2016 IL App (1st) 152129
FIRST DIVISION
November 7, 2016
No. 1-15-2129
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
CHARNA HALPERN, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of Cook County
Plaintiff-Appellant and )
Counterdefendant-Appellant, )
v. )
) No.13 CH 17139
TITAN COMMERCIAL LLC and )
BEN ROSENFIELD, )
) Transferred to Law Division
Defendants-Appellees and )
Counterplaintiffs-Appellees, ) Hon. Raymond Mitchell,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE SIMON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Harris and Mikva concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This case arises out of a dispute over a real estate broker’s commission. Defendants Titan
Commercial LLC (Titan) and its principal Ben Rosenfield filed a broker’s lien against a
property. Plaintiff Charna Halpern filed a complaint to extinguish the lien as improper. In turn,
defendants filed a counterclaim seeking payment of their real estate broker’s commission.
Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded defendants a $50,000 commission and denied
plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees. We affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND
No. 15-2129
¶3 Plaintiff is the owner of iO Theatre, a comedy club that she leased near Wrigley Field for
nearly 25 years. Plaintiff was looking to purchase a building to continue to operate her club at a
different location. In May 2010, plaintiff began working with defendants who specialize in off-
market properties. An off-market property, also known as a pocket listing, is a property not
marketed to the public for sale, but known to the broker based on the broker’s preexisting
relationship with the owner or landlord. Generally, when dealing with an off-market property,
the broker approaches the building owner, explores the owner’s inclination to sell, and builds up
a relationship that leads up to the owner’s willingness to sell the property. Other brokers do not
know about the availability of these properties. Defendants informed plaintiff about the
confidential nature of an off-market property and how they would be the only broker involved in
the transaction.
¶4 Defendants showed plaintiff a number of properties. On June 22, 2010, defendants
showed plaintiff an off-market property at 1501 N. Kingsbury (Kingsbury property) in Chicago.
Defendants had several meetings with the owner of the Kingsbury property a few months prior to
speaking with plaintiff about it. At the end of the showing, plaintiff and the owner of the
Kingsbury property discussed a potential transaction and a selling price. The owner requested
that plaintiff submit an offer to him.
¶5 Following the showing, defendants assisted plaintiff to find a parking solution in the
event that she would purchase the Kingsbury property. Defendants arranged another showing on
June 25, 2010, where plaintiff’s architect toured the property to evaluate the costs of converting
the building into a theater. Defendants also obtained the full set of plans for the building on the
property, information about the existing leases, and researched whether the zoning was
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appropriate for her comedy club. These efforts allowed plaintiff and her architect to determine
that the Kingsbury property was financially feasible for plaintiff’s needs.
¶6 On July 15, 2010, plaintiff, through Titan, submitted a letter of intent containing
plaintiff’s offer of $1.7 million to purchase the Kingsbury property. The letter stated that Titan
would receive a commission and that the seller would be responsible for the payment of it to
Titan. In the beginning of October 2010, plaintiff increased the offer to $2.8 million. Plaintiff
intended to purchase the property vacant without the tenants. Rosenfield advised plaintiff that if
she wanted the property vacant, based on his conversations with the owner, she could not
purchase the property until the middle of 2012.
¶7 After submitting the offer, plaintiff instructed defendants to maintain contact with the
owner and to make sure that no one else would buy the property. From 2010 to 2012, defendants
stayed in contact with the owner of the Kingsbury property and showed him several properties
the owner could potentially purchase with the proceeds from his sale of the Kingsbury property
to plaintiff. In December 2010, plaintiff assured Rosenfield in an email that she understood that
the Kingsbury property was Titan’s deal and no other broker’s.
¶8 Plaintiff looked at various properties using other brokers, but she continued to maintain
her interest in purchasing the Kingsbury property. Throughout 2012, she continued to negotiate
the purchase of the Kingsbury property with the assistance of Justin Cozart, an employee of the
Private Bank. In an email from May 2012, he advised her, “[p]lease try to keep this quiet until
we have our deal signed and done. This is a valuable property that we have been waiting out for
over a year to get.”
¶9 In November 2012, plaintiff entered into a contract to purchase the Kingsbury property
for $4.2 million, and subsequently closed on the property. No real estate broker commission was
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No. 15-2129
paid but a consulting fee of $100,000 was paid to Justin Cozart’s company. No commission was
paid to Rosenfield or Titan.
¶ 10 Titan filed a commercial broker’s lien on the Kingsbury property. On July 18, 2013,
plaintiff filed suit against Titan and Rosenfield seeking a temporary restraining order, a
preliminary injunction, declaratory relief, an action to quiet title, adjudication of the lien,
damages for tortius interference, and damages and attorney’s fees for violating the Commercial
Broker’s Lien Act (Act) (770 ILCS 15/1 et seq. (West 2012)). The chancery court granted
plaintiff the preliminary injunction. The case was then transferred to the law division.
