J-S70012-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
STEPHON HARRIS,
Appellant No. 2388 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence of February 20, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010090-2013
BEFORE: OLSON, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 10, 2016
Appellant, Stephon Harris, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on February 20, 2015, as made final by the denial of his post-
sentence motion on June 30, 2015. We affirm.
The trial court accurately summarized the factual background of this
case as follows:
These charges arose out of a dispute over a woman that both
the Appellant and the decedent had an interest in. On July 9,
2013, at approximately 9:45 [p.m.], John Anderson
(“Anderson”) . . . was shot and killed in the entryway of [his
apartment]. The entryway at this location had a street entrance
door and a second door that led up to the single, second floor
apartment that Anderson shared with Naheem Hines (“Hines”),
and Mohamad Khardani (“Khardani”). . . . Khardani owned the
building that housed the apartment, and a pizza shop located
below the apartment where Khardani worked.
Earlier that day, Anderson had exchanged a series of text
messages and phone calls with the girlfriend of Appellant when
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Appellant intercepted his girlfriend’s phone [call] and spoke
directly to Anderson. An argument ensued over the phone and
Anderson said, “I’m at 72nd, do what you gotta do.” Appellant
was visiting his friend Davon Kennedy (“Davon”) . . . and
Davon’s cousin[ (and Appellant’s c]o-defendant [Unique]
Kennedy [(“Unique”)] . . . when he recounted the argument that
he had with [Anderson] over the phone. Appellant said that
“Anderson needed to go.” The three [] men walked to a store
then Appellant and [Unique] told Davon they would catch up
with him later, and walked away together.
That evening, Hines was returning to the apartment when he
saw two [] males who appeared to be attempting to open the
apartment’s street level entry door. Though the males were
unfamiliar to Hines, he was later able to identify [Unique] as one
[] of the males. As Hines approached, the two [] males drifted
away from the apartment door and towards the pizza shop.
Hines asked Khardani, who was working in the pizza shop at the
time, if he knew the two [] males. Khardani recognized Appellant
as a repeat customer of the pizza shop and greeted him. . . .
Khardani did not recognize [Unique].
[Unique] asked Hines whether [Anderson] was at home and said
“Ace” was looking for him. Hines replied that he did not know
but would check when he went upstairs. Upon arriving upstairs,
Hines learned that Anderson was indeed at home along with
Tanesha Brooks-Mapp (“Brooks-Mapp”). . . . Hines delivered the
message that there were two [] males downstairs who were
looking for [Anderson]. Hines, Brooks-Mapp[,] and Anderson
went downstairs to the main entry of the apartment. Anderson
was unarmed. As soon as Anderson began to open the interior
door, five to six [] gunshots rang out and Anderson fell to the
floor in the doorway of the apartment. Hines was able to see
that [Unique] was the shooter and saw the two [] males with
whom he had spoken earlier running across the street, away
from the scene of the shooting. Khardani was inside of the pizza
shop when he heard shots. Khardani looked up to see Appellant
and the male he was with running from the scene and Anderson
lying on the ground.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/15, at 3-4.
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The procedural history of this case is as follows. On August 19, 2013,
the Commonwealth charged Appellant via criminal information with first-
degree murder1 and conspiracy to commit first degree murder.2 On
February 20, 2015, Appellant was found guilty of both charges and
immediately sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without
the possibility of parole. On March 2, 2015, Appellant filed a post-sentence
motion. That motion was denied via operation of law on June 30, 2015.
This timely appeal followed.3
Appellant presents two issues for our review:
1. W[as] the evidence [] sufficient to sustain a conviction for
conspiracy[?]
2. W[as] the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for first[-]degree
murder where there was no evidence of specific intent[?]
Appellant’s Brief at 4 (excess capitalization omitted).
Both of Appellant’s issues challenge the sufficiency of the evidence.
“Whether sufficient evidence exists to support the verdict is a question of
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 2502.
3
On July 30, 2015, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal (“concise statement”). See
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On September 4, 2015, Appellant filed his concise
statement. On October 23, 2015, the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a)
opinion.
The Commonwealth argues that Appellant waived his first issue on appeal by
failing to include it in his concise statement. Although Appellant’s concise
statement is not a model of clarity, we decline to find waiver on this basis.
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law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Walls, 144 A.3d 926, 931 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
omitted). “In assessing Appellant’s sufficiency challenge, we must
determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, together with all reasonable inferences
therefrom, the trier of fact could have found that the Commonwealth proved
[each] element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth
v. Ansell, 143 A.3d 944, 949 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). “The
evidence need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the fact-finder
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.”
