Dennis LeBlanc v. Randall Mathena

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-7151

DENNIS LEBLANC,

Petitioner - Appellee,

v.

RANDALL MATHENA, Chief Warden, Red Onion State Prison,
Pound, Virginia; COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,

Respondents - Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Arenda L. Wright Allen,
District Judge. (2:12-cv-00340-AWA-LRL)

Argued: May 10, 2016 Decided: November 7, 2016

Amended: November 10, 2016

Before NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and Thomas E.
JOHNSTON, United States District Judge for the Southern District
of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wynn wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Johnston joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a dissenting
opinion.

ARGUED: Stuart Alan Raphael, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellants. Bryan A.
Stevenson, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, Montgomery, Alabama, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of
Virginia, Linda L. Bryant, Deputy Attorney General, Criminal
Justice & Public Safety Division, Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Eugene P. Murphy, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Katherine Quinlan Adelfio, Assistant Attorney
General, Trevor S. Cox, Deputy Solicitor General, OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellants. Jennifer T. Stanton, J.T. STANTON, P.C., Norfolk,
Virginia; Randall S. Susskind, Jennae R. Swiergula, Stephen Chu,
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, Montgomery, Alabama, for Appellee.

2
WYNN, Circuit Judge:

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010), held that “the

Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole”

for juvenile offenders convicted of nonhomicide offenses.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that States must provide

juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment

with “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” Id. at 75.

Nearly a decade before the Supreme Court decided Graham,

Respondent, the Commonwealth of Virginia, sentenced Petitioner

Dennis LeBlanc to life imprisonment without parole for a

nonhomicide offense he committed at the age of sixteen. In

light of Graham, Petitioner sought postconviction relief from

his sentence in Virginia state courts. The state courts denied

Petitioner relief, holding that Virginia’s geriatric release

program--which was adopted more than fifteen years before the

Supreme Court decided Graham and will allow Petitioner to seek

release beginning at the age of sixty--provides the “meaningful

opportunity” for release that Graham requires.

Mindful of the deference we must accord to state court

decisions denying state prisoners postconviction relief, we

nonetheless conclude that Petitioner’s state court adjudication

constituted an unreasonable application of Graham. Most

significantly, Virginia courts unreasonably ignored the plain

3
language of the procedures governing review of petitions for

geriatric release, which authorize the State Parole Board to

deny geriatric release for any reason, without considering a

juvenile offender’s maturity and rehabilitation. In light of

the lack of governing standards, it was objectively unreasonable

for the state courts to conclude that geriatric release affords

Petitioner with the “meaningful opportunity to obtain release

based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” Graham

demands. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner is entitled to relief from

his unconstitutional sentence.

I.

On July 15, 2002, a Virginia state trial court found

Petitioner guilty of rape and abduction. Petitioner committed

the offenses on July 6, 1999, when he was sixteen years old.

The court sentenced Petitioner to two terms of life

imprisonment. Petitioner was ineligible for parole pursuant to

Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-165.1, which abolished parole for

individuals convicted of a felony committed after January 1,

1995. Petitioner did not appeal his conviction or sentence.

In 2011, Petitioner filed a motion to vacate his sentence

in state trial court. The motion argued that Graham rendered

Petitioner’s life sentence invalid. In opposition, Respondents

asserted that, notwithstanding Virginia’s abolition of parole,

Petitioner’s life sentence did not violate Graham because

4
Virginia allows for conditional release of “geriatric

prisoners,” Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-40.01 (“Geriatric Release”).

At a hearing on August 9, 2011, the state trial court

orally denied Petitioner’s motion to vacate. In rendering its

decision, the trial court relied on the Supreme Court of

Virginia’s decision in Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d 386

(Va. 2011), which held that Geriatric Release provides juveniles

sentenced to life in prison a “meaningful opportunity for

release” and therefore complies with Graham’s parole

requirement. J.A. 157. Petitioner appealed the trial court’s

decision to the Supreme Court of Virginia, which summarily

denied his petition for appeal.

On June 19, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. A federal

magistrate judge reviewed the petition and recommended that the

district court deny it. LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12-cv-340,

2013 WL 10799406, at *1 (E.D. Va. July 24, 2013). Petitioner

filed objections to the magistrate judge’s report. Finding the

objections well-taken, the district court granted Petitioner’s

habeas petition, holding that his state court adjudication was

contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, Graham.

LeBlanc v. Mathena, No. 2:12cv340, 2015 WL 4042175, at *9 (E.D.

Va. July 1, 2015). In particular, the district court concluded

5
that Geriatric Release does not offer juvenile offenders

sentenced to life imprisonment, like Petitioner, the “meaningful

opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and

rehabilitation” required by Graham. Id. at *9, *11–18. The

district court further concluded that Geriatric Release did not

comply with Graham’s dictate that state penal systems reflect

the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders, explaining that

Geriatric Release “treats children worse” than adult offenders.

Id. at *14 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, the district

court remanded Petitioner’s case to the state court for

resentencing in accordance with Graham. Id. at *19.

Respondents filed a timely appeal, and the district court

stayed its judgment pending resolution of that appeal.

II.

A.

The Virginia General Assembly established Geriatric Release

in 1994--more than 15 years before the Supreme Court decided

Graham--as part of its “truth-in-sentencing” reform package.

J.A. 169. The primary goal of truth-in-sentencing reform was to

close the gap between prisoners’ original sentences and the

amount of time they actually served. Brian J. Ostrom et al.,

Truth-in-Sentencing in Virginia 17-20 (April 5, 2001), available

at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/187677.pdf. The

centerpiece of the reform package was the elimination of parole

6
for all offenders who committed felonies on or after January 1,

1995. Id.

The statutory provision governing Geriatric Release, as

amended, 1 provides, in its entirety:

Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a
conviction for a felony offense, other than a Class 1
felony, (i) who has reached the age of sixty-five or
older and who has served at least five years of the
sentence imposed or (ii) who has reached the age of
sixty or older and who has served at least ten years
of the sentence imposed may petition the Parole Board
for conditional release. The Parole Board shall
promulgate regulations to implement the provisions of
this section.

Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-40.01. Unlike with other components of the

truth-in-sentencing reform package, 2 we have identified no

evidence in the contemporaneous legislative record speaking to

the General Assembly’s goal in enacting Geriatric Release or

providing guidance regarding the implementation of Geriatric

Release.

1 The original provision applied only to offenders who were
ineligible for parole. A 2001 amendment expanded the provision
to apply to all inmates.
2 The legislative history of the truth-in-sentencing reform
package focuses on the abolition of parole, establishment of
uniform sentencing guidelines and a sentencing commission,
elimination of “good time” credits, and imposition of longer
sentences for violent offenders. Commonwealth of Va. Comm’n on
Sentencing & Parole Reform, Report of the Commission on
Sentencing & Parole Reform to the Governor and General Assembly
of Virginia, H. Doc. No. 18 (Dec. 23, 1994).

7
 The Virginia Parole Board is responsible for deciding

whether to grant petitions for Geriatric Release. Section 53.1-

40.01 directs the Parole Board to promulgate regulations

necessary to implement the statute. Pursuant to that authority,

the Parole Board established administrative procedures governing

implementation of the Geriatric Release provision (the

“Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures”).

The Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures set forth a

two-stage review process for Geriatric Release petitions. At

the “Initial Review” stage, the Parole Board reviews a

prisoner’s petition--which must provide “compelling reasons for

conditional release”--and the prisoner’s “central file and any

other pertinent information.” J.A. 287. The Parole Board may

deny the petition at the Initial Review stage based on a

majority vote. Neither the statute nor the Geriatric Release

Administrative Procedures states what constitute “compelling

reasons for conditional release,” nor does either document

require the Parole Board to consider any particular factors in

conducting the Initial Review, nor does either document set

forth any criteria for granting or denying a prisoner’s petition

at the Initial Review stage.

If the Parole Board does not deny a petition at the Initial

Review stage, the petition moves forward to the “Assessment

Review” stage. As part of the Assessment Review, a Parole Board

8
member or designated staff member interviews the prisoner.

During that interview, the prisoner may present written and oral

statements as well as any written material bearing on his case

for parole. The interviewer then drafts a written assessment of

the prisoner’s “suitability for conditional release” and, based

on that assessment, recommends whether the Parole Board should

grant the petition. J.A. 288. In order to grant Geriatric

Release to a prisoner sentenced to life imprisonment, at least

four members of the five-member Parole Board must vote in favor

of release.

In engaging in the Assessment Review, Parole Board members

should consider “[a]ll factors in the parole consideration

process including Board appointments and Victim Input.” Id.

The Virginia Parole Board Policy Manual includes a long list of

“decision factors” to be considered in the parole review

process. J.A. 297. These factors include: public safety, the

facts and circumstances of the offense, the length and type of

sentence, and the proposed release plan. The Parole Board also

should consider certain characteristics of the offender,

including “the individual’s history, physical and mental

condition and character, . . . conduct, employment, education,

vocational training, and other developmental activities during

incarceration,” prior criminal record, behavior while

incarcerated, and “changes in motivation and behavior.” J.A.