¶ 11 Defendants counterclaimed and sought to recover their lost broker’s commission alleging
breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and quantum meruit. Following a bench trial, the trial
court denied plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees and granted defendants a judgment of $50,000 on
their quantum meruit claim. This appeal follows.
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it denied her request for
attorney fees and costs associated with pursuing the preliminary injunction action against
defendants. Plaintiff argues the trial court erroneously denied her request because she was the
prevailing party in her action to remove an improperly asserted lien on the property. We review
the award of attorney fees under a de novo standard of review. People v. Blanks, 361 Ill. App. 3d
400, 407 (2005) (matters of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo).
¶ 14 Section 10(l) of the Act provides that the prevailing party is entitled to recover the “cost
of proceedings asserting or defending a broker’s claim of lien, including reasonable attorneys’
fees, costs, and prejudgment interests.” 770 ILCS 15/10(l) (West 2012). A party is a “prevailing
party” for the purposes of awarding attorney fees when a judgment is entered in his favor and he
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achieves some sort of permanent affirmative relief after adjudication on the merits. See J.B.
Esker & Sons, Inc. v. Cle-Pa’s Partnership, 325 Ill. App. 3d 276, 282 (2001).
¶ 15 Here, plaintiff cannot be considered a prevailing party by merely the grant of an
interlocutory motion for a preliminary injunction. The court’s grant of the injunction was just a
preliminary stage, was not a final disposition on the merits of plaintiff’s claim asserting an
improper lien, and did not confer plaintiff a permanent relief. See People ex rel. Hartigan v.
National Anti-Drug Coalition, 124 Ill. App. 3d 269, 273 (1984) (“Such an injunction does not
decide controverted facts or the merits of the cause; rather it only shows that sufficient cause has
been made to authorize or require the court to preserve the rights in issue until a final hearing on
the merits.”). In granting plaintiff’s preliminary injunction, the chancery court specifically stated
that it was not deciding the merits of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendants. The court
emphasized that it was only making a determination on the likelihood of success on the merits
for the purposes of the preliminary injunction and suggested that defendants would not be
successful in an action to enforce the lien. The propriety of the lien was never adjudicated on the
merits.
¶ 16 Moreover, the Act, which is the statute relied by the plaintiff here, does require that, in
order to recover fees, plaintiff must be the “prevailing party” in a proceeding “asserting or
defending a broker’s claim of lien.” The preliminary injunction was not a final adjudication on
the merits as to the propriety of the lien and plaintiff cannot be viewed as the prevailing party.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying plaintiff’s request for attorney fees and costs.
¶ 17 Plaintiff next argues that the trial court’s determinations that defendants were entitled to a
broker’s commission under a quantum meruit theory and that defendants were the procuring
cause for the sale of the Kingsbury property were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
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No. 15-2129
Plaintiff contends that defendants did not negotiate the final sale of the Kingsbury property and
were not the procuring cause of sale. Instead, plaintiff maintains, a different real estate
professional actually negotiated the purchase of the property more than two years after plaintiff
had made her initial offer to buy the property. We review the trial court’s factual findings under a
manifest weight of the evidence standard. Lozman v. Putnam, 379 Ill. App. 3d 807, 820 (2008).
A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence “only when an opposite conclusion is
apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the
evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 18 A broker’s right to commission depends on whether the sale was procured through his
efforts or through information derived from him, and cannot be defeated by the owner’s making
the sale through another broker. Edens View Realty & Investment, Inc. v. Heritage Enterprises,
Inc., 87 Ill. App. 3d 480, 485 (1980); Van C. Argiris & Co. v. FMC Corp., 144 Ill. App. 3d 750,
754 (1986) (whether the complaining broker is the procuring cause of the sale “is a logical
sine qua non to the establishment of the fact that the services rendered were valuable and of
benefit to the seller, and thus, it is merely a part of the existing elements required for recovery in
quantum meruit.”). A real estate broker may be the procuring cause of a sale “if he brings
together the parties who ultimately consummate the transaction [citation] or if he is instrumental
in its consummation [citations]” or “on the basis of the negotiations he conducts, even though he
does not take part in bringing the parties together initially. [Citation.] Moreover, a real estate
broker may be the procuring cause where the transaction is effectuated through information
which he disseminates [citations], although it has been noted that in such cases, the broker
actually may do more than supply information [citation].” Pietka v. Chelco Corp., 107 Ill. App.
3d 544, 549-50 (1982).
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No. 15-2129
¶ 19 In light of the above principles and of the record before us, we find that the trial court’s
holding that defendants were the procuring cause of the Kingsbury property was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. The Kingsbury property was never publicly marketed for sale
but was an off-market property known to plaintiff because defendants showed her the property
and introduced her to its owner. Clearly, the only means to plaintiff purchasing the property was
through the defendants’ discovery of the property as a potential deal for plaintiff. Furthermore,
not only did Titan facilitate several meetings between the owner and plaintiff, but it also
conducted its due diligence when it procured information regarding the leases on the property,
the zoning, the parking situation, and a full set of plans for the property to allow plaintiff’s
architect to estimate the cost of converting the building on the property into a new comedy club.
