IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-1520
Filed November 9, 2016
IN THE INTEREST OF L.B.,
Minor child,
S.B., Mother,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Rachael E. Seymour,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals adjudication and disposition orders in a child-in-need-of-
assistance action involving her eleven-year-old child. AFFIRMED.
Eric W. Manning of Manning Law Office, PLLC, Urbandale, for appellant
mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Erin M. Hardisty of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for
minor child.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Bower, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
A mother appeals adjudication and disposition orders in a child-in-need-of-
assistance action involving her eleven-year-old child. She (1) challenges the
grounds for adjudication, (2) contends the department of human services failed to
make reasonable efforts toward reunification, and (3) takes issue with the district
court’s refusal to grant her motion for recusal.
I. Grounds for Adjudication
The district court adjudicated the child as a child in need of assistance
under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(b) (2015) (physical abuse or neglect), (c)(2)
(failure to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising child), (d) (sexual
abuse), and (n) (drug abuse). The record reveals the following facts.
The department social worker investigating the case testified the child was
removed after she reported the following: (1) a spanking with a belt by her
stepfather, resulting in a bruised bottom; (2) seeing her mother “isolate herself in
. . . her own room and stay in there for extended periods of time,” being unable to
shower, and having insufficient food; (3) sexual abuse by a person living in the
home; and (4) drug paraphernalia and other signs of drug use by her mother and
stepfather. Another department social worker testified that these were ongoing
concerns. In addition, two professionals who supervised visits testified to signs
of drug use by the mother.
On our de novo review of the record, we are persuaded all the cited
grounds were satisfied.
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II. Reasonable Efforts
The department has an obligation to make reasonable efforts towards
reunification. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). The mother
contends the department “failed to maintain reasonable efforts in regards to [L.B.]
attending school, maintaining services, and facilitating visitations.”
The mother is correct that the department failed to enroll the child in
school for almost four weeks after the child was placed with her adult sibling.
The department blamed the mother, noting her insistence that the child remain in
the Des Moines school district rather than the Melcher-Dallas school district
where her sibling lived. The district court ruled that the department had an
obligation to ensure the child’s school attendance as required by state law. The
court castigated the department for failing to enroll her and “direct[ed] that the
child start attending school immediately.” The court also noted the child had an
Individualized Education Plan in place in the Des Moines school system and
directed the department “to make an independent investigation as to what is in
the child’s best interest.” The court subsequently ruled that, if the mother failed
to sign the necessary releases, the department would have all the rights of the
parents to execute releases for all purposes, including educational purposes.
We conclude the district court appropriately addressed the school attendance
issue.
We turn to the mother’s visits with the child. A department social worker
testified the child had a visit with her mother following the removal and a second
visit was cancelled because the child was “distraught” and did not wish to see her
mother and stepfather. Following the removal hearing, the district court ordered
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visits at the department’s discretion. At a later hearing, the court stated visits
could not be denied simply because the child did not want them, absent
therapeutic concerns.
The department facilitated additional visits. A service provider who
supervised some of the visits noted the mother was forty-five minutes late for one
and fifteen minutes late for another. She testified that, at one of the visits, the
mother’s skin had “raised sores” that appeared to have been “cover[ed] . . . up
with makeup,” “[h]er hands shook,” and her leg “was bopping up and down.”
The mother acknowledged she was late for two visits and missed one.
While she cited transportation problems, she did not request transportation
assistance and, indeed, testified she had “not requested any services from DHS”
because she did not “need them.”
We conclude the department rectified the school attendance problem and
made reasonable efforts toward reunification.
III. Recusal
Before the second day of the adjudicatory hearing, the mother filed a
motion to recuse the judge based on the fact that she presided in a separate
proceeding involving a potential witness. The district court denied the motion
after citing and addressing the pertinent rule of Judicial Conduct. See Iowa Ct.
R. 51:2.11(A) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”). The judge
stated she “ha[d] no personal knowledge of [the witness] other than the facts that
were brought to this Court’s attention through the course of a prior judicial
proceeding involving [the witness]” and “[a]ny information learned was . . . during
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the course of this judge’s duties.” We discern no abuse of discretion in the
court’s ruling. See Taylor v. State, 632 N.W.2d 891, 893-94 (Iowa 2001) (setting
forth standard of review).
We affirm the adjudicatory and disposition orders entered by the district
court.
AFFIRMED.