9
297–99. Finally, the Parole Board should consider impressions

gained from interviewing the prisoner as well as information

from family members, victims, and other individuals.

B.

There are several key ways in which Geriatric Release

differs from Virginia’s parole system, which remains in place

for prisoners who committed their offenses before January 1,

1995. The first--and most obvious--is the age limitation. In

order to seek Geriatric Release, an inmate must be at least

sixty years of age. By contrast, most parole-eligible inmates

serving a life sentence will be considered for parole for the

first time after serving fifteen years of their sentence. Va.

Code Ann. § 53.1-151(C). Other prisoners will be considered for

parole when they serve a certain percentage of their sentence.

Id. § 53.1-151(A). Accordingly, whereas Petitioner would have

been considered for parole after serving twenty years of his

sentence, Petitioner cannot apply for Geriatric Release until

roughly twenty years later.

The second difference is that an inmate must actively

petition for Geriatric Release once he or she becomes eligible,

whereas the Parole Board automatically considers, on an annual

basis, whether to release each parole-eligible inmate.

A third difference is that, unlike with parole, the Parole

Board may deny a petition for Geriatric Release at the Initial

10
Review stage without considering any of the “decision factors”

enumerated in the Parole Board Policy Manual. Indeed, unlike

the parole system, which has established criteria that the

Parole Board must consider in granting or denying parole,

Geriatric Release affords the Parole Board unconstrained

discretion to deny a petition for Geriatric Release at the

Initial Review stage. Relatedly, in their petition, prisoners

must “identify compelling reasons” why they should receive

Geriatric Release, notwithstanding that the “compelling reasons”

requirement has no statutory basis and that the Geriatric

Release Administrative Procedures do not provide any guidance

regarding what constitutes a “compelling reason.” J.A. 287. By

contrast, there is no requirement that a parole-eligible inmate

demonstrate “compelling reasons” in order to obtain parole.

Fourth, the Parole Board or its designee interviews

prisoners undergoing parole review as a matter of course. By

contrast, the Parole Board can deny a petition for Geriatric

Release at the Initial Review stage “on a review of the record,”

without interviewing the inmate. J.A. 287.

A final notable difference is that four members of the

five-member Parole Board must approve Geriatric Release of

inmates sentenced to life imprisonment. By contrast, only three

members of the Parole Board must approve parole of parole-

eligible prisoners.

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 III.

We review the district court’s decision to grant

Petitioner’s habeas petition de novo. Richardson v. Branker,

668 F.3d 128, 138 (4th Cir. 2012). The Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which accords

deference to final judgments of state courts, circumscribes our

review. Nicolas v. Att’y Gen. of Md., 820 F.3d 124, 129 (4th

Cir. 2016). Under AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas

relief to a state prisoner, like Petitioner, if the prisoner’s

state court adjudication “was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as

determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), or “was based on an unreasonable determination of

the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court

proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2).

Respondents contend that the Virginia courts’ conclusion

that Geriatric Release complies with Graham’s parole requirement

amounted to a finding of fact, and therefore that the standard

set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) applies. Federal courts

review habeas petitions raising questions of law or mixed

questions of law and fact under Section 2254(d)(1). Horn v.

Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2007); see also, e.g.,

Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 246-52 (4th Cir. 2014)

(analyzing habeas petition raising mixed question of law and

12
fact under Section 2254(d)(1)). By contrast, Section 2254(d)(2)

applies to questions of historical fact. Weaver v. Palmateer,

455 F.3d 958, 963 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); Ouber v. Guarino, 293

F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he special prophylaxis of

section 2254(d)(2) applies only to determinations of basic,

primary, or historical facts.” (internal quotation omitted)).

Here, the Virginia courts’ evaluation of whether Geriatric

Release complies with Graham’s parole requirement implicates

questions of law, and therefore is subject to review under

Section 2254(d)(1). See, e.g., Moore v. Biter, 725 F.3d 1184,

1191 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a state court decision was

contrary to clearly established law when it held that Graham did

not bar a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s sentence under which

he would be eligible for parole in 127 years); Bunch v. Smith,

685 F.3d 546, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2012) (analyzing whether 89-year

sentence was functional equivalent of life sentence for purposes

of Graham under Section 2254(d)(1)). Therefore, we must

determine whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established”

Supreme Court law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

In assessing a state prisoner’s habeas claims, we review

the “last reasoned” state court decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker,

501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991); Grueninger v. Dir., Va. Dep’t of

Corrs., 813 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2016). “Unless a state-

13
court opinion adopts or incorporates the reasoning of a prior

opinion, AEDPA generally requires federal courts to review one

state decision.” Wooley v. Rednour, 702 F.3d 411, 421 (7th Cir.

2012) (internal quotation omitted). However, “[i]f the last

reasoned decision adopts or substantially incorporates the

reasoning from a previous state court decision, we may consider

both decisions to fully ascertain the reasoning of the last

decision.” Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.

2007) (internal quotation omitted); Brian R. Means, Federal

Habeas Manual § 3:7 (2016) (“[W]here the last reasoned state

court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the

reasoning from a previous decision, it is acceptable for the

federal court to look at both state court decisions to fully

ascertain the reasoning of the last decision.”).

The Supreme Court of Virginia summarily affirmed the trial

court’s oral denial of Petitioner’s motion to vacate.

Accordingly, the trial court decision constitutes the last

reasoned decision for purposes of our analysis. Nicolas, 820

F.3d at 129. The trial court relied on Angel’s reasoning

regarding the Geriatric Release provision’s compliance with

Graham’s parole requirement. Accordingly, we must consider both

the trial court’s decision and Angel in determining whether

Petitioner’s state court adjudication was “contrary to, or an

14
unreasonable application of” Graham--the question to which we

now turn.

IV.

A.

The Eighth Amendment, made applicable to the States through

the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the infliction of “cruel and

unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Roper v.

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005). “To determine whether a

punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond

historical conceptions to ‘the evolving standards of decency

that mark the progress of a maturing society.’” Graham, 560

U.S. at 58 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).

The Eighth Amendment “prohibits not only barbaric punishments,

but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime

committed.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).

Graham rests on a long line of Supreme Court decisions

addressing the constraints imposed by the Eighth Amendment on

the punishment of juvenile offenders. In Thompson v. Oklahoma,

487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth

Amendment prohibits the death penalty for offenders who

committed their crimes before the age of sixteen. The Court

grounded its decision on the principle “that punishment should

be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal

defendant.” Id. at 834 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S.

15
538, 545 (1987)). “[A]dolescents as a class are less mature and

responsible than adults,” the Court explained. Id.

“Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the

teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her

conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be

motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult.”

Id. at 835. Accordingly, a juvenile’s transgression is “not as

morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” Id. Because

juvenile offenders are not as personally culpable as adult

offenders, juvenile offenders should not receive punishments as

severe as those inflicted on adult offenders, the Court held.

Id. at 834.

In Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme Court again emphasized the

unique characteristics of youth when it extended Thompson’s bar

on the death penalty to all individuals who committed their

offenses before the age of eighteen. 543 U.S. at 578. Like

Thompson, the Roper Court highlighted juveniles’ “lack of

maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility” and

propensity for “reckless behavior.” Id. at 569 (citations

omitted). Roper further noted that “the character of a juvenile

is not as well formed as that of an adult” and juveniles’

“personality traits are more transitory, less fixed.” Id. at

570. As a result, “it is less supportable to conclude that even

a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of

16
irretrievably depraved character.” Id. “Indeed, ‘[t]he

relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact

that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as

individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may

dominate in younger years can subside.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v.

Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993)).

Against this backdrop, Graham held that “for a juvenile

offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth Amendment

forbids the sentence of life without parole.” 560 U.S. at 74.

The Court explained that “[t]his clear line is necessary to

prevent the possibility that life without parole sentences will

be imposed on juvenile nonhomicide offenders who are not

sufficiently culpable to merit that punishment.” Id. (emphasis

added). In reaching this conclusion, the Court again

highlighted the “lessened culpability” of juveniles, noting that

“developments in psychology and brain science continue to show

fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For

example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control

continue to mature through late adolescence.” Id. at 68.

Moreover, “[j]uveniles are more capable of change than are

adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of an

‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of

adults.” Id. (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).

Graham explained that life without parole is “the second

17
most severe penalty permitted by law,” behind only the death

penalty, because it “deprives the convict of the most basic

liberties without giving hope of restoration, except perhaps by

executive clemency—-the remote possibility of which does not

mitigate the harshness of the sentence.” Id. at 69–70 (citations

omitted). If a juvenile is sentenced to life in prison without

the possibility of parole, he or she has “no chance for

fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for reconciliation

with society, no hope.” Id. at 79.

Additionally, “[b]y denying the defendant the right to

reenter the community, the State makes an irrevocable judgment

about that person’s value and place in society. This judgment

is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s

capacity for change and limited moral culpability.” Id. at 74.

Accordingly, the sentence of life without parole for a juvenile

nonhomicide offender will always be “disproportionate” under the

Eighth Amendment because it always relies on a judgment “made at

the outset” that the defendant is incorrigible. Id. at 73. And

while some juvenile offenders may ultimately prove to pose a

risk to society for the rest of their lives, “[a] life without

parole sentence improperly denies the juvenile offender a chance

to demonstrate growth and maturity” later in life. Id. at 73

(emphasis added).

Although Graham left it to “the State[s], in the first

18
instance, to explore the means and mechanisms” to comply with

its dictates, id. at 75, the decision established at least three

minimum requirements for parole or early release programs for

juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment,

like Petitioner. 3

First, Graham held that such offenders must have the

opportunity “to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity

and rehabilitation.” Id. at 75 (emphasis added). Put

differently, the juvenile offender must have a “chance to later

demonstrate that he is fit to rejoin society” and that “the bad

acts he committed as a teenager are not representative of his

true character.” Id. at 79. To that end, a parole or early

release system does not comply with Graham if the system allows

for the lifetime incarceration of a juvenile nonhomicide

offender based solely on the heinousness or depravity of the

offender’s crime. Id. at 75 (“[The Eighth Amendment] prohibit[s]

States from making the judgment at the outset that [juvenile

nonhomicide offenders] never will be fit to reenter society.”);

id. at 76 (stating that the Eighth Amendment prohibits courts

3We address these three requirements because they are
particularly relevant to the Geriatric Release program and
Petitioner’s state court adjudication. We take no position on
whether Graham established--clearly or otherwise--other minimum
requirements for parole or early release programs for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment.

19
“from sentencing a juvenile nonhomicide offender to life without

parole based on a subjective judgment that the defendant’s

crimes demonstrate an ‘irretrievably depraved character’”

(quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572)).

Second, Graham held that the opportunity to obtain release

must be “meaningful,” which means that the opportunity must be

“realistic” and more than a “remote possibility.” Id. at 70, 75,

82. Graham’s “meaningful[ness]” requirement reflects the

Supreme Court’s long-standing characterization of “[p]arole [a]s

a regular part of the rehabilitative process. Assuming good

behavior, it is the normal expectation in the vast majority of

cases.” Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-03. Because parole is the

“normal expectation,” it should be “possible to predict, at

least to some extent, when parole might be granted.” Id.

(holding that, for purposes of the Eighth Amendment, executive

clemency is not a substitute for parole because clemency is an

“ad hoc” process that provides inmates with nothing more than a

“bare possibility” of release). To that end, Graham held that

the availability of executive clemency did not satisfy the

“meaningful opportunity to obtain release” requirement. 560 U.S.

at 69-70.

Third, Graham held that a state parole or early release

program must account for the lesser culpability of juvenile

offenders: “An offender’s age is relevant to the Eighth

20
Amendment, and criminal procedure laws that fail to take

defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.”

Id. at 76; see also Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465-66

(2012) (explaining that Graham’s “foundational principle” is

“that imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile

offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children”). 4

Accordingly, a state parole or early release system that

subjects juvenile offenders to more severe punishments than

their adult counterparts necessarily violates Graham.

B.

With these three principles in mind--(1) that juvenile

nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment must have

the “opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated

maturity and rehabilitation,” (2) that this opportunity must be

“meaningful,” and (3) that the early release or parole system

4The Supreme Court decided Miller after Petitioner’s state-
court adjudication. Although Petitioner may obtain relief only
based on law clearly established by the Supreme Court as of the
date of his adjudication, we may look to decisions post-dating
his adjudication for guidance regarding the interpretation and
application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent
predating the state court adjudication. See, e.g., Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003) (relying on post-adjudication
opinion to “illustrat[e] . . . proper application” of clearly
established precedent); Frazer v. South Carolina, 430 F.3d 696,
716 (4th Cir. 2005) (Motz, J., concurring) (“Where . . . a
Supreme Court decision post-dating state collateral review . . .
simply illustrates the appropriate application of Supreme Court
precedent that pre-dates the state-court determination . . . , a
federal court on habeas may consider the postdated opinion.”).

21
must take into account the lesser culpability of juvenile

offenders--we must determine whether the conclusion of the trial

court and Angel that Geriatric Release complies with Graham’s

parole requirement was “contrary to, or an unreasonable

application of” Graham. 5

1.

A state court adjudication is contrary to clearly

established law “if the state court arrives at a conclusion

opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of

law” or “if the state court confronts facts that are materially

5
It is important to note that this case does not present
the question of whether a lengthy term-of-years sentence for a
juvenile is the functional equivalent of life without parole
under Graham. That question has thus far divided courts.
Compare Bunch, 685 F.3d at 550 (holding that Graham did not
clearly establish that an lengthy term-of-years sentence for a
juvenile offender would violate the Eighth Amendment), Vasquez
v. Commonwealth, 781 S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 2016) (holding that
Graham did not address term-of-years sentences, even if they
exceed the prisoner’s life expectancy), and State v. Brown, 118
So. 3d 332, 342 (La. 2013) (concluding that Graham did not reach
term-of-years sentences), with Moore, 725 F.3d at 1186 (holding
that Graham clearly prohibited a sentence under which a juvenile
offender who would not be eligible for parole until age 144),
Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 A.3d 1031, (Conn. 2015) (holding
that “a fifty year term and its grim prospects for any future
outside of prison effectively provide a juvenile offender with
‘no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no chance for
reconciliation with society, no hope’” (quoting Graham, 560 U.S.
at 79)), Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 132, 136, 141–42 (Wyo.
2014) (holding that a sentence that would keep the defendant in
prison until age sixty-one was the functional equivalent of a
life sentence), and State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 72 (Iowa 2013)
(holding that “Miller's principles are fully applicable to a
lengthy term-of-years sentence”).

22
indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and

arrives at [the opposite] result.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S.

362, 405 (2000); Barbe v. McBride, 521 F.3d 443, 453-54 (4th

Cir. 2006).

Here, Angel, upon which the state trial court entirely

relied, correctly identified Graham as controlling and

recognized each of the three minimum requirements set forth

above for a parole or early release program for juvenile

nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment. In

particular, Angel repeatedly stated that Graham requires that

juvenile offenders be afforded an opportunity for “release based

on maturity and rehabilitation.” 704 S.E.2d at 402. Likewise,

the Angel court acknowledged that the opportunity for release

must be “meaningful.” Id. 6 And Angel recognized that Graham

demands that state penal systems account for the “limited moral

culpability of juvenile offenders.” Id. at 401. Accordingly,

Petitioner’s state court adjudication was not “contrary to”

Graham. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002) (holding that

6
Notwithstanding their contention that Graham “does not
address what type of parole is necessary to meet its standard,”
Respondents concede that Graham held that juvenile nonhomicide
offenders sentenced to life imprisonment must have the
opportunity to “obtain release based on maturity and
rehabilitation” and that this opportunity must be “meaningful.”
Appellants’ Br. at 37, 49. Accordingly, even Respondents
concede that Graham establishes minimum requirements for parole
or early release programs.

23
state court adjudication that “correctly identified the

principles announced [by the Supreme Court] as those governing

the analysis . . . was [not] contrary to . . . clearly

established law”).

2.

Petitioner, therefore, may obtain relief only if his state

court adjudication amounted to an “unreasonable application” of

Graham. A state court decision amounts to an “unreasonable

application” of clearly established Supreme Court precedent if

it “‘identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the

Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that

principle to the facts’ of the prisoner’s case.” Grueninger, 813

F.3d at 524 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 520). To satisfy this

standard, the state court adjudication must be “more than

incorrect or erroneous;” it must be “objectively unreasonable.”

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). That being said, to

reach a decision that constitutes an “unreasonable application”

of Supreme Court precedent, a state court need not address an

identical factual or legal scenario to that previously addressed

by the Supreme Court: “even a general standard may be applied in

an unreasonable manner.” Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930,

953 (2007).

24
 For several reasons, we agree with Petitioner that his

state court adjudication constituted an “unreasonable

application” of Graham.

First, Geriatric Release does not necessarily provide

Petitioner--or any other inmate, juvenile or otherwise--the

opportunity to obtain release “based on demonstrated maturity

and rehabilitation,” as Graham requires. In concluding that

Geriatric Release satisfied this requirement, Angel emphasized

that “if the prisoner meets the qualifications for consideration

contained in the statute, the factors used in the normal parole

consideration process apply to conditional release decisions

under this statute.” 704 S.E.2d at 402. Assuming arguendo the

“decision factors” used in the normal parole consideration

process adequately account for a juvenile offender’s “maturity

and rehabilitation,” 7 this conclusion ignores the Parole Board’s

authority to deny Geriatric Release for any reason--and without

consideration of the “decision factors”--and therefore is

objectively unreasonable.

7 The dissent incorrectly asserts that we conclude that the
parole “decision factors” do not account for a juvenile
offender’s “maturity and rehabilitation.” Post at 19. To the
contrary, because the Parole Board may deny a juvenile offender
Geriatric Release at the Initial Review stage without
considering the “decision factors,” we need not--and thus do
not--decide whether the “decision factors” adequately account
for a juvenile offender’s “maturity and rehabilitation,” as
Graham requires.