¶ 20 In 2010, plaintiff through Titan submitted an offer to purchase the property. Titan also
advised plaintiff that if she wanted the property vacant, without the tenants, she could not
purchase the property until the middle of 2012. After submitting her offer, plaintiff never
requested defendants to stop working on the purchase of the Kingsbury property. Rather she
instructed them to maintain contact with the owner to make sure no one else would buy the
property. She also assured Rosenfield in an email that the Kingsbury property would be
“absolutely [his] deal.” From 2010 to 2012, defendants stayed in contact with the owner of the
Kingsbury property and showed him properties he could purchase with the sale proceeds from
his sale of the Kingsbury property to plaintiff. Although plaintiff stopped working with Titan and
purchased the Kingsbury property with the assistance of another real estate professional, not a
broker, plaintiff admitted that she would have never known about the property had Titan not
shown it to her. Based on this record, we cannot say that the trial court’s finding that Titan was
the procuring cause of the sale was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Owen
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No. 15-2129
Wagener & Co. v. U.S. Bank, 297 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1052 (1998) (“Where a real estate broker
shows that he has been instrumental in bringing parties together and the transaction is
consummated, he is to be regarded as the procuring cause of the sale and entitled to his
commission. [Citation.] It is sufficient if the sale is effectuated through the efforts of the broker
or through information [provided by] him.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
¶ 21 Contrary to plaintiff’s argument, defendants did not abandon the deal. If the purchaser
claims that the broker abandoned the deal, “the evidence must show not only a discontinuance of
his efforts by the broker, it must show abandonment by the purchaser of all intention to buy the
property.” Western Pride Builders, Inc. v. Zicha, 23 Ill. App. 3d 770, 773 (1974). Certainly,
plaintiff never abandoned her intention to buy the Kingsbury property. In May 2012, Cozart and
plaintiff discussed how to keep their new offer to purchase the property “quiet” because it “is a
valuable property that we have been waiting out for over a year to get.” Moreover, there was no
evidence in the record that shows that defendants ever refused to perform any brokerage activity
to effectuate plaintiff’s purchase of the property. Instead, Rosenfield made regular calls to the
owner of the Kingsbury property to stay updated and offered to lend any assistance to close the
deal. After discovering plaintiff’s 2012 offer made through Cozart, Rosenfield reiterated to
plaintiff that Titan was owed a commission if plaintiff purchased the Kingsbury property.
¶ 22 Ultimately, plaintiff bought the Kingsbury property. Despite being an off-market property
where the purchaser and the seller did not know one another, there was no real estate broker
commission paid. Plaintiff signed the contract stipulating that she did not work with any broker
and warranted that only Cozart is owned a commission in the form of a “finder’s fee” although
without defendants’ efforts she would not have been able to purchase the property. Under these
circumstances, the trial court correctly held that defendants were entitled to their commission. A
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No. 15-2129
broker who is the procuring cause of a sale is entitled to a commission under the theory of
quantum meruit where a party receives a benefit which is unjust for him to retain without paying
for it. Romanek-Golub & Co. v. Anvan Hotel Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1042-43 (1988). If a
buyer excludes a broker from a transaction, the buyer may become liable to pay the broker’s
commission even in the absence of an express agreement. Louis v. Lexington Development
Corp., 253 Ill. App. 3d 73, 78 (1993).
¶ 23 In the instant case, defendants performed real estate broker services which benefitted
plaintiff. Plaintiff’s benefit consisted in the ability to purchase the Kingsbury property which
derived from defendants’ efforts. Defendants could not be deprived of their commission merely
because plaintiff completed the sale without the direct involvement of defendants, who brought
the parties together and without whom plaintiff admittedly would have never known about the
existence of the property. See Bennett & Kahnweiler Associates v. Ratner, 133 Ill. App. 3d 316
(1985). The trial court properly held that it would be unfair for plaintiff to keep that benefit
without compensating defendants who created that opportunity.
¶ 24 Finally, we reject plaintiff’s argument that defendants failed to establish the reasonable
value of their services to recover under quantum meruit. Plaintiff argues that the award was
“contrary to the law and speculative.” At trial, two experts testified that a reasonable and
customary commission paid to a real estate broker for brokering the Kingsbury property would
range between 1% and 6% of the sale price. Plaintiff did not produce any counterevidence
suggesting that this range of commissions was erroneous. Plaintiff paid a $100,000 “finder’s fee”
to another real estate professional and did not pay any broker’s fee. The $50,000 commission
representing 1.19% of the sale price is a reasonable commission in light of the unchallenged
expert testimony that 6% of the sale price would have been reasonable. Accordingly, we are
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No. 15-2129
unable to conclude that the judgment in favor of defendants on their quantum meruit claim was
excessive or against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 25 CONCLUSION
¶ 26 Based on the foregoing, we affirm.
¶ 27 Affirmed.
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