admissions
and denials in a responsive pleading shall refer
specifically to the paragraph in which the averment
admitted or denied is set forth.
(b) Averments in a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is required are admitted when not denied
specifically or by necessary implication. A general
denial or a demand for proof, except as provided by
subdivisions (c) and (e) of this rule, shall have the
effect of an admission.
(c) A statement by a party that after reasonable
investigation the party is without knowledge or
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of
an averment shall have the effect of a denial.
(d) Averments in a pleading to which no responsive
pleading is required shall be deemed to be denied.
(e) In an action seeking monetary relief for bodily injury,
death or property damage, averments in a pleading to
which a responsive pleading is required may be denied
generally except the following averments of fact which
must be denied specifically:
(1) averments relating to the identity of the
person by whom a material act was
committed, the agency or employment of such
person and the ownership, possession or
control of the property or instrumentality
involved;
(2) if a pleading seeks additional relief, averments
in support of such other relief; and
(3) averments in preliminary objections.
Pa.R.C.P. No. 1029.
In Swift, a panel of this Court held that where the salient paragraphs
contained the single word “Denied,” these general denials manifested
admission to the facts averred in the complaint and judgment on the
pleadings was warranted. Swift, 538 A.2d at 31.
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In the matter sub judice, Cresswell’s answers to the material
allegations in the complaint are “[a]dmitted,”1 “[t]he document speaks for
itself,”2 and “[d]enied and strict proof demanded.”3 The trial court found
that the responses “[d]enied and strict proof demanded” constituted general
denials pursuant to Rule 1029(b). We agree. Rule 1029(b) clearly states
that a “general denial or demand for proof . . . shall have the effect of an
admission.” Pa.R.C.P. No. 1029(b) (emphasis added). Cresswell’s argument
fails.
Next, Cresswell argues that the trial court’s grant of judgment on the
pleadings was in error because there was a dispute as to the material facts.
As discussed above, all of Cresswell’s general denials have the effect of an
admission; therefore, all of the facts in the complaint have been admitted
and there is no dispute as to the material facts. Cresswell’s argument fails.
Cresswell further argues that the trial court could have provided
Cresswell an opportunity to amend his answer rather than enter judgment.
Cresswell did not include this issue in his concise statement; therefore, the
issue is waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Even if this Court did not find
waiver, Cresswell would not be entitled to relief. In Swift, this Court held
____________________________________________
1
In response to ¶¶ 1, 2, 6, 8, 14, and 16 of the complaint.
2
In response to ¶¶ 7 and 15 of the complaint.
3
In response to ¶¶ 9, 10, 17, and 18 of the complaint.
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that an identical argument was abandoned because there was no effort to
amend the answer made in the trial court between the date the motion for
judgment on the pleadings was filed and the date it was granted. 4 Swift,
538 A.2d at 31. In the matter sub judice, Cresswell did not file any
document or pleading, including an answer to the motion for judgment on
the pleadings, between the filing of the answer to the complaint and the
notice of appeal. This argument fails.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/1/2016
____________________________________________
4
In Swift, there was a motion for amendment of answer filed after
judgment on the pleadings was entered; however, it was denied pursuant to
a local rule. This Court found that the appellant abandoned the issue as
there was no attempt to remedy the flaw in the motion. Swift, 538 A.2d at
31.
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