UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4522
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
RICARDO TYRONE WILLIAMS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 15-4523
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
QUINCY JAMEL HARGETT,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Greenville. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (4:15-cr-00023-BO-1; 4:15-cr-00023-BO-2)
Submitted: October 18, 2016 Decided: November 3, 2016
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Stuart Bruce, Acting United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas P. McNamara,
Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon, Chief Appellate
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina; Geoffrey Ryan Willis, WILLIS
JOHNSON & NELSON, PLLC, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
A federal grand jury indicted Ricardo Tyrone Williams, Jr.
and Quincy Jamel Hargett each for possession of a firearm by a
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). Williams
and Hargett moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that their
prior convictions did not qualify as felonies because they were
not punishable by a term exceeding one year. The district court
granted the motions and dismissed the indictment. The
Government appealed, and we previously granted the Government’s
motion to place these appeals in abeyance for our decision in
United States v. Barlow, 811 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 2041 (2016). When Barlow issued, the
Government moved for summary reversal. We deferred ruling on
that motion, and again placed the appeals in abeyance for
disposition of the petition for certiorari in Barlow. When that
petition was denied, the parties fully briefed the issues. For
the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand.
We review a district court's order dismissing an indictment
de novo. United States v. Good, 326 F.3d 589, 591 (4th Cir.
2003). Under North Carolina law, the presumptive range of
imprisonment for Hargett's prior offense of possession of a
stolen firearm was 6 to 17 months of imprisonment, and he was
sentenced to that range. Williams was also sentenced to the
presumptive range of 8 to 19 months of imprisonment for his
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prior conviction for possession with intent to sell marijuana.
Under North Carolina’s Justice Reinvestment Act of 2011,
however, both Hargett and Williams were required to be released
onto post-release supervision nine months before the expiration
of the their maximum sentences. The district court determined
that because Hargett and Williams had to be released prior to
serving 12 months of incarceration, those offenses were not
punishable by terms exceeding 1 year of imprisonment.
In Barlow, however, we held that the term of post-release
supervision is part of the term of imprisonment. 811 F.3d at
137-40. Therefore, we conclude that based on our decision in
Barlow, the district court erred in determining that Hargett and
Williams’ prior convictions were not predicate offenses for
purposes of § 922(g)(1).
Accordingly, we grant the Government's motion for summary
reversal, vacate the district court's orders, and remand with
instructions to reinstate the indictment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid in the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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