Heller v. Bedford Central School District

16-242 Heller v. Bedford Central Sch. Dist., et. al. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 4th day of November, two thousand sixteen. 5 6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 7 DEBRA A. LIVINGSTON, 8 Circuit Judges, 9 JED S. RAKOFF,* 10 District Judge. 11 12 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 13 ADAM B. HELLER, 14 Plaintiff-Appellant, 15 16 -v.- 16-242 17 18 BEDFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT; DR. 19 JERE HOCHMAN; TOWN OF POUND RIDGE; 20 DAVID RYAN; WESTCHESTER MEDICAL 21 CENTER; SUSAN KEMKER, M.D., 22 Defendants-Appellees, 23 * The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 1 1 ALEXANDER LERMAN, M.D., 2 Defendant. 3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X 4 5 FOR APPELLANT: MICHAEL H. SUSSMAN, Sussman & 6 Watkins, Goshen, New York. 7 8 FOR APPELLEES TOWN OF POUND RIDGE and DAVID RYAN: 9 STEVEN C. STERN, Sokoloff Stern 10 LLP, Carle Place, New York. 11 12 FOR APPELLEES BEDFORD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT and DR. JERE 13 HOCHMAN: RICHARD G. KASS, Bond, Schoeneck 14 & King, PLLC, New York, New 15 York. 16 17 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District 18 Court for the Southern District of New York (Forrest, J.). 19 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED 20 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be 21 AFFIRMED. 22 Adam B. Heller appeals from the judgment of the United 23 States District Court for the Southern District of New York 24 (Forrest, J.) dismissing under Rule 12(b)(6) his various § 25 1983 claims. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 26 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues 27 presented for review. We affirm on the grounds that 28 Heller’s communications presented a substantial risk of 29 disruption that, as a matter of law, justified the school 30 district’s actions; that there was probable cause for 31 Heller’s arrest and detention; that his brief commitment to 2 1 a mental institution did not shock the conscience such that 2 it violated substantive due process; and that his Second 3 Amendment challenge is baseless given that commitment. 4 Heller is a former public school teacher. In December 5 2012 and January 2013, he purchased two firearms, received a 6 third from a friend, and was shopping for a fourth. At the 7 same time, he had a month-long online conversation with 8 Georgia O’Connor via the online game Words with Friends. 9 During the course of that conversation, Heller told O’Connor 10 that he believed aliens controlled the government; that the 11 Sandy Hook school shooting (which had recently happened) was 12 fake; and that he “want[s] to kill people.” The FBI received 13 an anonymous tip about Heller in January and began 14 monitoring his online communications. They coordinated with 15 the local police department, which stopped Heller on January 16 18 as he drove home from a gun store. 17 The police induced Heller to go to a local hospital 18 where he was psychiatrically committed and later released. 19 The school district at which he worked then brought 20 disciplinary charges stating that Heller should be dismissed 21 from his teaching job because he failed to cooperate with an 22 investigation into his mental health and because he was 23 incompetent to work as a teacher due to mental illness. 24 After an eight-day hearing, a hearing officer sustained all 3 1 charges against Heller and praised the Pound Ridge police 2 department, the Bedford Central School District, and the 3 Westchester Medical Center for their roles. 4 Heller sued the school district, the school 5 superintendent, the town of Pound Ridge, Pound Ridge’s chief 6 of police, the medical center, and several of the 7 psychiatrists who examined him. He now appeals from 8 dismissal of his § 1983 claims which alleged: 1) retaliation 9 based on views he expressed in his online chat with 10 O’Connor; 2) unlawful search and detention; 3) violation of 11 substantive due process rights; and 4) violation of his 12 right to bear arms. 13 Heller’s online conversations and the record of his 14 dismissal hearing are both integral to and incorporated by 15 reference in his complaint. Roth v. Jennings, 489 F.3d 499, 16 509 (2d Cir. 2007). All parties cite these records 17 extensively and none object to their consideration on 18 appeal. 19 The District Court properly dismissed Heller’s 20 retaliation claims. At the start, Heller’s statements, 21 assuming arguendo that they relate to a matter of public 22 concern, were of such a character that “the disruption they 23 cause[d]” or threatened was “great enough to warrant the 24 school’s action against him.” Melzer v. Bd. of Educ. of 4 1 City Sch. Dist. of City of New York, 336 F.3d 185, 198 (2d 2 Cir. 2003). Indeed, although we need not reach the question 3 whether these statements constitute a “true threat,” their 4 threatening quality is highly relevant to the Pickering 5 balance. See Melzer, 336 F.3d at 198 (referencing the 6 balancing test outlined in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 7 U.S. 563 (1968)).1 8 In his online chats with O’Connor, Heller said that he 9 was “stewing in anger . . . and want[s] to kill people . . . 