UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4625
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ELIAZAR GUZMAN DOMINGUEZ, a/k/a CHI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:15-cr-00083-NCT-1)
Submitted: October 11, 2016 Decided: November 8, 2016
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lisa S. Costner, LISA S. COSTNER, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Randall Stuart Galyon, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eliazar Guzman Dominguez pled guilty to conspiracy to
distribute cocaine hydrochloride, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(b)(1)(C), 846 (2012). The district court sentenced
Dominguez to 108 months’ imprisonment, and he now appeals.
Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal. Dominguez has filed a pro se
supplemental brief, asserting that his guilty plea was coerced,
the evidence was insufficient to establish his guilt, he was
entrapped by the police, his sentence was procedurally
unreasonable, and his appellate counsel was ineffective.
Turning first to Dominguez’s argument that he was coerced
into pleading guilty, because he did not seek to withdraw his
guilty plea, the acceptance of his plea is reviewed only for
plain error. United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416,
422 (4th Cir. 2015). We conclude that no reversible error
occurred in the acceptance of Dominguez’s guilty plea. In
conducting the plea colloquy, the court complied with every
requirement of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, thereby raising a “strong
presumption that the plea is final and binding.” United States
v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 2012). Furthermore,
although Dominguez asserts that counsel scared him into
accepting the guilty plea, Dominguez provides no facts
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supporting his assertion. To the contrary, Dominguez informed
the district court on more than one occasion that his plea was
given voluntarily and absent any coercion. Given the thorough
plea colloquy and Dominguez’s sworn statements that he was not
coerced into pleading guilty, no plain error occurred in the
acceptance of his guilty plea.
We further conclude that Dominguez waived his claims of
insufficient evidence and entrapment by pleading guilty. See
United States v. Willis, 992 F.2d 489, 490 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[A]
guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional
defects, including the right to contest the factual merits of
the charges.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Dominguez next argues that his sentence was procedurally
unreasonable. “Procedural errors include ‘failing to calculate
(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the
Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a)
factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts,
or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence — including
an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)).
Dominguez argues that the district court erred in relying
on a prior conviction in determining his criminal history score
and relied on erroneous facts in determining drug quantity.
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Because Dominguez did not object to the calculation of his
criminal history category or offense level, those calculations
are reviewed for plain error. United States v. McLaurin, 764
F.3d 372, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Dominguez argues that his North Carolina conviction for
possession of cocaine was not a felony, but the Sentencing
Guidelines provide that misdemeanor offenses are counted when
computing a defendant’s criminal history, subject to certain
exceptions not applicable here. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 4A1.2(c) (2014). Thus, the conviction in question was
properly counted toward his criminal history and the district
court did not plainly err in determining Dominguez’s criminal
history category. Furthermore, the uncontroverted evidence
supports the district court’s determination that Dominguez was
accountable for 20 kilograms of cocaine, and the district court
therefore properly calculated Dominguez’s Guidelines range. We
thus conclude that the sentence was procedurally reasonable.
Finally, Dominguez argues that his appellate counsel was
ineffective.
It is well established that a defendant may raise a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in the
first instance on direct appeal if and only if it
conclusively appears from the record that . . .
counsel did not provide effective assistance.
Otherwise, he must raise his claim in the district
court by a collateral challenge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255.
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United States v. Galloway, 749 F.3d 238, 241 (4th Cir. 2014)
(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The record on
appeal does not meet this demanding standard; Dominguez’s claim
should therefore be raised, if at all, in a § 2255 motion.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Dominguez’s conviction and
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Dominguez, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Dominguez requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Dominguez.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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