UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4503
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DEREK LEON HINTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:14-cr-00434-WO-1)
Submitted: October 6, 2016 Decided: November 14, 2016
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Blake Norman, THE LAW OFFICE OF J. BLAKE NORMAN, Durham,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States
Attorney, Randall S. Galyon, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Derek Leon Hinton was convicted on
three counts of distribution of cocaine base (“crack”), in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012). On
appeal, Hinton contends that the district court improperly
permitted the Government to introduce evidence pursuant to Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b) of Defendant’s two recent convictions for
distribution of crack. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
“To be admissible under Rule 404(b), evidence must be (1)
relevant to an issue other than character; (2) necessary; and
(3) reliable.” United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 317 (4th
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence
also must satisfy the mandate of Fed. R. Evid. 403 that “the
probative value of the evidence must not be substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” United States v. Byers,
649 F.3d 197, 206 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We review the admission of Rule 404(b) evidence for
abuse of discretion and “will not vacate a conviction
unless . . . the district court judge acted arbitrarily or
irrationally.” United States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742,
755 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Generally, evidence of a crime or other bad act is
inadmissible “to prove a person’s character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance
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with the character.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). However, such
evidence may be admissible for other purposes, “such as proving
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b)(2). As “a rule of inclusion,” Rule 404(b) allows
admission of “all evidence of other crimes or acts except that
which tends to prove only criminal disposition.” United States
v. Briley, 770 F.3d 267, 275 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation
marks omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1844 (2015).
“In drug cases, evidence of a defendant’s prior, similar
drug transactions is generally admissible under Rule 404(b) as
evidence of the defendant’s knowledge and intent.” Cabrera-
Beltran, 660 F.3d at 755. However, to be admissible, the prior
narcotics activity must have a sufficient nexus to the charged
offenses, i.e., the acts should be “related in time, manner,
place, or pattern of conduct.” United States v. Johnson, 617
F.3d 286, 297 (4th Cir. 2010). Here, Hinton had been convicted
of selling crack in hand-to-hand sales in Burlington, North
Carolina, on two occasions only a matter of months before the
charged offenses. We therefore conclude that the evidence of
Hinton’s prior drug distribution was admissible to demonstrate
knowledge and intent.
Hinton contends that knowledge and intent were not issues
in this case because he did not claim that he unknowingly sold
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crack to the confidential human source, but rather denied
selling anything to the source. By pleading not guilty to the
charges of distributing crack, however, Hinton necessarily put
his knowledge and intent--elements of the prosecution’s case--
directly at issue. See United States v. Mark, 943 F.2d 444,
448 (4th Cir. 1991). “[T]he government, which has the burden
of proving every element of the crime charged, must have the
freedom to decide how to discharge that burden.” United States
v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 997 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding the
defendant’s intent at issue, notwithstanding defendant’s
conditional offer to stipulate to intent).
Thus, we conclude that the evidence was relevant and
necessary. See Byers, 649 F.3d at 208 (noting that evidence is
relevant as long as it has “any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without
the evidence” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United
States v. McBride, 676 F.3d 385, 398 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding
that evidence is necessary when it “is an essential part of the
crimes on trial” or “furnishes part of the context of the
crime” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
We further conclude that any prejudicial effect did not
substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence,
especially in light of the district court’s limiting
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instructions to the jury explaining that the jury was to
consider the acts only as evidence of intent or knowledge, and
not as evidence of bad character or propensity. See United
States v. White, 405 F.3d 208, 213 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[A]ny risk
of such prejudice was mitigated by a limiting instruction from
the district court clarifying the issues for which the jury
could properly consider [the Rule 404(b)] evidence.”).
For these reasons, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Hinton’s
previous crack sales. Accordingly, we affirm Hinton’s
convictions. *
AFFIRMED
*We dispensed with oral argument because the facts and
legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
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