COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
§
ROBERT D. MAXWELL, No. 08-14-00027-CR
§
Appellant, Appeal from the
§
v. 199th Judicial District Court
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, of Collin County, Texas
§
Appellee. (TC# 199-80460-2013)
§
OPINION
Appellant Robert D. Maxwell appeals his convictions for indecency with a child. In three
issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, raises a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, and complains about the trial court’s failure to give a unanimity instruction
in the jury-charge. We affirm the convictions.1
BACKGROUND
In cause number 199-80460-2013, Appellant was indicted on four counts of indecency
with a child, M.E.2 Appellant pleaded “not guilty” to the charged offenses. A jury returned a
1
As this case was transferred from our sister court in Dallas, Texas, we decide it in accordance with the precedent
of that court. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3; see also, TEX.GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001 (West 2013).
2
To protect the complainants’ anonymity, we will refer to them by the initials of their full names. TEX.R.APP.P.
9.10(a)(3).
“guilty” verdict for two of the four counts. The judgment of the court assessed punishment at ten
years’ confinement to run consecutively with trial cause no. 199-80491-2012 on one count and
the other, ten years confinement suspended, with ten years community supervision. Appellant
now appeals his convictions on several grounds.
The complainants in these companion cases are M.E. and H.S.3 Appellant is M.E.’s
stepfather. At trial, M.E. testified that Appellant first began by taking M.E. to various stores
when M.E. was in the seventh and eighth grade. During these outings, M.E. explained,
Appellant would drive to dark and remote areas within store parking lots. M.E. further explained
that the trips first consisted of Appellant exposing himself and asking M.E. to watch, which M.E.
refused. M.E. described how, over time, Appellant ridiculed M.E. into watching Appellant
masturbate and later, “talked [M.E.] into touching [Appellant]” While M.E. was unable to
remember the specifics of all the incidents, M.E. testified that these “parking lot” incidents
occurred more than once and gradually progressed to Appellant forcing M.E. to masturbate
Appellant.
M.E. also testified to certain “swimming” incidents. M.E. described how, on more than
one occasion at the pool, Appellant began by tickling M.E. and M.E.’s friend, H.S. M.E. further
testified that Appellant would then follow M.E. and H.S. around in the pool and grab both M.E.
and H.S.’s breasts over their bathing suits—what M.E. referred to as scooping. Lastly, M.E.
testified to certain “mudding” incidents. During these outings, M.E. explained that Appellant
would drive recklessly in order to startle both M.E. and H.S. M.E. explained that to make
Appellant stop the reckless driving, M.E. had to kiss H.S. Once stopped, M.E. explained,
Appellant would get out of the vehicle and masturbate. In addition, M.E. testified to a mudding
3
This appeal, 08-14-00027-CR (cause no. 199-80460-2013) is a companion case to 08-14-00028-CR (cause no.
199-80491-2012). These cases were tried jointly. M.E. is the complainant in 199-80460-2013, the case at hand, and
H.S. is the complainant in the companion case 199-80491-2012 (08-14-00028-CR).
2
incident where Appellant grabbed H.S.’s breast.
M.E.’s first forensic interview was with Lydia Conner. During this interview, M.E. made
certain allegations that Sergeant Jim Blackburn (“Sgt. Blackburn”) with the Collin County
Sheriff’s Office reviewed. Sgt. Blackburn testified that while he did not think there was enough
to charge a crime, “it seemed that there was enough happened [sic] that it disturbed [M.E.]
enough to make the allegation.” At trial, M.E. testified that she previously told a friend that
Appellant raped M.E., which had given rise to this first interview. While Sgt. Blackburn
declined to further investigate, he did refer the interview to Child Protective Services.
M.E. admitted during trial that she previously lied when she told a friend at school that
Appellant raped M.E. Nevertheless, M.E. testified that while she initially lied to investigators
and denied that anything occurred, moving to Nebraska and away from Appellant made it easier
to talk about the incidents.