25
 Under the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures, the

Parole Board must consider the “decision factors”--the “factors

used in the normal parole consideration process”--during the

Assessment Review stage. But the Parole Board may deny a

petition for Geriatric Release for any reason--without

consideration of the “decision factors”--at the Initial Review

stage. It was objectively unreasonable to conclude that

Geriatric Release satisfied Graham’s requirement that juvenile

offenders be able to obtain release “based on maturity and

rehabilitation,” when, under the plain and unambiguous language

of the governing procedures, the Parole Board can deny every

juvenile offender Geriatric Release for any reason whatsoever. 8

Like Respondents, the dissent seeks to insulate Angel from

collateral review by claiming that “the Virginia Supreme Court’s

conclusion that Virginia law requires consideration of ‘normal

parole factors’ such as rehabilitation and maturity is one of

state law and thus is binding on this court.” Post at 19-20.

But, contrary to Respondents’ and the dissent’s

8
Because the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures do
not require consideration of maturity and rehabilitation--or any
other factors--we need not, and thus do not, decide whether a
statute or regulation requiring only that a state decision-maker
consider “maturity and rehabilitation” satisfies Graham’s
requirement that juvenile offenders have the opportunity to
obtain release “based on demonstrated maturity and
rehabilitation.” 560 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added).

26
characterization, Angel does not hold that the Geriatric Release

Administrative Procedures “require” consideration of the

“decision factors.” Rather, Angel states that the “decision

factors” “apply to conditional release decisions,” but never

addresses whether--much less holds that--the Parole Board must

consider the “decision factors” in reviewing every petition for

Geriatric Release. 704 S.E.2d at 402 (emphasis added).

Indeed, by reading Angel as “requir[ing]” consideration of

the “decision factors,” the dissent puts Angel into direct

conflict with the plain language of the Geriatric Release

Administrative Procedures, which permit the Parole Board to deny

a petition for Geriatric Release at the Initial Review stage for

any reason, and without consideration of the “decision factors.”

See supra Part II. But in predicting how state courts would

resolve an unsettled issue of state law, we must reject, if at

all possible, predictions that would ascribe absurd or

irrational conclusions to state courts. See, e.g., Pena v.

Greffet, 110 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1134 (D.N.M. 2015) (refusing to

predict that state court would resolve unsettled issue of state

law in a way that “would produce absurd results”); Union Cnty.

Ill. v. MERSCORP, Inc., 920 F. Supp. 2d 923, 931 (S.D. Ill.

2013) (adopting prediction of state law that was “[t]he only

non-absurd, non-inconvenient way to read the language of the law

itself and the language of Illinois appellate courts”); Jakomas

27
v. McFalls, 229 F. Supp. 2d 412, 424 (W.D. Pa. 2002) (rejecting

plaintiff’s contention that state court would interpret state

law in a way that would lead to an “absurd result”).

Accordingly, we refuse to read Angel’s description of the

Geriatric Release Administrative Procedues as “apply[ing]” the

“decision factors” as requiring that the Parole Board consider

those factors at the Initial Review stage, as the dissent

proposes.

Contrary to the dissent’s position, Angel’s error is not

that it irrationally interpreted the Geriatric Release

Administrative Procedures as requiring consideration of the

“decision factors.” Rather, Angel unreasonably concluded that

the potential for consideration of maturity and rehabilitation

at the Assessment Review stage is adequate to comply with

Graham’s requirement that States afford juvenile nonhomicide

offenders a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” 569 U.S. at 75, when

the Procedures allow the Parole Board to deny Geriatric Release

for any reason at the Initial Review stage and therefore provide

no guarantee that the Parole Board will consider a juvenile

offender’s maturation and rehabilitation--a question of federal

constitutional law. Indeed, under the Geriatric Release

Administrative Procedures, the Parole Board could allow

Petitioner to die in prison without ever having considered

28
whether Petitioner had matured or was rehabilitated. Graham

does not countenance such a possibility. 560 U.S. at 74, 79

(rejecting sentences of life without parole for juvenile

nonhomicide offender because such a penalty “guarantee[s] [the

offender] will die in prison without any meaningful opportunity

to obtain release” and “foreswears altogether the rehabilitative

ideal”).

Geriatric Release also fails to comply with Graham’s

requirement that juvenile offenders have the opportunity to

obtain release “based on demonstrated maturity and

rehabilitation” because it allows for the lifetime incarceration

of a juvenile nonhomicide offender based solely on the

heinousness or depravity of the offender’s crime. Data provided

by the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission shows that, to

date, 95.4 percent of the denials of Geriatric Release have been

based on the “serious nature of the crime.” J.A. 178. 9

9 The Sentencing Commission’s 95.4 percent figure reflects
adjudications of Geriatric Release petitions filed by adult
offenders only. There is no data available regarding
adjudications of Geriatric Release petitions by juvenile
offenders because no juvenile offender sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole in Virginia has reached the age of
sixty. Respondents maintain the absence of data on the
adjudication of Geriatric Release petitions by juvenile
offenders precludes reliance on this data. We agree with the
district court, however, that “[c]ompelling juveniles who are
currently serving sentences of life without the possibility of
parole to wait until enough similarly situated juveniles reach
age sixty so that courts can reassess the probabilities and
(Continued)
29
Accordingly, the Parole Board denies Geriatric Release petitions

in nearly every case on grounds that the petitioners’ “crimes

demonstrate an ‘irretrievably depraved character’”--directly

contrary to Graham’s instruction that state penal regimes take

into account a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s greater “capacity

for change” relative to his adult counterparts by giving such

offender the opportunity “to demonstrate that the bad acts he

committed as a teenager are not representative of his true

character.” 560 U.S. at 73, 79.

For this reason, the dissent misconstrues Graham when it

appeals to the conduct giving rise to Petitioner’s conviction

and Petitioner’s conduct at sentencing to justify its position.

Post at 5-6. Rather, Graham forbids States from making a

“judgment . . . at the outset” that a juvenile offender is

“incorrigible” because juvenile offenders have a “capacity for

change.” 560 U.S. at 73, 79.

A second reason Petitioner’s adjudication was objectively

unreasonable is that the Geriatric Release program does not

offer juvenile nonhomicide offenders the “meaningful”

opportunity for release traditionally afforded by parole.

statistics related to geriatric release perpetuates the
injustice that Graham sought to correct.” LeBlanc, 2015 WL
4042175, at *17.

30
Tellingly, when analyzing whether Geriatric Release complied

with Graham, the Angel court said that “the effect of [the

juvenile defendant’s life] sentences is that [he] will spend the

rest of his life confined in the penitentiary.” 704 S.E.2d at

401 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Virginia, therefore,

expected the defendant in Angel--who was 17 when he committed

his offenses and less than 4 years older when the Supreme Court

of Virginia decided his appeal--would spend his life jail,

notwithstanding the availability of Geriatric Release and that

the defendant had had only four years to “grow[] and matur[e].”

Graham, 560 U.S. at 73. But under clearly established Supreme

Court precedent--precedent repeatedly relied on by Graham, id.

at 70--“parole” should be the “normal expectation in the vast

majority of cases,” Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-03. It was

objectively unreasonable, therefore, for the Supreme Court of

Virginia to take the position that a penal regime under which it

concedes early release is the exception, rather than the

expectation, complies with Graham’s meaningfulness requirement.

Relatedly, Geriatric Release also fails to satisfy the

“meaningful” opportunity requirement because there are no

standards governing the denial of Geriatric Release petitions.

In the context of determining whether a life sentence without

parole complied with the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court

explained that “[t]he law generally specifies when a prisoner

31
will be eligible to be considered for parole, and details the

standards and procedures applicable at that time,” allowing

prisoners “to predict, at least to some extent, when parole

might be granted.” Id. at 300-01. By contrast, mechanisms that

allow a decision-maker to grant or deny early release “for any

reason without reference to any standards,” offer inmates

nothing more than a “bare possibility” of release and therefore

do not constitute “parole” for purposes of the Eighth

Amendment. 10 Id. at 301.

As explained above, the Geriatric Release statute does not

provide the Parole Board with any guidance regarding what

factors it must consider in deciding whether to release a

geriatric prisoner. See supra Part II.A. And, as Petitioner

correctly notes, the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures

10 The dissent claims that Graham only “requir[es] that the
parole board have an ability to consider . . . evidence [of
maturity and rehabilitation] in deciding whether the offender
should be released.” Post at 22 (emphasis added). Graham’s
holding that executive clemency does not comply with the
“meaningful opportunity for release” requirement belies the
dissent’s assertion. In particular, notwithstanding that an
executive has unfettered discretion to grant clemency--and
therefore is “able” to consider an offender’s rehabilitation and
maturity in deciding whether to grant clemency--executive
clemency does not comply with Graham’s parole requirement
because it is an “ad hoc” process without any governing
standards. 560 U.S. at 69-70 (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 300-01).
For purposes of Graham, the key issue is not whether the Parole
Board is “able” to consider a juvenile offender’s rehabilitation
and maturity--it is whether the Parole Board must consider
rehabilitation and maturation. See supra.

