NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 7 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SAIF KHORSHED, No. 15-55155
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02655-MRW
v.
MEMORANDUM*
GINA MARIE LINDSEY, LAWA
Executive Director; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michael R. Wilner, Magistrate Judge, Presiding**
Submitted October 25, 2016***
Before: LEAVY, GRABER, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Saif Khorshed appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing
his employment action alleging various claims. We have jurisdiction under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge. See 28
U.S.C. § 636(c).
***
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th
Cir. 2010), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Khorshed’s action because Khorshed
failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. See id. at
341-42 (although pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed, a plaintiff must
still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see
also Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.
2008) (“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a lack of a cognizable
legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
theory.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Khorshed’s request
to file a surreply. See Preminger v. Peake, 552 F.3d 757, 769 n.11 (9th Cir. 2008)
(court reviews for abuse of discretion a district court’s decisions concerning its
management of litigation).
Khorshed’s contentions that the court improperly denied his motion to
dismiss on the briefs and about alleged bias of the magistrate judge are
unpersuasive.
2 15-55155
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
3 15-55155