NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-2494
___________
DAVID L. THOMAS,
Appellant
v.
DANIEL SCHLOSSER; SALVADOR OCCHIPINTI;
DENNIS RALPH; PIERRE ELHAJJAR; J.C. PENNEY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-97-cv-02733)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
____________________________________
___________
No. 16-2495
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DAVID THOMAS,
Appellant
v.
BERGEN PINES HOSPITAL; DR. DUANE DYSON
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-97-cv-04260)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
____________________________________
___________
No. 16-2496
___________
DAVID L. THOMAS,
Appellant
v.
BERGEN COUNTY SHERIFFS DEPARTMENT;
RACHELSON, OFC. FIRST NAME UNKNOWN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-97-cv-04911)
District Judge: Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 17, 2016
Before: FISHER, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 10, 2016)
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OPINION *
___________
PER CURIAM
In these consolidated appeals, pro se appellant David Thomas appeals the District
Court’s orders denying his requests to reopen three actions and to amend his complaint in
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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two of those cases. For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm the District Court’s
judgments.
In 1997, Thomas filed three civil-rights actions in the District Court. See D.N.J.
Civ. A. Nos. 97-2733, 97-4260, 97-4911. The allegations in the complaints overlap
substantially. In short, Thomas’s claims arose from a June 25, 1996 incident in which he
was accused of shoplifting and threatening employees of a J.C. Penney store with a knife.
He sued the store, its employees, the police officers who arrested him, doctors who
treated him after he allegedly sustained injuries in the course of his arrest, and officers
from the prison where he was eventually held. The District Court dismissed these
complaints in 1997 and 1998.
In April 2016 — nearly 20 years after his complaints were dismissed — Thomas
filed an identical one-page motion to reopen in each case. The motion did not
meaningfully explain either why reopening was justified or why Thomas was seeking
reopening at such a late date. In two of the actions, he also filed proposed amended
complaints. See Civ. A. No. 97-2733 dkt. #37-1; Civ. A. No. 97-4260 dkt. #22-1. The
District Court denied the motions, explaining that Thomas had “provide[d] no reason
why the Court should provide any such relief.” Thomas filed timely notices of appeal in
the three cases, and we consolidated the appeals.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
orders for abuse of discretion. See Ahmed v. Dragovich, 297 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir.
2002).
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The District Court acted well within its discretion here. Thomas did not rely on
any particular rule in seeking reopening; we will construe his motion as arising under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). See id. at 208. Thomas is not entitled to relief under any
subsection of Rule 60(b). A motion under Rule 60(b)(1)–(3) must be filed within one
year of the judgment that is challenged, and a motion under Rule 60(b)(5)–(6) must be
filed “within a reasonable time.” Rule 60(c)(1). Thomas filed his motions more than 15
years after the adverse judgments, which is plainly untimely under either standard. See,
e.g., Moolenaar v. Gov’t of the V.I., 822 F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir. 1987) (Rule 60(b)(6)
motion filed almost two years after judgment was not made within a reasonable time).
While these time limits do not apply to motions under Rule 60(b)(4), see United
States v. One Toshiba Color TV, 213 F.3d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc), Thomas
does not claim that the District Court “lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or the
parties or entered ‘a decree which is not within the powers granted to it by the law,’”
Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 575 F.2d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting United States v.
Walker, 109 U.S. 258, 266 (1883)). Moreover, to be entitled to relief under Rule
60(b)(6), Thomas must show “extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an
extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.” Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir.
2014) (quoting Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993)). Thomas
has not identified any circumstances, let alone extraordinary ones, that would justify
reopening.
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For similar reasons, the District Court did not err in refusing to permit Thomas to
amend his complaints. See generally Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 230-
31 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing standards governing post-judgment motions to amend). A
Court can deny leave to amend on the ground of undue delay; “[d]elay may become
undue when a movant has had previous opportunities to amend a complaint.” Cureton v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001). Here, Thomas sought
to amend his complaints to present allegations concerning events that occurred in 1996
and 1997 and that were known to him at that time. He has provided no explanation for
his failure to include these allegations in his initial complaints (or his failure to attempt to
amend earlier). In these circumstances, Thomas’s delay in seeking amendment was
undue, and the District Court properly refused to allow amendment. See id. at 273-74;
see also Jang v. Boston Sci. Scimed, Inc., 729 F.3d 357, 368 (3d Cir. 2013).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgments.
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