Sandra Maddox (“Ms. Maddox”) also testified at trial. Ms. Maddox lived in Appellant’s
neighborhood. Ms. Maddox testified that after uncomfortably observing M.E. and H.S. interact
with Appellant, she invited M.E. to her barn where M.E. confessed that on one occasion on their
way to the store, Appellant stopped his vehicle, masturbated, and made M.E. touch Appellant’s
penis. Sometime after M.E.’s conversation with Ms. Maddox, Ms. Maddox called H.S.’s older
brother and informed him of her concerns. H.S.’s bother informed his parents about the contents
of the call, and H.S.’s parents ultimately notified the police.
M.E.’s father also testified at trial. Appellant attempted to question M.E.’s father about
an allegation that M.E. made involving M.E.’s father’s father-in-law. Outside the presence of
the jury, Appellant explained that this testimony would establish that when M.E.’s mother was
displeased, M.E. would fabricate allegations of abuse so that M.E.’s mother could get her way.
3
Specifically, and still outside the presence of the jury, M.E.’s father explained that once after
leaving Nebraska, M.E. told M.E.’s mother that M.E.’s father’s father-in-law had a sexual
conversation—what M.E.’s father referred to as a “sex talk”—with M.E. M.E.’s father stated
that M.E.’s mother did not want M.E. to return to Nebraska with M.E.’s father because of this
conversation. M.E.’s father further explained that this allegation was never investigated or
confirmed. M.E. never returned to Nebraska. After listening to arguments on the issue and the
M.E.’s father’s testimony, the trial court ruled that M.E.’s father’s testimony was inadmissible
and was therefore not presented to the jury. Appellant’s first issue is regarding the trial court’s
ruling on the Nebraska allegation testimony.
Andrea Kemp (“Ms. Kemp”), a forensic interviewer with the Family Advocacy Network
in Kearney, Nebraska, testified on the State’s behalf as an expert witness. 4 Ms. Kemp conducted
M.E.’s second forensic interview in Nebraska. During cross-examination, Appellant’s trial
counsel asked Ms. Kemp how many forensic interviews Ms. Kemp had conducted and, in a
follow-up question, also asked how many of these interviews were ultimately determined false
outcries. Ms. Kemp responded to Appellant’s trial counsel’s follow-up question, without any
objection, that “maybe two or three percent” were false outcries. In a second issue, Appellant
argues that the Appellant’s trial counsel was ineffective by eliciting this inadmissible testimony.
The State charged Appellant with four counts of indecency with a child by: (1) touching
M.E.’s genital’s with Appellant’s hand; (2) causing the hand of M.E. to touch Appellant’s
genitals; (3) touching the breasts of M.E.; and (4) exposing part of Appellant’s genitals. The jury
acquitted Appellant on Counts (1) and (3) and convicted Appellant on Counts (2) and (4).
In the companion case, trial cause no. 199-80491-2012, Appellant was indicted on seven
4
The record does not contain a witness list nor was Ms. Kemp designated as an expert at trial, however, both the
Appellant and the State referred to Ms. Kemp as an expert.
4
counts of indecency with a child by touching the breasts of a child, H.S. After the close of
evidence, however, the State proceeded with only two of the seven counts. The jury returned a
“guilty” verdict for both counts.
The jury-charge stated the unanimity requirement in the “Presiding Juror” section. The
jury-charge in this case contained a general unanimity instruction informing the jury that, “[y]our
verdict must be unanimous and signed by the presiding juror.” In a third issue, Appellant asserts
that the trial court erred when it did not give the jury a more explicit unanimity instruction
concerning which incident of exposure constituted the indecency by exposure count.
DISCUSSION
In three issues, Appellant asserts that: (1) the trial court erred by excluding impeachment
evidence (the Nebraska allegation) that the complainant, M.E., previously accused a relative of
having an “inappropriate” sexual conversation with M.E.; (2) trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by eliciting inadmissible testimony regarding the truthfulness of the class of persons to
whom the complainants belong; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to give a unanimity
instruction requiring the jurors to unanimously agree which of the alleged incidents at trial
constituted each of the charged offenses.
1. Exclusion of Impeachment Evidence
Appellant first argues the trial court should have admitted testimonial evidence of the
Nebraska allegation since it showed M.E.’s motive to lie and facilitate M.E.’s mother’s desires to
keep M.E. with her, which, in turn, would undermine M.E.’s credibility.
A. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence under an abuse of
discretion standard. Jackson v. State, Nos. 05-13-00579-CR, 05-13-00580-CR, 2014 WL
5
3955171, at *1 (Tex.App--Dallas Aug. 14, 2014, no pet.)(mem. op., not designated for
publication), citing Page v. State, 213 S.W.3d 332, 337 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). A trial court’s
determination that is within the zone of reasonable disagreement will not be disturbed on appeal.
Jackson, 2014 WL 3955171 at *1, citing Burden v. State, 55 S.W.3d 608, 615 (Tex.Crim.App.
2001).
B. Analysis
It is well established that a witness’s credibility may not be impeached with specific
instances of the witness’s conduct other than specific criminal convictions. TEX.R.EVID. 608(b).
Nevertheless, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has acknowledged that the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment may require admission of evidence that Rule 608(b) would
otherwise bar. Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). In Lopez, appellant
Lopez was charged and convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a
child. Id. at 222. Lopez purportedly compelled a twelve-year-old to perform oral sex on Lopez
over the course of several months. Id. at 221. Lopez unsuccessfully attempted to impeach the
twelve-year-old’s credibility with testimonial evidence about a complaint the twelve-year-old
previously made: that his mother had thrown him against a washing machine. Id. The Court in
Lopez held that sex abuse cases create no per se exception to Rule 608(b) and, in balancing the
probative value of the testimonial evidence against the risk of admission, determined this
testimonial evidence would unduly prejudice the jury. Id. at 225–26. In conducting its analysis,
the Court found that while the twelve-year-old’s credibility was a crucial issue a trial, the fact
that the washing machine incident was never proven false, in addition to its dissimilarity to oral
sex, meant it would very likely confuse the jury. Id. at 226 (“Its probative value was extremely
low, and the risk that its admission would confuse the jury was high.”).
6
The Court, however, has found that a defendant is entitled to show any relevant fact that
might tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, interest, or animus on the part of any witness
testifying against him, subject to reasonable restrictions. Billodeau v. State, 277 S.W.3d 34, 43
(Tex.Crim.App. 2009), citing TEX.R.EVID. 613(b). Finding that the trial court abused its
discretion, the Court in Billodeau determined the defendant was entitled to present evidence that
the child-complainant in an aggravated sexual assault prosecution made false threats accusing
two neighbors of sexual molestation. Id. at 43. There, child-complainant alleged the defendant
had kissed the child-complainant, put his penis in the child-complainant’s anus, and then threated
to kill the child-complainant if the child-complainant told anyone about the incident. Id. at 37.
The child-complainant in Billodeau suffered from a mental illness since the age of four up until
the date of the alleged incident, when the child-complainant was eight years of age. Id. at 37-38.
The Court noted that this mental illness contributed to the child-complainant’s acts of rage and
anger and that the child-complainant understood the definition molestation. Id. at 38, 42. The
Court determined that the child-complainant’s previous false threats accusing neighbors of
molestation when angry about perceived injustices were similar to the issue on appeal there: the
accusation that the defendant in Billodeau had molested the child-complainant. Id. at 43. In
conducting a non-constitutional, Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b)5 analysis, the Court
determined that the defendant in Billodeau was entitled to present evidence of the false threats
after the child-complainant denied making the false threats. Id. at 43.
We find that the present case falls in line with Lopez. Like Lopez, the Nebraska
allegation was never developed nor shown to be false. See Lopez, 18 S.W.3d at 225-26. In
addition, the Nebraska allegation was dissimilar to the parking lot, swimming, and mudding
5
The rule provides: “Any other error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be
disregarded.” See, TEX.R.APP.P. 44.2(b).