10 because the people who are behind [government weather 11 control] are evil.” O’Connor asked “what people do you 12 think deserve to die for the sins of an evil government,” 13 and Heller responded, “oh I don’t know. but I could probably 14 do some research and hand you a list . . . #1. Someone 15 should just shoot down one of the planes.” O’Connor said, 16 “you are scaring me,” and asked him to “just promise me you 17 arent going to kill anybody.” Heller responded “yea I 18 promise.” O’Connor brought up the “list” in a subsequent 1 The test for whether a communication is a true threat is objective, and the determination is a question of law. United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 123 at n.4 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Turner, 720 F.3d 411, 420 (2d Cir. 2013). The inquiry is “whether an ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the communication would interpret it as a threat of injury.” Id. (quoting United States v. Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir. 2006)). A statement can be a true threat even if the speaker has no intention of carrying it out. Id. 5 1 conversation, and Heller said, “there are a lot of people in 2 this country who have done seriously evill things to the 3 masses. one day, someone is going to make a list and go 4 about the task of removing them from power. That will be in 5 the middle of a civil war in America.” 6 Context is crucial to identification of a true threat. 7 Turner, 720 F.3d at 420. The context here bespeaks danger. 8 • Heller was delusional. He believed that the military 9 controlled the weather and had deliberately caused 10 Hurricane Sandy, the Haitian earthquake, and the 11 Fukushima nuclear disaster. 12 • He believed that space aliens controlled the 13 government, that the government was capable of mind 14 control, and that he was working on “deprogramming 15 himself” from that government mind control. 16 • He was a public school teacher who came into contact 17 with 125-150 students each semester. 18 • He believed that the Sandy Hook elementary school 19 killing of 26 people had been faked; he appeared to 20 have researched the shooting; and he made his 21 threatening statements within a few weeks of it. 22 • He seemed to be angry, depressed, and generally 23 emotionally “worked up.” 6 1 • And–-with no prior history of interest in guns or gun 2 ownership–-he purchased two guns, received a third from 3 a friend, and considered purchasing a fourth, all in a 4 brief period. 5 Although we need not decide whether Heller’s 6 statements constituted a true threat to determine whether 7 the Pickering balance has been satisfied, as a matter of 8 law, the record is clear that “an ordinary, reasonable 9 recipient who is familiar with the context of the 10 communication” could well have viewed Heller’s 11 communications as “a threat of injury.” Turner, 720 F.3d at 12 420. O’Connor herself seems to have interpreted them as 13 legitimate threats. United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 14 (2d Cir. 1994) (“In making this determination, proof of the 15 effect of the alleged threat upon the addressee is highly 16 relevant.”). 17 Heller argues that his statements were “off-the-cuff 18 political hyperbole written in the context of friendly 19 social media banter,” and that he ended the conversation 20 with “humor.” However, his statements appear to be in 21 earnest, and O’Connor so interpreted them. He identified 22 airplanes as targets and said that people in government 23 deserved to die; and his conduct raised prudent concern 24 about the risk of a school shooting. See Turner, 720 F.3d 7 1 at 424 (rejecting the argument that “only communications 2 that facially threaten unequivocal, unconditional, 3 immediate, and specific injury” are “true threats”). In 4 such circumstances, the school’s concern about the safety of 5 its students and the potential for “severe . . . disruption” 6 to its functioning justified its actions. See Melzer, 336 7 F.3d at 198, 199 (stating that such factors “may outweigh a 8 public employee’s rights”). 