J-S74031-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
STEPHANO BROTHERS REAL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ESTATE INVESTMENT : PENNSYLVANIA
ASSOCIATES :
:
:
v. :
:
:
DEBORAH WILLIAMS : No. 2571 EDA 2015
:
Appellant
Appeal from the Order Entered July 22, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): 2015-13541
DEBORAH WILLIAMS : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
STEPHANO BROTHERS REAL : No. 2629 EDA 2015
ESTATE INVESTMENT :
ASSOCIATES
Appeal from the Order July 31, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
Civil Division at No(s): No. 2015-13541
BEFORE: OTT, J., RANSOM, J., STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 02, 2016
Deborah Williams pro se appeals from the order entered on July 22,
2015, which struck Appellant’s appeal and permitted Appellee to proceed
with eviction. Appellant also appeals from the order entered on July 31,
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court
J-S74031-16
2015, which denied Appellant’s Petition to Reopen and Petition to Appeal
Nunc Pro Tunc. In that order, the court further dictated that money held in
escrow be applied to satisfy the judgment against her. 1 We affirm.
In March of 2012, Appellant moved into her daughter’s residence at
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue N-3, Oreland, PA 19075. Appellant was added to
her daughter’s residential lease through a roommate addendum. Appellant’s
daughter vacated the premises in December of 2014, while Appellant
remained as a tenant.
In May of 2015, Appellee filed a landlord-tenant action against
Appellant in magisterial district court due to her failure to pay rent. On May
15, 2015, a judgement was entered in favor of Appellee for $1,640.60, plus
possession of the premises, if the judgment was not satisfied at the time of
the eviction.2 On June 15, 2015, Appellant appealed the decision to the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. On June 25, 2015, Appellee
filed an Emergency Motion to Strike Appeal, asserting that the appeal was
untimely. On July 17, 2015, the common pleas court held a hearing on
Appellee’s motion. On July 22, 2015, the court issued an order granting
____________________________________________
1
On September 30, 2015, this Court issued a Per Curiam order consolidating
the appeals at Superior Court docket numbers 2571 and 2629 EDA 2015.
2
Appellant was not present at the district court hearing. Rather, her
daughter appeared on Appellant’s behalf. Appellant’s daughter was not a
party to this action and was, therefore, barred from testifying and presenting
evidence on Appellant’s behalf.
-2-
J-S74031-16
Appellee’s motion, striking Appellant’s appeal, and permitting Appellee to
proceed with eviction.
On July 23, 2015, Appellant filed a Petition for Stay of Eviction and,
the following day, filed a Petition to Reopen and Emergency Motion for Stay
of Eviction. A second hearing was held on July 31, 2015. At the conclusion
of the hearing, the court denied both of Appellant’s motions. The court
further ordered that Appellee receive the entire $2,030.00 held in escrow by
the Montgomery County Prothonotary. This amount satisfied Appellee’s
judgment, and a portion of Appellant’s June 2015 rent. In August 2015,
Appellant filed separate notices of appeal from the orders entered July 22,
2015, and July 31, 2015. The trial court did not direct Appellant to file a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but the court filed an opinion explaining its
decision.
Appellant raises the following issues:
1. Whether Minor Court Rules Committee unintentionally
misled Appellant in its amendments to Title 246, Chapter 1002 in
providing protection for victims of domestic violence, without
disclosing the proper procedure for securing protection?
2. Whether Appellant meets the standard as a victim of
domestic violence, per the 30-day window specifically defined for
such victims? If so, thereby find an error of law occurred when
the trial Court, too, inadvertently was misled in striking
Appellant’s SUPERSEDEAS [sic] appeal?
3. Whether an error of law occurred when representative
appeared on behalf of Appellant was withdrawn as a party at the
district justice hearing then barred from testifying and
presenting evidence to support her mother’s case.