32
authorize the Parole Board to deny a petition for Geriatric

Release at the Initial Review stage for any reason. Without any

statutory or administrative guidance regarding what constitutes

a “compelling reason” warranting release or setting forth the

criteria for denying a juvenile offender’s petition for

Geriatric Release at the Initial Review stage, it is impossible

to predict whether and when--if at all--the Parole Board will

grant Geriatric Release. Accordingly, Geriatric Release does

not afford juvenile nonhomicide offenders the “meaningful”

opportunity to obtain release to which Graham entitles them. See

Graham, 560 U.S. at 69-70 (holding that executive clemency,

which the Supreme Court has recognized lacks governing

standards, did not constitute “meaningful opportunity to obtain

release” for juvenile offenders sentenced to life imprisonment).

Third, the state courts unreasonably concluded that the

Geriatric Release program complies with Graham’s dictate that

state punishment regimes account for the lesser culpability of

juvenile offenders. In particular, even if the Parole Board was

required to consider the “decision factors” in deciding whether

to grant a petition for Geriatric Release--which it is not--a

prisoner’s youth at the time of his offense is not among those

decision factors. Therefore, neither the Geriatric Release

statute nor the Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures

33
require that the Parole Board consider the “special mitigating

force of youth,” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834, as Graham requires.

More significantly--and as the district court correctly

noted--Geriatric Release treats juvenile offenders sentenced to

life imprisonment “worse” than adult offenders receiving the

same sentence because juvenile offenders “must serve a larger

percentage of their sentence than adults do before eligibility

to apply for geriatric release.” LeBlanc, 2015 WL 4042175, at

*14. For example, under Geriatric Release, a fifty-year-old

sentenced to life in prison will be eligible to apply for

Geriatric Release in ten years, but a sixteen-year-old will have

to serve forty-four years before receiving his first opportunity

to apply for Geriatric Release. Graham emphasized that a life

sentence is “especially harsh” for a juvenile offender relative

to an adult offender because, under such a sentence, the

“juvenile offender will on average serve more years and a

greater percentage of his life in prison than an adult

offender.” 560 U.S. at 70. Given that (1) the Supreme Court

specifically held that sentencing systems that require juvenile

offenders to serve more years and/or a greater percentage of

their lives relative to adult offenders violate the Eighth

Amendment’s proportionality principle and that (2) Geriatric

Release subjects juvenile offenders to longer--and

proportionately longer--sentences, it was objectively

34
unreasonable to conclude that Geriatric Release complied with

Graham.

3.

The dissent does not dispute that the Geriatric Release

Administrative Procedures permit the Parole Board to deny a

petition for Geriatric Release for any reason at the Initial

Review stage, without consideration of the “decision factors,”

post at 21-22, contrary to Graham’s holding that juvenile

nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment must have

an opportunity “to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity

and rehabilitation,” 560 U.S. at 75 (emphasis added). And the

dissent does not dispute that Geriatric Release subjects

juvenile offenders, on average, to longer—-and proportionately

longer—-sentences, post at 23, contrary to Graham’s dictate that

state penal regimes account for the lesser culpability of

juvenile offenders, 560 U.S. at 76. Nonetheless, the dissent

maintains that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because we

fail to afford his state court adjudication the level of

deference Section 2254(d)(1) requires, as the Supreme Court

interpreted that provision in Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86

(2011). We disagree.

In Harrington, the petitioner claimed that his state court

adjudication amounted to an unreasonable application of the test

for ineffective assistance of counsel set forth in Strickland v.

35
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. In

rejecting the petition, the Supreme Court explained that “[t]he

standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both ‘highly

deferential,’ . . . and when the two apply in tandem, review is

‘doubly’ so . . . .” Id. at 105 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689; Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009)).

Notably, Harrington further explained that “evaluating

whether a rule application was unreasonable [for purposes of

Section 2254(d)(1)] requires considering the rule’s specificity.

The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in

reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.” Id. at 101

(quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The

Court held that the Strickland standard “is a general one, so

the range of reasonable applications is substantial.” Id. at 105

(citing Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123). This echoes the Court’s

earlier pronouncement in Yarborough, upon which the dissent also

relies: “If a legal rule is specific . . . [a]pplications of the

rule may be plainly correct or incorrect. Other rules are more

general, and their meaning must emerge in application over the

course of time. Applying a general standard to a specific case

can demand a substantial element of judgment.” 541 U.S. at 664;

see post at 13. Thus, determining whether a state court’s

decision was “unreasonable” for purposes of Section 2254(d)(1)

36
depends on the specificity of the constitutional rule the state

court applied.

A court applying Strickland must determine two things: that

the defendant’s counsel’s representation “fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness,” and that the deficient

performance was “prejudicial to the defense.” 466 U.S. at 687–

91. By contrast, Graham set forth a categorical rule barring

sentences of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide

offenders. 560 U.S. at 77–79. And Graham clearly established

that parole or early release programs for such offenders must

(1) provide an opportunity to obtain release “based on

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” and (2) account for

the lesser culpability of juvenile offenders. See supra Part

III.A. The Court characterized these minimum requirements as

establishing a “boundar[y]” on state courts’ authority to make

“case-by-case” sentencing determinations. 560 U.S. at 77.

Accordingly, Graham’s categorical rule and its minimum

requirements for parole or early release programs do not afford

state courts the same “leeway” that the “reasonableness” and

“prejudice” components of Strickland permit. Indeed, the

dissent misconstrues Harrington when it affords the same

“doubly” deferential review to Petitioner’s state court

adjudication as federal courts apply in reviewing state court

decisions applying Strickland.

37
 Contrary to the dissent, we do not engage in de novo

review. Rather, we hold that the Supreme Court of Virginia

unreasonably applied Graham when it acknowledged Graham’s

minimum requirements for parole or early release programs for

juvenile nonhomicide offenders sentenced to life imprisonment

but concluded that Geriatric Release—-which permits the Parole

Board to deny petitions for Geriatric Release without ever

considering a petitioner’s maturity or rehabilitation and which

treats juvenile offenders worse than adult offenders--complied

with those requirements.

V.

Nevertheless, Respondents and the dissent seek refuge in

Supreme Court’s statement that “[i]t is for the State, in the

first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for

compliance” with Graham’s requirements. Appellants’ Br. at 24,

38, 42-43; post at 2. According to Respondents and the dissent,

this single sentence effectively immunized Petitioner’s

sentence--and those of all other juvenile nonhomicide offenders

sentenced to life imprisonment eligible for any form of early

release other than executive clemency--from collateral review.

But the Supreme Court’s proper regard for States’

independent judgment regarding how best to operate their penal

systems does not, “[e]ven in the context of federal habeas, . .

. imply abandonment or abdication of judicial review.” Miller-

38
El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). This is particularly

true when, as here, the Supreme Court clearly sets forth minimum

constitutional requirements to guide state courts’ and

policymakers’ decisions--requirements that the Supreme Court of

Virginia readily determined from the plain language of Graham.

In sum, we hold that notwithstanding its recognition of

Graham’s “governing legal principles,” the Supreme Court of

Virginia unreasonably concluded that Geriatric Release--a

program that predated Graham by more than 15 years, that permits

the Parole Board to deny release for any reason whatsoever, and

that treats juvenile offenders worse than adult offenders--

complies with Graham’s parole requirement. Accordingly, we

affirm the district court’s decision and remand so that the

Petitioner can be resentenced in accordance with Graham and the

Eighth Amendment.

AFFIRMED

39
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

In affirming the grant of Dennis LeBlanc’s habeas petition

brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the majority holds that the

Virginia Supreme Court concluded unreasonably that Virginia’s

geriatric release program provided a meaningful opportunity for

release to juveniles and therefore satisfied the requirements of

Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010). Graham forbids

sentencing juveniles to life in prison without parole for

nonhomicide crimes. In reaching its conclusion, the majority

relies simply on its expressed disagreement with the Virginia

Supreme Court’s decision in Angel v. Commonwealth, 704 S.E.2d

386 (Va. 2011), and effectively overrules it. The Virginia

court’s opinion, however, is demonstrably every bit as

reasonable as the majority’s opinion in this case and should be

given deference under § 2254(d)(1).

After 16-year-old LeBlanc raped a 62-year-old woman in

Virginia Beach, Virginia, in 1999, he was convicted in the

Virginia Beach Circuit Court of abduction and rape. The court

sentenced him in 2003 to life imprisonment on each count. While

Virginia had, in 1994, abolished traditional parole for felony

offenders, see Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-165.1, it had at the same

time adopted a “geriatric release” program that allows for the

conditional release of inmates who serve at least 10 years of

their sentence and reach the age of 60, see id. § 53.1-40.01.

