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NON -PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 1 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHARLES RASHAWN BROWN
Appellant No. 137 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 14, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP- 51 -CR- 0008440 -2008
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MOULTON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 08, 2016
Appellant appeals pro se from the order entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing his petition filed pursuant
to the Post Conviction Relief Act ( "PCRA "), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541 -46. We
affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:1 On October
23, 2008, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to the charges of
aggravated assault, conspiracy, firearms not to be carried without a license,
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The record provided to this Court is sparse. As court -appointed PCRA
counsel indicated in the lower court, "the Quarter Sessions file was
misplaced, and the clerks did their best to reconstruct the file." PCRA
Counsel's No -Merit Letter, filed 10/17/15, at 1. Appellant has raised no
issue concerning the accuracy of the record provided to this Court and has
not sought to supplement the record.
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and possession of an instrument of crime.2 On that same date, in
accordance with the plea agreement, Appellant was sentenced to an
aggregate of five years to ten years in prison, to be followed by seven years
of probation. Appellant did not file timely post- sentence motions nor a direct
appeal.
On May 18, 2012, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition,3 and the
PCRA court appointed counsel. On October 17, 2015, counsel filed a motion
to withdraw his representation, as well as a Turner/Finley4 no -merit letter.
The PCRA court provided Appellant with notice of its intent to dismiss the
petition, and after receiving no response, by order entered on December 14,
2015, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant's PCRA petition. The PCRA court
also granted counsel's petition to withdraw his representation. This timely
pro se appeal followed. The PCRA court did not direct Appellant to file a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement; however, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion explaining that Appellant's PCRA petition was untimely filed
without meeting any of the timeliness exceptions.
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 903, 6106, and 907, respectively.
3 Although Appellant's pro se PCRA petition was docketed on May 21, 2012,
the prison envelope in which Appellant's petition was mailed bears a time
stamp of May 18, 2012. Accordingly, pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule,
we deem Appellant's instant PCRA petition to have been filed on May 18,
2012. See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 931 A.2d 710 (Pa.Super. 2007)
(discussing the prisoner mailbox rule).
4 Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988), and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
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Preliminarily, we must determine whether Appellant's instant PCRA
petition was timely filed. See Commonwealth v. Hutchins, 760 A.2d 50
(Pa.Super. 2000). "Our standard of review of the denial of PCRA relief is
clear; we are limited to determining whether the PCRA court's findings are
supported by the record and without legal error." Commonwealth v.
Wojtaszek, 951 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa.Super. 2008) (quotation and
quotation marks omitted).
Pennsylvania law makes it clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear
an untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500,
837 A.2d 1157 (2003). The most recent amendments to the PCRA, effective
January 19, 1996, provide that a PCRA petition, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the underlying
judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment is deemed
final "at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of the time for seeking review." 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(3).
The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions in the PCRA
allow for very limited circumstances under which the late filing of a petition
will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, a
petition must allege and the petitioner must prove:
(i) the failure to raise a claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the
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presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution
or the law of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or
law of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
the time period provide in this section and has been
held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)- (iii).
"We emphasize that it is the petitioner who bears the burden to allege
and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions applies." Commonwealth
v. Marshall, 596 Pa. 587, 596, 947 A.2d 714, 719 (2008) (citation
omitted).
In the case before us, Appellant was sentenced on October 23, 2008,
and he filed neither a timely post- sentence motion nor a direct appeal.
Accordingly, his judgment of sentence became final on Monday, November
24, 2008,5 upon the expiration of the thirty -day period for filing an appeal to
this Court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Accordingly, he
had one year from that date, or until November 24, 2009, to file a timely
PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). However, Appellant did not file
5 The thirtieth day after sentencing, November 22, 2008, fell on a Saturday,
thus extending the time for appealing to this Court to Monday, November
24, 2008. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908.
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his PCRA petition until May 18, 2012, and thus, it is patently untimely. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
Nevertheless, Appellant suggests that his sentence is illegal,6 and thus,
he is not subject to the PCRA's time restrictions. However, our Supreme
Court has held specifically that, "[a]lthough legality of sentence is always
subject to review within the PCRA, [legality of sentencing] claims must still
first satisfy the PCRA's time limits or one of the exceptions thereto."
Commonwealth v. Fahy, 558 Pa. 313, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (1999).
In the case sub judice, Appellant has not invoked any of the applicable
exceptions to the PCRA, and therefore, we agree with the PCRA court that
Appellant's instant petition was untimely filed.
Affirmed.
6 We note that Appellant's pro se brief falls well below the standards
delineated in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Pa.R.A.P.
2111(a). "[A]lthough this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed
by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon
an appellant. Accordingly, a pro se litigant must comply with the procedural
rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court." Commonwealth v.
Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 251 -52 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citations omitted).
Although we could quash or dismiss this appeal for Appellant's failure to
conform materially to the requirements set forth in our Rules of Appellate
Procedure, see Pa.R.A.P. 2101, we will address Appellant's argument
regarding the timeliness of his PCRA petition to the extent we can discern it.
See Commonwealth v. Adams, 882 A.2d 496, 498 (Pa.Super. 2005)
(declining to quash appeal despite numerous substantial defects in
appellant's brief).
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Judgment Entered.
J seph D. Seletyn,
Prothonotary
Date: 11/8/2016
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Com. v. Brown, C.
Combined Opinion