7
incidents, namely: the Nebraska allegation involved a “sex talk” while the others involved more
than a conversation. See id. Moreover, this case involved multiple incidents (the parking lot,
swimming, and mudding incidents) and two victims with similar allegations, unlike Billodeau,
which involved one allegation of molestation against the defendant and one victim, who suffered
from a mental illness. Billodeau, 277 S.W.3d at 38-42. Lastly, the Appellant cross-examined
M.E. but failed to mention the Nebraska allegation; as such, M.E. never denied the allegation at
trial, which would have then given rise to a 613(b)(3)6 examination.7 As such, we find the trial
court did not abuse its discretion and that the risk of confusion was high, outweighing the
testimony’s probative value. Because we find the present case in line with Lopez and unlike
Billodeau, Appellant’s first issue is overruled.
2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In a second issue, Appellant contends that his trial counsel’s representation was
ineffective when counsel elicited inadmissible testimony: namely, expert testimony regarding the
truthfulness of the class of persons to which the complainants belong.
A. Standard of Review
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must establish by
a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) trial counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that
this deficient performance deprived appellant of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Ex parte Chandler, 182 S.W.3d 350,
353 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Appellant must satisfy both Strickland components; the failure to
6
Texas Rules of Evidence 613(b)(3) provides, in relevant part, that when examining a witness about a bias or
interest, a party must first inform the witness of the circumstances surrounding the bias or interest and the witness
“must be given the opportunity to explain or deny” the circumstances, and only if the witness denies can extrinsic
evidence be admitted. [Emphasis added].
7
The Appellant and the State failed to discuss this rule on appeal.
8
satisfy either will defeat his ineffectiveness claim. Perez v. State, 310 S.W.3d 890, 893
(Tex.Crim.App. 2010).
Under the first prong of Strickland, the appellant must show that trial counsel’s
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698,
104 S.Ct. at 2064. Stated differently, the appellant must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that trial counsel’s actions did not meet the objective norms for professional conduct.
Mitchell v. State, 68 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Under the second prong of
Strickland, the appellant must establish that there is a reasonable probability that but for trial
counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the case would have been different. Mitchell,
68 S.W.3d at 642. Reasonable probability is that which is sufficient to undermine the confidence
in the outcome. Id.
We presume that the representation fell within the wide range of reasonable and
professional assistance. Mallett v. State, 65 S.W.3d 59, 63 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Ineffective
assistance claims must be firmly founded in the record to overcome this presumption. Thompson
v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). In most direct appeals, this task is very
difficult because the record is undeveloped and, as such, cannot reflect the potential failings of
trial counsel. Id. at 813-14. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are generally not
successful on direct appeal because of the undeveloped record and are thus more appropriately
developed an application for writ of habeas corpus. Lopez v. State, 343 S.W.3d 137, 143
(Tex.Crim.App. 2011). “[W]hen no reasonable trial strategy could justify the trial counsel’s
conduct, counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness as a matter
of law, regardless of whether the record adequately reflects the trial counsel’s subjective reasons
for acting as [trial counsel] did.” Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).
9
B. Analysis
Expert testimony that a particular witness is truthful is inadmissible under Rule 702.8
Yount v. State, 872 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). Moreover, an expert may not give
an opinion that a complainant, such as a sexual assault victim, or the complainant’s class is
truthful. Yount, 872 S.W.2d at 712; cf. Schutz v. State, 957 S.W.2d 52, 71 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997)
(testimony regarding the ability to perceive is allowed whereas a tendency testimony is not
allowed). Appellant points to several cases where our sister courts found a defendant’s trial
counsel to be ineffective based on the admission of inadmissible expert testimony regarding a
witness’s testimony. In each of the cases, however, the ineffective assistance stemmed from the
trial counsel’s failure to object to inadmissible expert opinion testimony regarding each of the
child-complainant’s truthfulness.
In Fuller v. State, the State elicited the expert’s opinion testimony regarding “[the
expert’s] particular determination of [the child-complainant’s] truthfulness.” 224 S.W.3d 823,
835 (Tex.App--Texarkana 2007, no pet.). On appeal, “[appellant] complain[ed] his counsel was
ineffective in not objecting[.]” Id. at 829. In Sessums v. State, four expert witnesses were asked
“to explain and then comment directly on the factors they used in determining if this [child-
complainant] was telling the truth.” 129 S.W.3d 242, 248 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 2004, pet.
ref’d). On appeal, “[appellant] argue[d] counsel was ineffective because he did not object[.]” Id.
