UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-6117
JEAN BERNARD GERMAIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.; AUTUMN DURST; KRISTI CORTEZ;
JANE DOE #2, RN; RICHARD RODERICK; WARDEN BOBBY P. SHEARIN;
CARLA BUCK; LIEUTENANT MCALPINE; LIEUTENANT CROSS; SERGEANT
G. FORNEY; CORPORAL J. WILT; OFFICER CHRISTOPHER PRESTON;
OFFICER JEREMY WOLFORD,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:13-cv-00382-JFM)
Submitted: July 18, 2016 Decided: November 7, 2016
Before Chief Judge GREGORY, and WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Jean Bernard Germain, Appellant Pro Se. Gina Marie Smith,
MEYERS, RODBELL & ROSENBAUM, PA, Riverdale, Maryland; Stephanie
Judith Lane-Weber, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jean Paul Germain appeals the district court’s orders
granting summary judgment to the Defendants and dismissing his
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. We affirm in part, vacate in
part, and remand.
Germain claimed that the Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his medical needs and engaged in cruel and
unusual punishment. We review de novo a district court’s order
granting summary judgment. D.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Balt. Bd. of
Sch. Comm’rs, 706 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2013). “Summary
judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Id. “In determining whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists, we view the facts, and draw all reasonable
inferences, in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Id. However, conflicting evidence will prevent summary
judgment only if it creates a “genuine issue of material fact.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district
court properly granted summary judgment to the Defendants on all
of Germain’s claims except Germain’s claim that Lieutenant
McAlpine, Officer Preston, and Officer Wolford engaged in cruel
and unusual punishment as they forcibly removed Germain from his
cell. Germain claims that Preston beat him on his head and
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face, knocking a tooth loose, and that either Wolford or
McAlpine twisted his right foot, causing severe pain.
“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and
unusual punishments’ [extends] to the treatment of prisoners by
prison officials . . . [,] forbid[ding] ‘the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain.’” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 317
(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319
(1986), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S.
34 (2010)). In a case such as this, the question is whether the
force “was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose
of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We observe that neither Preston, Wolford, nor McAlpine
addressed Germain’s claim that, during the cell extraction, he
was punched in the face, knocking a tooth loose, and had his
right foot twisted in such a way to cause severe pain. The
Defendants did not refute the claim or show that the use of such
force was justified under the circumstances. * In light of the
fact that these three Defendants failed to address this
particular claim, we are compelled to vacate that part of the
*
We note that the record conclusively shows that the
Defendants’ use of pepper spray was not cruel and unusual
punishment and Germain was not denied a decontamination shower.
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court’s order addressing this claim and remand for further
proceedings.
Finally, we have considered Germain’s claims that he was
denied due process and that the district court abused its
discretion granting appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw,
denying Germain’s subsequent motion to appoint counsel, and
denying his motion for recusal, and find these claims are
without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm in part, and vacate in part, and
remand that part of the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to Preston, Wolford, and McAlpine on the issue of
whether they engaged in cruel and unusual punishment while they
were removing Germain from his cell. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART
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