FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 04 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JAMES J. O’HAGAN, No. 14-35142
Appellant, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-06007-BHS
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NORTHWEST FARM CREDIT
SERVICES, FLCA,
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted October 25, 2016**
Before: LEAVY, SILVERMAN, and GRABER, Circuit Judges.
James J. O’Hagan appeals pro se from the district court’s decision affirming
the bankruptcy court’s order granting Northwest Farm Credit Services, FLCA’s
motion for contempt based on violations of the automatic stay. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo a district court’s
decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court, and apply the same standard of review
the district court applied to the bankruptcy court’s decision. Christensen v. Tucson
Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1990). We
affirm.
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by finding O’Hagan in
contempt for violating the automatic stay because O’Hagan openly admitted to
taking possession of estate property and refused to cease state court litigation in an
effort to obtain an interest in the property. See Knupfer v. Lindblade (In re Dyer),
322 F.3d 1178, 1190 (9th Cir. 2003) (a party seeking an order of contempt has the
burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the contemnor violated the
automatic stay (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by denying O’Hagan’s
recusal request because O’Hagan did not demonstrate any basis for recusal. See
Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 721 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2013) (a
bankruptcy court judge must recuse him or herself when “a reasonable person with
knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned” (citation omitted)); see also Liteky v. United States, 510
2 14-35142
U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (explaining that “judicial rulings alone almost never
constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”).
We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters
not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
O’Hagan’s pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 14-35142