at 246. In Miller v. State, two experts and the child-complainant’s mother testified “that each
believed [child-]complainant was telling the truth[.]” 757 S.W.2d 880, 883 (Tex.App.--Dallas
1988, pet. ref’d). In resolving the appeal, the court determined that the testimony “was
inadmissible and should have been objected to by defense counsel.” Id. at 883. Lastly, in
8
Texas Rule of Evidence 702 provides, in relevant part: “A witness who is qualified as an expert . . . will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”
10
Garcia v. State, a detective and an expert testified over “the truthfulness of the testimony of the
complaining witnesses.” 712 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tex.App.--El Paso 1986, pet. ref’d). On appeal,
the complaint was “the failure to make proper objections to exclude the inadmissible and
prejudicial testimony . . . .” Id.
The present case is different: Appellant’s trial counsel elicited the complained-of
testimony regarding M.E. truthfulness. Appellant’s trial counsel began by inquiring into Ms.
Kemp’s interview process. After asking how many forensic interviews Ms. Kemp had
conducted, Appellant’s trial counsel asked how many were ultimately determined to be false
outcries, which Ms. Kemp responded, “maybe two to three percent.” Appellant’s trial counsel
followed up by inquiring into the cause of the false outcries, and Ms. Kemp explained that most
of these false outcries involved custody battles. Appellant’s trial counsel never inquired into Ms.
Kemp’s specific opinion of M.E.’s truthfulness.
Although the reasons for trial counsel’s conduct may not readily appear in the record, if
there is at least a possibility the conduct could have been a part of a legitimate trial strategy, we
will generally defer to trial counsel’s decisions. Ortiz v. State, 93 S.W.3d 79, 88-89
(Tex.Crim.App. 2002). The record is entirely void of any explanation for trial counsel’s
conduct. In reviewing the entire dialogue surrounding the complained-of testimony, we find that
a possible motive was to suggest that allegations of abuse may arise in custody battles—as in
M.E.’s case. Applying the presumption of reasonable professional assistance, and in finding a
possible trial strategy, we conclude that Appellant has failed to satisfy the first prong of
Strickland. See King v. State, 91 S.W.3d 375, 383 (Tex.App.--Texarkana 2002, pet. ref’d)
(holding that where trial counsel acted affirmatively and the record was undeveloped, the
appellant failed the first prong of Strickland); see also Sorrells v. State, No. 03-08-00072-CR,
11
2010 WL 1404625, at *10 (Tex.App.--Austin Apr. 9, 2010, pet. ref’d)(mem. op., not designated
for publication)(holding that where “the record is undeveloped with regard to defense counsel’s
reasoning for his actions, and because his actions could reasonably have been part of a sound
trial strategy, we conclude [the appellant] has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that
defense counsel provided deficient performance . . . .”)[Emphasis added].9 Because Appellant
must satisfy both prongs of Strickland and he failed this first prong, we decline to address the
second prong. For the above reasons, we overrule Appellant’s second issue.
3. Unanimity Instruction
In a third issue, Appellant argues the trial court erred by failing to give a unanimity
instruction requiring the jurors to unanimously agree which alleged incident discussed at trial
constituted each of the charged offenses.
A. Standard of Review
Appellate courts review claims regarding jury-charge errors under a two-pronged test.
Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984). First, we must determine
whether error exists; second, if error exists, we then evaluate the harm caused by the error. Ngo
v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Next, if there is a charge error, the degree
of harm required for reversal depends on whether the error was preserved at trial. Almanza, 686
S.W.2d at 171; Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 278 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). If the error was
preserved, we review for “some harm” whereas unpreserved errors are reversible only for
egregious harm. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.
B. Analysis
The governing law in Texas requires that a jury verdict be unanimous in all criminal
9
We also note that Appellant’s trial counsel referred to “our trial strategy” during the trial and was attentive enough
to object to a possible hearsay statement before it was made.