9 Heller has also failed to plausibly allege that the 10 defendants were motivated by a desire to retaliate against 11 Heller for his views. A review of the record confirms that 12 the defendants were interested in Heller’s communications 13 only insofar as they raised the prospect of a shooting spree 14 at the high school. The school district did not immediately 15 bring charges after it learned of Heller’s speech. Instead, 16 school officials worked with law enforcement to monitor the 17 situation at the high school. Next, the district ordered an 18 independent psychological evaluation of Heller. Only after 19 the evaluation process was complete did the district bring 20 charges against Heller. Moreover, the charges were not 21 based on his speech but rather (a) his unwillingness to 22 cooperate with the evaluation and (b) the possibility that 23 he might be mentally unfit to teach. As the claim of 8 1 retaliation is not plausible on its face, it must be 2 dismissed. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 3 Heller’s other First Amendment claim is that he 4 intended his gun purchases as a symbolic invocation of his 5 Second Amendment rights so that his possession constituted 6 expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. 7 Heller does not allege that anyone other than the gun store 8 employees knew of his purchases. Without more, a gun store 9 employee would understand Heller’s purchase as a routine 10 retail transaction. And since there was no likelihood that 11 the supposed message “would be understood by those who 12 viewed it,” he has not sustained his burden of demonstrating 13 more than a “plausible contention” that his purchase was 14 expressive. Church of Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. 15 Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2004); see also Nordyke v. 16 King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Typically a 17 person possessing a gun has no intent to convey a particular 18 message, nor is any particular message likely to be 19 understood by those who view it.”). 20 Heller’s Fourth Amendment claim is defeated by probable 21 cause. He argues that his arrest on January 18 and his 22 subsequent hospital detention--both based on his mental 23 health--were unlawful. Pursuant to New York’s Mental 24 Hygiene law, the police may take into custody individuals 9 1 who both appear mentally ill and pose a substantial risk of 2 physical harm to others. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law §§ 9.41, 3 9.01. Probable cause to make such an arrest means a 4 substantial chance or probability that those requirements 5 are satisfied, based on the information that the police had 6 at the time. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 245 n.13 7 (1983); Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 235 (2d 8 Cir. 2001). 9 At the time of the arrest, the police department had 10 access to Heller’s communications with O’Connor, along with 11 an anonymous tip from a friend of Heller’s and information 12 about Heller’s gun purchases. Heller’s delusional 13 communications established at least a substantial chance 14 that he was mentally ill and posed a risk of physical harm 15 to others. Since there was probable cause for both the 16 initial arrest and the detention, the Fourth Amendment 17 claims were properly dismissed. 18 Heller claims his substantive due process rights were 19 violated by his involuntary commitment. But substantive due 20 process rights are only implicated when commitment decisions 21 reflect a level of care substantially below the standards of 22 the medical community. Bolmer v. Oliveira, 594 F.3d 134, 23 142 (2d Cir. 2010). That is a level considerably worse than 24 malpractice; a level so dismissive of the patient’s rights 10 1 to care and freedom that it shocks the conscience. Cty. of 2 Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). Heller has 3 not plausibly alleged that the standards used to commit him 4 shock the conscience, and his claim was therefore properly 5 dismissed. 6 Heller’s Second Amendment claim is that his involuntary 7 commitment to a mental institution made it illegal under 8 federal law for him to purchase guns. 18 U.S.C.A. § 9 922(g)(4). Restrictions on the purchase of guns by the 10 mentally ill are presumptively lawful. D.C. v. Heller, 554 11 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“[N]othing in our opinion should be 12 taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the 13 possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.”); 14 see also New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 15 804 F.3d 242, 269 n.107 (2d Cir. 2015). Heller’s Second 16 Amendment claim was properly dismissed because the 17 restriction on gun purchases by individuals committed to a 18 mental institution is presumptively lawful, and because 19 Heller has not stated a plausible claim that he was 20 improperly committed. 21 22 23 11 1 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in 2 Heller’s other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of 3 the district court. 4 5 FOR THE COURT: 6 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK 7 12