40
 In 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in

Graham, where it held that “for a juvenile offender who did not

commit homicide the Eighth Amendment forbids the sentence of

life without parole.” 560 U.S. at 74. The Court explained that

a State must provide this class of juvenile offenders “some

meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated

maturity and rehabilitation,” but that “[i]t is for the State,

in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for

compliance.” Id. at 75.

In its first application of Graham, the Virginia Supreme

Court held that the factors Virginia applies in considering

candidates for geriatric release were the same as “the factors

used in the normal parole consideration process” and that, while

Virginia’s geriatric release program had “an age qualifier,” it

nonetheless afforded inmates, including juvenile offenders, “the

‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated

maturity and rehabilitation’ required by the Eighth Amendment.”

Angel, 704 S.E.2d at 402 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).

After Angel had been decided, LeBlanc filed a motion in the

Virginia Beach Circuit Court to vacate his sentence as invalid

under Graham. The Circuit Court denied his motion, relying on

Angel to conclude that Virginia had “an appropriate mechanism in

place” to enable LeBlanc “to receive some form of parole.” But

when LeBlanc sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C.

41
§ 2254, the district court granted LeBlanc’s petition,

concluding, contrary to the Virginia court’s decision, that

Virginia’s geriatric release program fell short of Graham’s

requirements.

In now affirming, the majority unfortunately fails to

respect, in any meaningful way, the deference Congress requires

federal courts to give to state court decisions on post-

conviction review under § 2254. Under even a loose application

of the governing standard in § 2254(d), a reviewing federal

court would be constrained to conclude that the Virginia Beach

Circuit Court’s ruling was not contrary to or an unreasonable

application of Graham. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). To hold

otherwise would require finding that the Virginia Supreme

Court’s decision in Angel, as well as the Virginia Beach Circuit

Court’s decision relying on it, amounted to an “extreme

malfunction in the state criminal justice system.” Harrington

v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011).

To reach its conclusion that Virginia’s geriatric release

program does not provide juveniles with a meaningful opportunity

to obtain release, the majority conducts its own de novo review

of the program, concluding that the program lacks “governing

standards” for release. The majority, however, fails to

recognize that our task on a § 2254 habeas petition is not to

evaluate state parole systems de novo but rather to determine

42
whether the Virginia Supreme Court’s evaluation of its own

program was an unreasonable application of Graham, see 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1), which it clearly was not. Graham held that the

Eighth Amendment forbids States from determining, at the time of

sentencing, that a juvenile offender who did not commit a

homicide “never will be fit to reenter society,” 560 U.S. at 75

(emphasis added), and that such offenders must have “a chance to

demonstrate growth and maturity,” id. at 73. Analyzing the

sufficiency of Virginia’s geriatric release program under

Graham, the Virginia Supreme Court reasonably concluded that the

program, which employs the same “factors used in the normal

parole consideration process,” provides nonhomicide juvenile

offenders with “the ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release

based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ required by

the Eighth Amendment.” Angel, 704 S.E.2d at 402 (quoting

Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). While the majority may disagree with

the Virginia Supreme Court’s conclusion, the fact that it was

reasonable precludes LeBlanc from obtaining relief under § 2254.

Moreover, beyond this case, the majority’s approach will

encourage federal courts to scrutinize state policies and parole

determinations under similar systems, a result that Congress

clearly intended to forestall when it imposed the restrictions

stated in § 2254. Indeed, the Supreme Court also sought to

avoid this result by explicitly leaving the application of

43
Graham to the States. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 75 (noting that

it is for the State “to explore the means and mechanisms for

compliance”).

At bottom, when applying the prescribed standards to

evaluate the Virginia court’s application of Graham, it is clear

that LeBlanc’s petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus must

be denied. I now address his petition under those standards.

I

During the morning of July 6, 1999, Dennis LeBlanc, who was

at the time 16 years old, asked a 62-year-old woman, who was

walking home from a grocery store, for a cigarette. After the

woman told him that she did not smoke, LeBlanc pushed her down,

dragged her to nearby bushes, raped her, and stole her purse.

When police were later able to match LeBlanc’s DNA with that of

the sperm sample taken from the woman, LeBlanc was charged and

convicted in the Virginia Beach Circuit Court of rape, in

violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-61, and abduction with intent

to defile, in violation of Virginia Code § 18.2-48. He was

sentenced to life imprisonment on each count in March 2003. The

court noted that “the two offenses have to be some of the most

serious charges I’ve ever heard about.” When imposing life

imprisonment, the court did not mention parole, as traditional

parole had been abolished in 1994 when the geriatric release

44
program was adopted. ∗ In response to the sentence given, LeBlanc

told the court twice, “F--k you.”

More than seven years after LeBlanc’s sentencing, the

Supreme Court decided Graham, holding for the first time that

“for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide the Eighth

Amendment forbids the sentence of life without parole.” 560

U.S. at 74 (emphasis added). The Court explained that while

“[a] State [was] not required to guarantee eventual freedom to a

juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime,” it was

required to provide the juvenile offender with “some meaningful

opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and

rehabilitation.” Id. at 75. The Court, however, directed that

“[i]t is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the

means and mechanisms for compliance” with that command. Id.

After the Graham decision had been handed down, the

Virginia Supreme Court considered whether Virginia’s geriatric

release program satisfied Graham’s requirements, and it held

that the program did so. See Angel, 704 S.E.2d at 402. More

specifically, the court explained that Virginia’s geriatric

∗ The majority claims that LeBlanc was sentenced to “life
imprisonment without parole,” ante at 3 (emphasis added), but
its statement begs the question. LeBlanc was sentenced simply
to life imprisonment, and, at the time, his sentence allowed for
the possibility of release under Virginia’s geriatric release
program, leaving the question whether the program functions as a
form of parole.

45
release program, as set forth in Virginia Code § 53.1-40.01,

allows for the conditional release of inmates when they reach

age 60 and have served 10 years and that “the factors used in

the normal parole consideration process” apply to such

determinations. Id. The court concluded that, “[w]hile [the

geriatric release program] has an age qualifier, it provides

. . . the ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation’ required by the Eighth

Amendment.” Id. (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).

In May 2011, several months after Angel was decided,

LeBlanc filed a motion in the Virginia Beach Circuit Court to

vacate his life sentence as invalid under Graham. He contended

that Angel was wrongly decided and that he did not indeed have a

meaningful opportunity for release. The Circuit Court, however,

denied LeBlanc’s motion, explaining:

[The] Supreme Court of Virginia has already looked at
this issue in the Angel case and determined that there
was an appropriate mechanism in place . . . for a
defendant to receive some form of parole as enunciated
in [Graham], and they denied Mr. Angel’s appeal. . . .
The court feels and finds and is so ordering that
there is an appropriate mechanism in place, that the
sentence rendered back in 2003 for Mr. LeBlanc . . .
in which the defendant received two life sentences
. . . was the appropriate sentence . . . .

(Emphasis added). The Virginia Supreme Court summarily denied

LeBlanc’s petitions for appeal and for rehearing.

46
 LeBlanc filed this federal habeas petition pursuant to

§ 2254, contending again that the Virginia Supreme Court had

wrongly decided Angel and that, based on statistics that he had

presented to the state court, he had only a “remote possibility

of release,” which did not amount to the “meaningful

opportunity” for release required by Graham. A magistrate judge

recommended dismissing LeBlanc’s petition, but the district

court disagreed and granted the petition, ordering that the

Virginia Beach Circuit Court resentence LeBlanc. The district

court concluded that “the state court’s decision was both

contrary to, and an unreasonable application of, clearly

established federal law set forth in Graham,” explaining that

“[t]here is no possibility that fairminded jurists could

disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with[] the

dictates of Graham.” The court noted further that the geriatric

release program “falls far short of the hallmarks of compassion,

mercy and fairness rooted in this nation’s commitment to

justice.”

From the district court’s judgment, the respondents -- the

Commonwealth of Virginia and Randall Mathena, the Warden of Red

Onion State Prison (collectively herein, the “Commonwealth” or

“Virginia”) -- filed this appeal.

47
 II

The operative state court decision for our review is the

decision of the Virginia Beach Circuit Court. See Grueninger v.

Dir., Va. Dep’t of Corr., 813 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2016)

(“‘look[ing] through’” the Virginia Supreme Court’s summary

refusal to review the defendant’s appeal and “evaluat[ing] the

Circuit Court’s reasoned decision”). That decision concluded

that Virginia’s geriatric release program provides an

“appropriate mechanism” for implementing Graham. The Circuit

Court relied on the Virginia Supreme Court’s opinion in Angel,

which applied Graham and concluded that Virginia’s geriatric

release program, which uses the “normal” parole factors for

determining release, provided “the ‘meaningful opportunity to

obtain released based on demonstrated maturity and

rehabilitation’ required by the Eighth Amendment.” Angel, 704

S.E.2d at 402 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75).