Commonwealth v. Ford, 141 A.3d 547, 552 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation
omitted).
In his first issue, Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence
to convict him of conspiracy to commit murder. In order to convict a
defendant of conspiracy to commit an offense, “the Commonwealth must
establish the defendant: 1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in
an unlawful act with another person or persons; 2) with a shared criminal
intent; and 3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy.”
Commonwealth v. Dantzler, 135 A.3d 1109, 1114 (Pa. Super. 2016) (en
banc) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] conspiracy may
be inferred where it is demonstrated that the relation, conduct, or
circumstances of the parties, and the overt acts of the co-conspirators
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sufficiently prove the formation of a criminal confederation.”
Commonwealth. v. Orie Melvin, 103 A.3d 1, 43 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citation omitted).
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove the first
element of conspiracy, i.e., that he entered into an agreement with Unique
to commit murder. There was, however, overwhelming evidence that
Appellant and Unique entered into an agreement to murder Anderson.
“[A]cting together before, during, and after an attack on another individual
suffices to show a unity of criminal purpose for purposes of sustaining a
conviction for criminal conspiracy[.]” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 65 A.3d
939, 945 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). As noted above, Appellant
told Unique that Anderson “had to go.” Unique only knew of Anderson’s
location because Appellant relayed the information Anderson supplied during
their telephone conversation. Appellant and Unique then proceeded to
Anderson’s residence. Appellant was fully aware that Unique was armed at
the time. They then asked Hines if Anderson were home. Once Anderson
came to the door, Unique shot Anderson and then fled the scene with
Appellant. These circumstances establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
Appellant and Unique formed an agreement to murder Anderson.
Appellant argues that he went to Anderson’s residence to peacefully
resolve the dispute regarding Appellant’s girlfriend and that he was unaware
of any plan to murder Anderson. In support of this argument, he cites
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Unique’s trial testimony. The jury, however, found this testimony not
credible. “It is not for this Court to overturn the credibility determinations of
the fact-finder.” Commonwealth v. Blackham, 909 A.2d 315, 320 (Pa.
Super. 2006), appeal denied, 919 A.2d 954 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted).
Instead, the jury inferred that Appellant and Unique entered into an
agreement to murder Anderson. This inference was supported by the record
and, therefore, there was sufficient evidence to convict Appellant of
conspiracy to commit murder.
In his second issue, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient
to find him guilty of first-degree murder. In order to convict a defendant of
first-degree murder, “the Commonwealth must [] demonstrate[] that[ ] a
human being was unlawfully killed, the defendant perpetrated the killing,
and the defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill.”
Commonwealth v. Ovalles, 144 A.3d 957, 969 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, a “defendant may be liable
for the overt acts committed in furtherance of [a] conspiracy regardless of
which co-conspirator committed the act.” Commonwealth v. Yong, 120
A.3d 299, 312 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal granted on other grounds, 137
A.3d 573 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).
Appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove the requisite
specific intent to kill. “The Commonwealth may establish the mens rea
required for first-degree murder, specific intent to kill, solely from
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circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964
(Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted). Appellant focuses on case law
addressing shooting an individual in a vital part of the body to prove specific
intent to kill. This ignores, however, the fact that the jury could have drawn
an inference of “a specific intent to kill . . . from the manner in which the
homicide was committed, such as, multiple gunshot wounds.”
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 793 (Pa. 2004). As noted
above, Anderson suffered five gunshot wounds. Together with the evidence
that Appellant told Unique that “Anderson has to go,” the evidence was
sufficient for the jury to infer that Appellant possessed the requisite specific
intent to kill.
Appellant also argues that Unique’s testimony at trial established that
the shooting was in self-defense and therefore Appellant lacked the specific
intent to kill. “The evidence does not need to disprove every possibility of
innocence, and doubts as to guilt, the credibility of witnesses, and the
weight of the evidence are for the fact-finder to decide.” Commonwealth
v. Forrey, 108 A.3d 895, 897 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). In this
case, the jury did not credit Unique’s self-defense testimony. Instead, the
jury determined that the multiple gunshot wounds suffered by Anderson
evidenced a specific intent to kill. Again, “[i]t is not for this Court
to overturn the credibility determinations of the fact-finder.” Blackham,
909 A.2d at 320 (citation omitted). Accordingly, both of Appellant’s
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sufficiency challenges are without merit and we affirm the judgment of
sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/10/2016
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