4. Whether there was a breakdown in the court process
where Prothonotary’s office refused to file Appellants’ [sic]
-3-
J-S74031-16
Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc within 24 hours of appeal being stricken?
Additionally, whether the Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc was indeed filed
timely, and further met the 3 requisite elements to be granted?
5. Whether covenants in lease of Appellant mandating: 1)
“waiver of right to sue,” 2) “assumption of all legal costs” and,
3) “legal fees can be “recovered as rent”” can withstand
substantive and procedural unconscionability in an action which
is frivolous, and unlawful [“for-profit scheme] in violation of the
Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law of
Pennsylvania? (UTPCPL)
6. Whether Appellant is entitled to receipts upon tender of
payments for rent, fees, etc. to Appellee in satisfaction of the
statutorily mandated protection afforded under the Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection law of Pennsylvania?
7. Whether the instant and prior actions constitute Abuse of
Process upon which relief could be granted?
Appellant’s Brief at 2-4.
The issues raised in these consolidated appeals overlap. Accordingly,
we will address them together. Upon our review, Appellant’s second issue
raised is dispositive. According to Appellant, the common pleas court erred
in striking her appeal as untimely. The Landlord Tenant Act establishes time
constraints within which a party must file an appeal to the court of common
pleas. The Act provides:
Within ten days after the rendition of judgment by a lower court
arising out of residential lease or within thirty days after a
judgment by a lower court arising out of a nonresidential lease
or a residential lease involving a victim of domestic violence,
either party may appeal to the court of common pleas[.]
-4-
J-S74031-16
68 P.S. § 250.513(b); Pa.R.Civ.P.D.J. 1002.3 Time limitations on filing
appeals are strictly construed. See, e.g., Valley Forge Ctr. Assocs. v.
Rib-It/K.P., Inc., 693 A.2d 242, 245 (Pa. Super. 1997) (interpreting
Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) and explaining that the time limitation of Pa.R.A.P. 903 is
jurisdictional in nature and must be strictly construed).
Appellant’s claim is premised upon the assertion that she is a victim of
domestic violence and, thus, had thirty days to file an appeal. The Landlord
Tenant Act defines a victim of domestic violence as “a person who has
obtained a protection from abuse order against another individual or can
provide suitable evidence as the court shall direct.” 68 P.S. § 250.513.
Following the hearing, the common pleas court dismissed Appellant’s
appeal as untimely and permitted Appellee to proceed with eviction. The
common pleas court determined that Appellant was not a victim of domestic
violence because she failed to produce a protection from abuse order, or
police reports suggesting she was a victim, and the court found that her
testimony was not credible. Trial Court Opinion, 10/13/15, at 3. When
____________________________________________
3
The time for filing an appeal from a judgment entered by a district justice
is prescribed by Pa.R.Civ.P.D.J. 1002. Pa.R.Civ.P.D.J. 1002(b) provides “[a]
party aggrieved by a judgment for the delivery of possession of real property
arising out of a residential lease may appeal therefrom within ten (10) days
after the date of the entry of judgment…” Subdivision “b” is designed to
implement the time for appeal set forth in the Landlord Tenant Act and to
clarify where right of possession of residential real estate is at issue. See
Cherry Ridge Development v. Chenoga, 703 A.2d 1061, 1062-1063 (Pa.
Super. 1997).
-5-
J-S74031-16
reviewing a trial court’s determination of credibility, it is well established that
this Court is not free to usurp the trial court’s duty as the fact finder.
Mackay v. Mackay, 984 A.2d 519, 533 (Pa. Super. 2009). As the record
supports the above credibility determination, we defer to this finding.
Thus, Appellant does not qualify for the 30-day appeal period, and her
appeal to the court of common pleas was untimely.4
Application for Emergency Relief denied. Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/2/2016
____________________________________________
4
After submission to this panel, Appellant filed an Application for Emergency
Relief, reasserting many of the claims raised in her appeal. Upon review, no
relief is due.
-6-