Faced with the district court’s contrary conclusion, we

must decide whether the Circuit Court’s decision “was contrary

to, or involved an unreasonable application of,” Graham, 28

U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

A

First, to satisfy the requirement of § 2254(d)(1) that the

state court decision be shown to be “contrary to” Graham,

LeBlanc would have to show (1) that the state court “applie[d] a

48
rule different from the governing law set forth in [Supreme

Court] cases,” or (2) that it decided this case “differently

than [the Supreme Court] [has] done on a set of materially

indistinguishable facts.” Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694

(2002). Therefore, “a run-of-the-mill state-court decision

applying the correct legal rule from [Supreme Court] cases to

the facts of a prisoner’s case would not fit comfortably within

[the] ‘contrary to’ clause.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

406 (2000).

In this case, no one can seriously argue that the Virginia

Beach Circuit Court failed to correctly identify Graham as

stating the applicable legal rule. In denying LeBlanc’s motion

to vacate his sentence, the Circuit Court specifically discussed

Graham, noting how “the U.S. Supreme Court in rendering its

decision gave the court[s] guidelines to deal with defendants

who were juveniles at the time of their offenses.” Because the

Circuit Court operated under the correct U.S. Supreme Court

rules and did not reach an opposite conclusion from the Supreme

Court on a question of law, the argument that the Virginia Beach

Circuit Court produced a decision “contrary to” Graham can

survive only if the facts of Graham were “materially

indistinguishable” from LeBlanc’s case. Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.

But LeBlanc cannot make this showing either.

49
 Graham involved a juvenile offender convicted in Florida

for a nonhomicide crime, who was sentenced to life in prison

without any possibility of parole. As such, his sentence:

guarantee[d] he will die in prison without any
meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no matter
what he might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he
committed as a teenager [were] not representative of
his true character, even if he [were to] spend[] the
next half century attempting to atone for his crimes
and learn from his mistakes.

560 U.S. at 79. Because Florida had abolished its parole

system, the life sentence gave Graham “no possibility of release

unless he [was] granted executive clemency.” Id. at 57

(emphasis added). The Court noted, however, that executive

clemency provided Graham only a “remote possibility” of release,

id. at 70, and that Florida had effectively “denied him any

chance to later demonstrate that he [was] fit to rejoin

society,” id. at 79. In these circumstances, the Court held

that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a sentence

of life without the possibility of parole for juvenile offenders

who commit nonhomicide crimes. Id. at 74.

LeBlanc’s case differs materially. Unlike Florida law

before Graham, Virginia’s geriatric law affords a juvenile

sentenced to life imprisonment some opportunity for release.

The geriatric law provides in relevant part:

Any person serving a sentence imposed upon a
conviction for a felony offense . . . who has reached
the age of sixty or older and who has served at least

50
 ten years of the sentence imposed may petition the
Parole Board for conditional release. The Parole
Board shall promulgate regulations to implement the
provisions of this section.

Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-40.01. And the Virginia Supreme Court --

the ultimate authority on Virginia law -- has construed “[t]he

regulations for conditional release under [§ 53.1-40.01] [to]

provide that if the prisoner meets the qualifications for

consideration contained in the statute, the factors used in the

normal parole consideration process apply to conditional release

decisions under this statute.” Angel, 704 S.E.2d at 402

(emphasis added). Thus, LeBlanc cannot show that the facts in

Graham, where the prisoner enjoyed no opportunity for release

outside of clemency, are materially indistinguishable from the

facts of this case, where LeBlanc has an opportunity to be

released by the Parole Board.

B

Second, LeBlanc is also unable to demonstrate that the

decision by the Virginia Beach Circuit Court, applying Angel,

was an “unreasonable application of” Graham. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). To satisfy this requirement, LeBlanc would have

to show that, even “if the state court identifie[d] the correct

governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions,” it

“unreasonably applie[d] that principle to the facts of the . . .

case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 365. And to show that the state

51
court unreasonably applied governing legal principles, he would

have to show that the state court’s decision was “‘objectively

unreasonable,’” rather than “merely wrong” or involving “clear

error.” White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014) (quoting

Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75-76 (2003)).

To emphasize the difficulty of meeting this standard, the

Supreme Court has said that a prisoner would have to show “that

the state court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal

court was so lacking in justification that there was an error

well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S.

at 103; see also id. at 101 (“A state court’s determination that

a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as

‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on the correctness of the

state court’s decision” (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541

U.S. 652, 664 (2004))). Not surprisingly, the rare decision

finding § 2254(d)(1) satisfied typically arises from the

misapplication of a long-established Supreme Court standard.

See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 389 (2005) (finding

it was objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude

that, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984),

capital defense lawyer’s failure to consult prior conviction

file that was certain to contain aggravating evidence was not

52
ineffective assistance); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 527-28

(2003) (similar for file containing mitigating evidence).

In this case, after the Virginia Beach Circuit Court

correctly identified Graham as the governing law, it applied

that decision to the facts of LeBlanc’s case. In doing so, the

Circuit Court considered the Graham requirement that States must

provide a mechanism that affords a juvenile sentenced to life

imprisonment “a meaningful opportunity for release.” Since the

Graham Court stated that its holding applied only to juvenile

offenders convicted of a nonhomicide crime and sentenced to life

imprisonment without parole, Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, and since

the Virginia Supreme Court had held that the geriatric release

program employed normal parole factors, the Circuit Court

reasonably concluded that LeBlanc’s sentence did not violate

Graham.

Indeed, it strains credulity to conclude that the Circuit

Court’s application of Graham was “so lacking in justification”

that it fell “beyond any possibility for fairminded

disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. For one, Graham’s

focus on the parallel between life without parole and the death

penalty, see 560 U.S. at 69-70, along with the Court’s

indictment of life without parole as impermissibly deeming a

“juvenile offender forever . . . a danger to society,” id. at 72

(emphasis added), suggests that the Court saw no constitutional

53
problem with state parole systems that allow for release only

later in life. Indeed, the Court emphasized that “[t]he Eighth

Amendment does not foreclose the possibility that persons

convicted of nonhomicide crimes committed before adulthood will

remain behind bars for life. It does prohibit States from

making the judgment at the outset that those offenders never

will be fit to reenter society.” Id. at 75 (emphasis added).

Thus, the state court was justified in reading Graham’s Eighth

Amendment concerns as limited to traditional sentences of life

without any possibility of parole.

Further, Graham did not define the bounds of its singular

requirement that a juvenile must have “some meaningful

opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and

rehabilitation.” 575 U.S. at 75. Rather, in adopting “[a]

categorical rule against life without parole for juvenile

nonhomicide offenders,” id. at 79, Graham declined to address

what characteristics render a parole or release program

“meaningful.” The Court did not dictate, for example, how

frequently a parole board must meet regarding a juvenile

nonhomicide offender or when, after a sentence is imposed on the

offender, it must first begin meeting. Graham required only

that, under a procedure that the Court did not specify, the

offender be given a meaningful opportunity for release based on

demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation. Given Graham’s leeway

54
with respect to procedures and decisionmaking, the range of

permissible state court interpretation is commensurately broad.

See Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664 (“[E]valuating whether a rule

application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s

specificity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts

have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations”).

This is for good reason. Federal courts simply cannot be

inserting themselves so deeply into state parole procedures that

they effectively usurp the role of a state parole board. See

Vann v. Angelone, 73 F.3d 519, 521 (4th Cir. 1996) (“It is

difficult to imagine a context more deserving of federal

deference than state parole decisions”).

Affording the proper deference to its interpretation of

Graham’s broad rule, it is readily apparent that the Virginia

Beach Circuit Court operated well within its margin of error in

concluding that Virginia’s geriatric release program provides a

“meaningful opportunity to obtain release.” The program

includes the Parole Board’s review of the inmate’s circumstances

by considering a range of factors, such as:

• Whether the individual’s history, physical and
mental condition and character, and the individual’s
conduct, employment, education, vocational training,
and other developmental activities during
incarceration, reflect the probability that the
individual will lead a law abiding life in the
community and live up to all conditions of
[geriatric release] if released;

55
 • Length of sentence;

• Facts and circumstances of the offense;

• Mitigating and aggravating factors;

• Inter-personal relationships with staff and inmates;
and

• Changes in attitude toward self and others.

Virginia Parole Board Policy Manual 2-4 (Oct. 2006). These

factors on their face allow for consideration of an offender’s

maturity, rehabilitation, and youth at the time of the offense.

Further, inmates such as LeBlanc know in advance that the

Virginia Parole Board will be considering these factors when it

determines geriatric release so that “it is possible to predict,

at least to some extent, when [geriatric release] might be

granted.” Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 301 (1983). Thus, the

Virginia Beach Circuit Court’s conclusion, after applying Angel,

that Virginia’s geriatric release law provided the meaningful

opportunity to obtain release, certainly was not “an error well

understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any

possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington, 562 U.S.

at 103; see also id. at 102 (“It bears repeating that even a

strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary

conclusion was unreasonable”). To hold otherwise would require

a finding in effect that the Virginia Beach Circuit Court judge

56
and the Virginia Supreme Court justices failed to meet the

definition of “fairminded jurists.” See id. at 101.