12
cases. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 36.29(a)(West Supp. 2016); Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d
766, 771 (Tex.Crim.App. 2011). Stated differently, “the jury must be unanimous in finding
every constituent element of the charged offense in all criminal cases.” Jourdan v. State, 428
S.W.3d 86, 94 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014). Unanimity “means that the jury must ‘agree upon a single
and discrete incident that would constitute the commission of the offense alleged.’” Cosio, 353
S.W.3d at 771, (quoting Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 717 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007)).
“[T]hree variations may result in non-unanimous verdicts as to a particular incident of
criminal conduct[.]” [Internal citations and footnotes omitted]. Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 771. Of
the three variations, Appellant basis his non-unanimity appeal on the fact that the State charged a
particular offense and presented evidence that the defendant committed that offense on multiple,
separate occasions. See Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 772. If the State presents evidence that the
defendant committed the charged offense on multiple occasions, the trial court can ensure
unanimity by instructing the jury that its verdict must be unanimous as to a single offense among
those presented. Id. at 772. The instruction, however, should not refer to any specific evidence
and should permit the jury to return a general verdict. Id. at 776. A constitutional unanimity
violation is subject to the constitutional harm standard when properly preserved by a timely and
specific objection at trial. Id. at 776; see TEX.R.APP.P. 33.1(a). A jury-charge error, however,
will never be waived by a defendant’s failure to object at trial. Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. In
the present case, the issue has not been properly preserved therefore we analyze a charge error, if
there is one, under the egregious harm standard. See Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 776.
i. Jury-Charge Error
When analyzing a potential jury-charge error, we must first determine if error exists.
Ngo, 175 S.W.3d at 743. Appellant claims that the State charged one offense (indecency with a
13
child by exposure) and presented evidence that the defendant committed the offense on multiple
occasions. Appellant’s trial counsel did not raise a jury-charge issue at trial. As an initial matter,
we note that the jury-charge in this case contained the general unanimity instruction informing
the jury that, “[y]our verdict must be unanimous and signed by the presiding juror.” Appellant
argues that this instruction was insufficient because the State presented evidence of more than
one incident to prove the offense of indecency with a child by exposure.10 See Cosio, 353
S.W.3d at 772 (“non-unanimity may occur when the State charges one offense and presents
evidence that the defendant committed the charged offense on multiple but separate occasions.”).
Appellant insists that the trial court should have submitted a unanimity instruction for
each count. At trial, Appellant did not produce an alternate jury-charge. While a more explicit
unanimity jury-charge could help reduce the likelihood of the error Appellant raises in this issue,
we cannot conclusively say, without a posited alternative jury-charge, that the failure to provide
a hypothetical instruction with a more explicit unanimity requirement would result in a jury-
charge error. See Curry v. State, 222 S.W.3d 745, 753 (Tex.App.--Waco 2007, pet. ref’d)(noting
that courts presume that juries follow the general unanimity instruction).
The jury-charge contained one count of indecency with a child by exposure. As such, the
jury could have based their conviction of evidence of anyone of the repeated parking lot
incidents, up until they progressed to actual contact, in order to unanimously find that the
Appellant exposed himself to M.E.
10
Appellant incorrectly claimed in his original appeal brief that the jury-charge contained two counts of indecency
by exposure out of the four total counts. The indictment and the jury charge show one charge of indecency by
exposure; the remaining three were charges of indecency by touching. Appellant only challenged the exposure
count in the original brief, the State acknowledged the possibility of error regarding the touching counts in its
response, which prompted appellant to raise both exposure and touching errors in the reply brief. For the purposes
of this opinion, we will consider only those arguments raised in the original brief. See U.S. Lawns, Inc. v. Castillo,
347 S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 2011, pet. denied)(It is well settled that Rule 38.3 “does not allow
an appellant to include in a reply brief a new issue in response to a matter pointed out in [the] appellee’s brief but
not raised by the appellant’s original brief.”); see also TEX.R.APP.P. 38.3.
14
ii. Harm Analysis
Assuming, for the sake of argument, the charge was erroneous, because Appellant failed
to preserve the jury-charge error at trial, reversal is warranted only if the error resulted in
egregious harm. See Neal, 256 S.W.3d at 278. Appellant relies on the San Antonio Court of
Appeal’s decision in Arrington, another child sex abuse case in which the court overturned a
conviction for jury-charge error, but that decision was reversed. Arrington v. State, 413 S.W.3d
106 (Tex.App.--San Antonio 2013), rev’d, 451 S.W.3d 834 (Tex.Crim.App. 2015).
