Jean Germain v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6117

JEAN BERNARD GERMAIN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.; AUTUMN DURST; KRISTI CORTEZ;
JANE DOE #2, RN; RICHARD RODERICK; WARDEN BOBBY P. SHEARIN;
CARLA BUCK; LIEUTENANT MCALPINE; LIEUTENANT CROSS; SERGEANT
G. FORNEY; CORPORAL J. WILT; OFFICER CHRISTOPHER PRESTON;
OFFICER JEREMY WOLFORD,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:13-cv-00382-JFM)

Submitted: July 18, 2016 Decided: November 7, 2016

Before Chief Judge GREGORY, and WYNN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded in part by unpublished
per curiam opinion.

Jean Bernard Germain, Appellant Pro Se. Gina Marie Smith,
MEYERS, RODBELL & ROSENBAUM, PA, Riverdale, Maryland; Stephanie
Judith Lane-Weber, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, for
Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Jean Paul Germain appeals the district court’s orders

granting summary judgment to the Defendants and dismissing his

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) complaint. We affirm in part, vacate in

part, and remand.

Germain claimed that the Defendants were deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs and engaged in cruel and

unusual punishment. We review de novo a district court’s order

granting summary judgment. D.L. ex rel. K.L. v. Balt. Bd. of

Sch. Comm’rs, 706 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir. 2013). “Summary

judgment is appropriate only where there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Id. “In determining whether a genuine issue of

material fact exists, we view the facts, and draw all reasonable

inferences, in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party.” Id. However, conflicting evidence will prevent summary

judgment only if it creates a “genuine issue of material fact.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).

We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district

court properly granted summary judgment to the Defendants on all

of Germain’s claims except Germain’s claim that Lieutenant

McAlpine, Officer Preston, and Officer Wolford engaged in cruel

and unusual punishment as they forcibly removed Germain from his

cell. Germain claims that Preston beat him on his head and

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face, knocking a tooth loose, and that either Wolford or

McAlpine twisted his right foot, causing severe pain.

“[T]he Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against ‘cruel and

unusual punishments’ [extends] to the treatment of prisoners by

prison officials . . . [,] forbid[ding] ‘the unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain.’” Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 317

(4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319

(1986), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S.

34 (2010)). In a case such as this, the question is whether the

force “was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore

discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose

of causing harm.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320-21 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

We observe that neither Preston, Wolford, nor McAlpine

addressed Germain’s claim that, during the cell extraction, he

was punched in the face, knocking a tooth loose, and had his

right foot twisted in such a way to cause severe pain. The

Defendants did not refute the claim or show that the use of such

force was justified under the circumstances. * In light of the

fact that these three Defendants failed to address this

particular claim, we are compelled to vacate that part of the

*
We note that the record conclusively shows that the
Defendants’ use of pepper spray was not cruel and unusual
punishment and Germain was not denied a decontamination shower.

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court’s order addressing this claim and remand for further

proceedings.

Finally, we have considered Germain’s claims that he was

denied due process and that the district court abused its

discretion granting appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw,

denying Germain’s subsequent motion to appoint counsel, and

denying his motion for recusal, and find these claims are

without merit.

Accordingly, we affirm in part, and vacate in part, and

remand that part of the district court’s order granting summary

judgment to Preston, Wolford, and McAlpine on the issue of

whether they engaged in cruel and unusual punishment while they

were removing Germain from his cell. We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART