NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 9, 2016
Decided November 9, 2016
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 15‐3863
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellee, Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, South Bend Division.
v.
No. 3: 12CR063‐001
RONALD C. BOHN,
Defendant‐Appellant. Robert L. Miller, Jr.,
Judge.
O R D E R
Ronald Bohn pleaded guilty to one count of possessing a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(j), and was sentenced to 110 months’ imprisonment, ten months below the
statutory maximum. Although his plea agreement included a broad appeal waiver, Bohn
appealed. His appointed lawyer asserts that the appeal is frivolous and seeks to
withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We invited Bohn to comment on
counsel’s motion, but he has not responded. See CIR R. 51(b). Counsel has submitted a
brief that explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this
kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis in the brief appears to be
No. 15‐3863 Page 2
thorough, we limit our review to the subjects counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey,
748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
Acting on a tip that Bohn was selling prescription drugs at his rental property, his
parole officer searched the house and found marijuana in a pill bottle. The police then
obtained a warrant to search the property and found four stolen firearms and other
stolen items, including pried‐open safes, prescription drugs, and more than 100 chains
and necklaces. After his motion to suppress the evidence was denied, Bohn entered into
a plea agreement with the government. In the agreement, he admitted that he had
constructively possessed a stolen firearm because he was the landlord and was at the
property performing repairs at the time of the search.
Counsel first tells us that she has consulted with Bohn and he wishes to withdraw
his guilty plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel considers challenging whether the plea
was knowing and voluntary, but properly concludes that any such challenge would be
frivolous. The plea colloquy transcript demonstrates that the district court substantially
complied with the requirements of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
See United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013); Konczak, 683 F.3d at 349.
As counsel points out, the district court did not advise Bohn that it was obligated to
impose a $100 special assessment, see FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(L), but the error was
harmless because the plea agreement informed Bohn that he would have to pay a
mandatory $100 special assessment. See United States v. Driver, 242 F.3d 767, 769 (7th Cir.
2001). Otherwise the court fulfilled its obligation under Rule 11; it advised Bohn of the
nature of the charges, the potential penalties, the trial and appellate rights he waived,
and the sentencing process. See FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1); Davenport, 719 F.3d at 618. The
court also ensured that an adequate factual basis for Bohn’s guilty plea existed and that
he entered into the plea voluntarily. See FED R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2), (3).
Counsel also considers whether Bohn could challenge his sentence, but rightly
concludes that this challenge would be foreclosed by the appeal waiver. In his plea
agreement, Bohn expressly waived his right “to appeal or to contest [his] conviction and
[his] sentence or the manner in which [his] conviction or [his] sentence was determined
or imposed. . . .” Because the guilty plea stands, so does the waiver. See United States v.
Zitt, 714 F.3d 511, 515 (7th Cir. 2013). Further, the district court did not rely on any
impermissible factors in sentencing, and Bohn’s sentence was within the ten‐year
statutory maximum. See United States v. Smith, 759 F.3d 702, 706 (7th Cir. 2014);
United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005).
No. 15‐3863 Page 3
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.