“An egregious harm determination must be based on a finding of actual father than
theoretical harm.” Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 777. Actual harm is established when the erroneous
jury instruction affected “the very basis of the case,” “deprive[d] the defendant of a valuable
right,” or “vitally affect[ed] a defensive theory.” Id. In assessing harm, we consider: (1) the
entire jury charge; (2) the state of the evidence, including contested issues and the weight of the
probative evidence; (3) the parties’ arguments; and (4) all other relevant information in the
record. Id. This analysis is done on a case-by-case basis. Gelinas v. State, 398 S.W.3d 703, 710
(Tex.Crim.App. 2013).
(1) The Entire Jury Charge
In Cosio, a jury convicted the defendant of two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a
child and two counts of indecency with a child by contact, each supported by evidence of
multiple incidents of criminal conduct. Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 769-70. The trial court there gave
the jury multiple instructions on unanimity, but none was adequate to appropriately inform the
jurors that they had to be unanimous as to which incident of criminal conduct they believed
constituted each count in the indictment. Id. at 774. As in Cosio, the defendant in Arrington was
charged with several different sexual offenses. Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 837-38. The charge
15
did not require the jurors to be unanimous as to which separate criminal act constituted each
count, but instead, included only a generic unanimity instruction. Id. at 838.
In light of our analysis above (Section 3.B.i.), we find that the jury instructions here were
unlikely erroneous since any one of the repeated parking lot incidents, up until the actual contact
between the Appellant and M.E., could have been the basis for the one exposure conviction. We
conclude that this factor weighs against finding egregious harm.
(2) The State of the Evidence
Under this element, we consider the entire record in determining whether the evidence
made it more or less likely that the jury-charge caused Appellant actual harm. Casio, 353
S.W.3d at 841. At trial, Appellant’s defense against the allegations was that M.E. fabricated the
allegations against him.11 Before the allegations were fully developed, M.E.’s mother intended
to move to Nebraska along with M.E. and the Appellant’s son. At trial, M.E.’s mother testified
regarding a court order prohibiting her from changing her domicile in Collin County, Texas.
Since M.E.’s mother shared a biological son with Appellant, Appellant was able to obtain a court
order preventing their son’s relocation and therefore preventing M.E.’s mother from leaving
Collin County. The State objected to the introduction of the court order. Appellant responded to
the objection by stating that the order would “show a bias of [M.E.’s mother].” M.E.’s mother
had not paid the next month’s rent in Collin County, anticipating their move to Nebraska and
was thereafter forcibly evicted. According to M.E.’s mother, when M.E. became aware of what
was happening to her mother and brother as a result of the non-relocation order, M.E. disclosed
more details regarding the misconduct of the Appellant.
If the jury had believed Appellant’s theory, it would have found him not guilty of all of
11
In his first issue on appeal, Appellant asserted that the trial committed an error in excluding testimony that would
undermine the credibility of M.E. in order to show that she had fabricated the allegations against Appellant.
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the counts of indecency. Instead, in finding Appellant guilty of two of the four counts of
indecency towards M.E., the jury necessarily disbelieved Appellant’s defensive evidence. This
first sub-factor goes against finding that the state of the evidence should be weighed in favor of
finding egregious harm.
Second, in light of our finding in Appellant’s second issue on appeal (Section 2), the
inadmissible testimony regarding the truthfulness of the class of persons to which M.E. belongs
does not implicate that the state of the evidence should be weigh in finding egregious harm.
Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 842 (Where the Court found that inadmissible testimony regarding the
child-complainant’s testimony that was admitted at trial was “before the jury to consider in
finding appellant guilty . . . .”). Where trial counsel fails to object, or, as in the present case,
offers, inadmissible testimony, the jury could properly consider it as evidence of appellant’s
guilt. Id. at 843 (“An appellate court should not disregard evidence that was admitted for all
purposes at a trial merely because it believes that a trial court could have excluded the evidence
had a proper objection been presented.”). Disregarding inadmissible but admitted evidence at
trial would be an improper focus on theoretical harm. Id. This second sub-factor goes against
finding that the state of the evidence should be weighed in favor of finding egregious harm.
