FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 04 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: REYNALDO F. MARQUES, No. 14-56692
Debtor. D.C. No. 8:14-cv-00615-JFW
______________________________
REYNALDO F. MARQUES, MEMORANDUM*
Appellant,
v.
J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
putative assignee of FDIC as Receiver for
Washington Mutual Bank its assignees and
or successors in interest; et al.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 25, 2016 **
Before: LEAVY, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Chapter 7 debtor Reynaldo F. Marques appeals pro se from the district
court’s orders affirming the bankruptcy court’s orders dismissing Marques’
adversary proceeding without leave to amend and denying Marques’ motion for
reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). We review de
novo a district court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court, and apply the
same standard of review the district court applied to the bankruptcy court’s
decision. Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d
1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.
The bankruptcy court properly dismissed Marques’ adversary proceeding
because Marques lacks standing to pursue claims that are property of the
bankruptcy estate. See Canatella v. Towers (In re Alcala), 918 F.2d 99, 102 (9th
Cir. 1990) (causes of action which accrued before a Chapter 7 petition is filed are
part of the bankruptcy estate vested in the trustee); see also 11 U.S.C. § 554(d)
(“[P]roperty of the estate that is not abandoned under this section and that is not
administered in the case remains property of the estate.”); Estate of Spirtos v. One
San Bernardino Cty. Superior Court Case Numbered SPR 02211, 443 F.3d 1172,
1176 (9th Cir. 2006) (bankruptcy code endows bankruptcy trustee with exclusive
right to sue on behalf of estate).
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Marques leave
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to amend his complaint because his lack of standing could not be cured by
amendment. See Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he court need not extend the general rule that parties are allowed to
amend their pleadings if amendment would be an exercise in futility” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Marques’
motion under Rule 59(e) because Marques failed to demonstrate any basis for
relief. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9023 (making Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 applicable to
bankruptcy cases); Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir.
2001) (discussing factors for granting a motion for reconsideration under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e)).
Marques’ contentions that the bankruptcy court exhibited bias and violated
due process are unpersuasive because his allegations stem entirely from the
bankruptcy judge’s adverse rulings. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555
(1994) (explaining that “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis
for a bias”).
We do not consider arguments not specifically and distinctly raised and
argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir.
2009).
AFFIRMED.
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