LeBlanc concedes, as he must, that the geriatric release

program provides some opportunity for release. He argues,

rather, that the opportunity is not meaningful because of the

low level of success shown by statistics. The statistics to

which he refers, however, provide him with minimal support as

they relate to older inmates and do not reflect the outcomes of

offenders similarly situated to him. Given that Virginia’s

parole reforms apply only to felony offenders who committed

their crimes after 1994, juvenile offenders sentenced after 1994

will not gain eligibility for geriatric release for years to

come, as they must first reach the age of 60. A 17-year-old

juvenile offender who committed a nonhomicide offense in 1995,

for example, would not become eligible for geriatric release

until 2038. Because of this timing, relevant statistics for

juvenile offenders simply do not exist.

I conclude that, just as the Virginia Beach Circuit Court

did not rule “contrary to” Graham, it also was not an

“unreasonable application of” Graham to LeBlanc’s circumstances

within the meaning of § 2254(d)(1).

III

Nonetheless, the majority, for purposes I do not fully

understand, engages in an aggressive effort to prop up LeBlanc’s

57
claim. To do so, it rests on its unsupported conclusions that

Virginia’s geriatric release program does not adequately allow

for release “based on maturity and rehabilitation”; that it does

not account for youth as a mitigating factor; and that it lacks

governing standards. Even if the majority’s rigorous, de novo

scrutiny of the Virginia court’s reasoning did not defy

§ 2254(d)’s deferential standard of review, its conclusions are

demonstrably mistaken on their own terms.

The majority first claims that Virginia’s program fails to

provide any consideration for the “special mitigating force of

youth,” ante at 34; see also ante at 30-31, and for an inmate’s

progress with respect to “maturity and rehabilitation,” ante at

28-29. Yet, in the very same opinion, it contradictorily quotes

the factors that the Parole Board is required to consider in

granting release under the program, noting that the Parole Board

is to consider “certain” characteristics of the offender,

including “‘the individual’s history, physical and mental

condition and character, . . . conduct, employment, education,

vocational training, and other developmental activities during

incarceration,’ prior criminal record, behavior while

incarcerated, and ‘changes in motivation and behavior.’” Ante

at 9-10 (emphasis added). Saying that these factors do not

account for maturity and rehabilitation flaunts reason. But

more importantly, the Virginia Supreme Court’s conclusion that

58
Virginia law requires considerations of “normal parole factors”

such as rehabilitation and maturity is one of state law and thus

is binding on this court. And once it is understood that

Virginia law requires consideration of maturity and

rehabilitation, it follows that, under the § 2254(d) standard,

Virginia’s geriatric release program satisfied Graham.

Second, the majority’s conclusion that the Virginia program

lacks “governing standards” for release is puzzling in light of

the majority’s own description of the Virginia program, which

includes a detailed description of the relevant standards:

The Geriatric Release Administrative Procedures
set forth a two-stage review process for Geriatric
Release petitions. [Id.] At the “Initial Review”
stage, the Parole Board reviews a prisoner’s petition
-- which must provide “compelling reasons for
conditional release” -- and the prisoner’s “central
file and any other pertinent information.” J.A. 287.
The Parole Board may deny the petition at the Initial
Review stage based on a majority vote. [Id.] Neither
the statute nor the Geriatric Release Administrative
Procedures states what constitute “compelling reasons
for conditional release” nor does either document set
forth any criteria for granting or denying a
prisoner’s petition at the Initial Review stage. [Id.]

If the Parole Board does not deny a petition at
the Initial Review stage, the petition moves forward
to the “Assessment Review” stage. [Id. at 288] As
part of the Assessment Review, a Parole Board member
or designated staff member interviews the prisoner.
[Id.] During that interview, the prisoner may present
written and oral statements as well as any written
material bearing on his case for parole. The
interviewer then drafts a written assessment of the
prisoner’s “suitability for conditional release” and,
based on that assessment, recommends whether the
Parole Board should grant the petition. J.A. 288. In

59
 order to grant geriatric release to a prisoner
sentenced to life imprisonment, at least four members
of the five-member Parole Board must vote in favor of
release. [Id.]

In engaging in the Assessment Review, Parole
Board members should consider “[a]ll factors in the
parole consideration process including Board
appointments and Victim Input.” Id. The Virginia
Parole Board Policy Manual includes a long list of
“decision factors” to be considered in the parole
review process. J.A. 297. These factors include:
public safety, the facts and circumstances of the
offense, the length and type of sentence, and the
proposed release plan. [J.A. 297–99.] The Parole
Board also should consider certain characteristics of
the offender, including “the individual’s history,
physical and mental condition and character, . . .
conduct, employment, education, vocational training,
and other developmental activities during
incarceration,” prior criminal record, behavior while
incarcerated, and “changes in motivation and
behavior.” J.A. 297–99. Finally, the Parole Board
should consider impressions gained from interviewing
the prisoner as well as information from family
members, victims, and other individuals. [J.A. 300.]

Ante at 8-10 (emphasis added; brackets in original).

The majority’s effort to bypass the “governing standards”

that it quotes is, in essence, an argument that the Parole Board

may not deny release without considering the juvenile offender’s

maturity and rehabilitation and that the Parole Board must, on

each application for release, explicitly consider maturity and

rehabilitation, regardless of what is presented in the

application. This argument, however, reads into Graham far more

than the case actually holds. Graham does not dictate parole

board procedures and decisionmaking. And, more particularly, it

60
does not limit the permissible factors for denying release.

Rather, it requires that the juvenile offender be given an

opportunity for release based on “demonstrated maturity and

rehabilitation,” imposing the burden on the juvenile offender to

present evidence of maturity and rehabilitation and in turn

requiring that the parole board have an ability to consider that

evidence in deciding whether the offender should be released.

Within this structure, therefore, when the Virginia Parole Board

is presented with a juvenile offender’s application that makes a

showing of maturity and rehabilitation, the Board is authorized,

on the stated factors under which it operates, to grant release.

This is just the meaningful opportunity that the Supreme Court

describes in Graham. And Angel thus properly held that the

Virginia Geriatric Release factors provide that ability to grant

release on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,

particularly in stating that the Parole Board should consider

the juvenile offender’s developmental activities during

incarceration, his behavior while incarcerated, and the changes

in his motivation and behavior.

Stated otherwise, under the majority’s view, to satisfy

Graham a State would have to consider only the Graham factors in

considering release, denying the Parole Board the opportunity to

consider any of the non-Graham factors that might be relevant to

the juvenile offender’s application for release and the Board’s

61
decision on that application. That aggressive reading of Graham

would, I think, surprise the Supreme Court that decided it. But

more importantly, it certainly was not unreasonable for the

Virginia Circuit Court to understand Graham as not mandating the

precise factors that every parole board must consider when

reviewing juvenile offenders’ applications for release.

The majority also faults the geriatric release program

because it allows for longer sentences to juveniles than adults,

relying simply on the fact that juveniles commit their crimes

earlier in life. See ante at 21, 34-35. It is a reality that a

person who commits a serious crime at age 35 or, indeed, as a

juvenile, will have the possibility of serving more years in

prison than a person who commits the same crime at age 62. But

if that reality violates Graham, it is hard to see how any term-

of-years sentence for a juvenile could withstand Eighth

Amendment scrutiny; a young person’s chances of serving a full

sentence are inherently higher than an older person’s.

Finally, the majority surmises that the Virginia Supreme

Court in Angel expected that Angel would spend the rest of his

life in jail and that therefore the court’s application of

Graham was unreasonable because this observation implied that

early release would be “the exception, rather than the

expectation.” Ante at 31. This ground for attacking the

Virginia Supreme Court can rest only on wild speculation, as no

62
juvenile offender has yet been processed under the State’s

geriatric release program, and the majority has pointed to no

data to predict how the Parole Board will decide applications of

juveniles for early release when they first qualify. Graham did

not require that juveniles be released at any given time; it

required that the juveniles be given a meaningful opportunity to

prove themselves and to persuade the Parole Board to grant them

release. If the Parole Board is given that authority by law, as

the Virginia court found it is, then Graham is satisfied.

In short, the majority has reviewed de novo Virginia’s

parole criteria based on its own expectations of how the system

might work and has failed to appreciate that our sole task on a

§ 2254 petition is to determine whether the Virginia Supreme

Court’s decision in applying Graham was unreasonable. And in

fulfilling the task given by § 2254, it is not sufficient to

show simply that the Virginia Supreme Court was wrong or even

committed clear error; rather, it must be shown that the court

erred in a manner “well understood and comprehended in existing

law,” such that its error was “beyond any possibility for

fairminded disagreement.” See White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702

(quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103).

63
 * * *

Because of the limitations of the Supreme Court’s holding

in Graham, the directly relevant holding by the Supreme Court of

Virginia in Angel, and the restrictions imposed by § 2254(d), we

are simply not free to grant LeBlanc’s habeas petition.

Unfortunately, the majority, in its adventuresome opinion, pays

only lip service to the required standards of review. Were it

to have applied them meaningfully, I submit, the judgment of the

district court granting LeBlanc his habeas petition would have

to be reversed and the case remanded with instructions to

dismiss the petition.

64