Lastly, inconsistencies in a child-complainant’s testimony alone do not warrant finding
that the state of the evidence should be weighed in favor of finding egregious harm. Arrington,
451 S.W.3d at 843. In the present case, there were inconsistences regarding M.E.’s first forensic
interview, what she told Ms. Maddox, what she told a friend, and what she later said at trial.
Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that any slight inconsistencies in M.E.’s testimony had any
actual effect on the unanimity of the jury’s verdict; in finding Appellant guilty of two counts, the
jury necessarily found M.E. credible. See Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 843 (“[I]n deciding to
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convict appellant of six counts, the jury necessarily found the complainant credible. Although
[the complainant] may have been inconsistent in attempting to explain the reason for the
existence of the rumors, and was somewhat inconsistent as to the types of abuse that appellant
inflicted upon her during each of the four incidents, the jury clearly resolved any inconsistences
in favor of [the complainant], and not appellant.”).
In considering the entire record, the jury clearly credited M.E.’s story and not Appellant’s
defense. Had the jury believed Appellant’s defense, they would have acquitted Appellant on all
charges. Because the entire record fails to show actual harm to Appellant, this factor weighs
strongly against a finding of egregious harm.
(3) The Parties’ Arguments
Under this factor, we look to whether any statements made by the State, Appellant, or the
trial judge exacerbated or ameliorated error in the charge. Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 844. In
Ngo, the Court found egregious harm where the jury charge did not contain a unanimity
instruction and the jury was explicitly and repeatedly told by the prosecution and the trial judge
that it need not return a unanimous verdict. 175 S.W.3d 751 (“This is not an instance of a jury
charge which is simply missing an important word—‘unanimously’—which reasonable jurors
might infer from the context of the entire charge or from the comments of the advocates
emphasizing the correct legal principles.”).
In the present case, only Appellant’s trial counsel mentioned the unanimity requirement
in his closing argument: “If [Appellant] is found guilty of any of the charges in this case I
suggest it will be a difficult thing for you to reach unanimously or quickly.” [Emphasis added].
This factor, therefore, we believe weighs slightly against a finding of egregious harm. Cf.
Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 844 (where the Court found that the factor weighed neither for nor
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against finding egregious harm where neither party mentioned the unanimity requirement).
(4) Other Relevant Information in the Record
M.E. testified to several occasions when she felt uncomfortable: the parking lot
incidents, the swimming incidents, and the mudding incidents. M.E. testified as to how the
parking lot incidents began by exposure and progresses to actual contact. Ms. Maddox reiterated
these progressive parking lot incidents. We find that the other relevant information factor here
weighs against finding egregious harm.
(5) Conclusion of Jury-Charge Harm Analysis
Concluding that none of the factors weigh in favor of finding egregious harm, we find
that if there was a jury-charge error, it would not have caused Appellant egregious harm. See
Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 845 (Where the Court concluded that although “the only factor that
weighs in favor of finding egregious harm is the jury instructions[,] . . . the evidence in the entire
record and the analytical meaning of the jury’s verdicts in the aggregate show that the erroneous
instructions did not cause actual harm.).
C. Conclusion of Appellant’s Third Issue
The potentially “erroneous jury instructions did not cause” Appellant “egregious harm”
even if they failed to instruct the jury to be unanimous regarding what particular act or acts
“support each count” because “the evidence in the entire record and the analytical meaning of the
jury’s verdicts in the aggregate show that the erroneous instructions did not cause actual harm to
appellant.” See Arrington, 451 S.W.3d at 845; see also Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 777-78 (finding no
egregious harm even though the jury-charge allowed for non-unanimous verdicts when two other
factors did not weigh in favor of egregious harm). Issue Three is overruled.
CONCLUSION
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Having overruled Appellant’s three issues on appeal, we affirm the convictions.
October 31, 2016
YVONNE T. RODRIGUEZ, Justice
Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.
(Do Not Publish)
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