Vincent Morford v. TLC Express, LLC, d/b/a Indy Expediting (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
Nov 15 2016, 7:15 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Ronald E. Weldy A. Richard M. Blaiklock
Barker Hancock & Cohron LLC Edward D. Thomas
Noblesville, Indiana Lewis Wagner, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Vincent Morford, November 15, 2016
Appellant-Plaintiff, Court of Appeals Case No.
49A02-1603-PL-642
v. Appeal from the Marion Superior
Court
TLC Express, LLC, d/b/a Indy The Hon. John Hanley, Judge
Expediting, Trial Court Cause No.
Appellee-Defendant. 49D11-1406-PL-18563

Bradford, Judge.

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 Case Summary
[1] Appellant-Plaintiff Vincent Morford (“Morford”) brought suit against his

former employer Appellee-Defendant TLC Express, LLC, d/b/a Indy

Expediting (“Indy Expediting”) asserting various causes of action, including a

wage claim, intentional interference with an economic relationship, and

blacklisting. The trial court granted summary judgment for Indy Expediting on

the intentional interference with an economic relationship and blacklisting

claims, and certified its order for interlocutory appeal.

[2] On appeal, Morford raises the following restated issues: whether the trial court

erred in granting Indy Expediting’s motion for summary judgment on

Morford’s intentional interference with an economic relationship and

blacklisting claims. Because Indy Expediting was justified in its disclosures to

Morford’s subsequent employer and the truthfulness of the content of such

disclosures was supported by the record, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[3] Morford began working for Indy Expediting on or about March 7, 2013. Emily

Reeves served as Morford’s co-driver while he worked for Indy Expediting

delivering cargo. On March 22, 2013, Morford was terminated from his

employment with Indy Expediting as a result of failing his pre-employment

drug test.

[4] On or about May 24, 2013, Morford filed a claim with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against Indy Expediting. On June 21,
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 2013, Morford wrote Indy Expediting a handwritten letter. In the letter,

Morford admitted that after he was terminated from Indy Expediting for testing

positive for cocaine, he was mad and “wanted to get even” so he “convinced

Emily to file charges” against Indy Expediting.1 App. Vol. 2, p. 42. Morford

went on to say that he “just became a Christian” and that he did not “want to

be a part of any deception anymore.” App. Vol. 2, p. 42.

[5] On or about August 5, 2013, Indy Expediting responded to a Performance

History Records Request from Morford’s subsequent employer Towne Air

Freight. In responding to this request, Indy Expediting disclosed that Morford

had failed a drug test, “filed false filings on company,” and “lied to dispatcher.”

App. Vol. 2, p. 44. Indy Expediting went on to state that it “never would rehire

him” and warned Towne Air Freight to “[p]lease be careful – we are having

him prosecuted for false allegations.” App. Vol. 2, p. 44.

[6] On or about August 20, 2013, Morford filed a second EEOC charge against

Indy Expediting. On February 11, 2014, Indy Expediting filed a Notice of

Claim against Morford in the Perry Township Small Claims Court. The claim

was based upon damages incurred as a result of the time Indy Expediting spent

investigating and disputing Morford’s allegedly false EEOC claims. On

February 19, 2014, Morford filed a counter-claim against Indy Expediting

alleging lost wages and harassment. On June 4, 2014, the Perry Township

1
Based upon the record, it is unclear what became of the charges that Emily Reeves allegedly filed against
Indy Expediting.

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 Small Claims Court ordered the agreed dismissal of the parties’ pending claims.

Morford filed the present action later that day after the agreed dismissal.

[7] On June 4, 2014, Morford filed a complaint alleging that Indy Expediting had

violated the Wage Claims Statute, Indiana Code chapter 22-2-9; intentionally

interfered with his economic relationship with his subsequent employer Towne

Air Freight; and violated the Blacklisting Statute under Indiana Code chapter

22-5-3. On August 3, 2015, Indy Expediting filed a motion for summary

judgment. Morford filed his opposition on October 8, 2015. On December 21,

2015, the trial court granted in part, and denied in part, the motion for

summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment on Morford’s

intentional interference with an economic relationship and blacklisting claims,

but denied judgment on his wage claim.

[8] On January 20, 2016, Morford filed a motion to correct error and motion to

certify the trial court’s interlocutory order for appeal pursuant to Indiana

Appellate Rule 15(B). Indy Expediting filed its opposition to the motion to

correct error and motion to certify on February 9, 2016. Morford filed his reply

in support of motion to correct error on February 15, 2016. The trial court

denied Morford’s motion to correct error on February 16, 2016. On March 18,

2016, Morford filed his motion to accept jurisdiction over interlocutory appeal

with this Court. This Court granted the motion on April 22, 2016.

Discussion and Decision

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 Standard of Review
[9] We review summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial

court. Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.2d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014). At the trial court, the

summary judgment movant has the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of

any genuine issue of material fact as to a determinative issue, at which point the

burden shifts to the non-movant to present contrary evidence showing an issue

for the trier of fact. Id. “A fact is material if its resolution would affect the

outcome of the case and an issue is genuine if a trier of fact is required to

resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material

facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Id. (internal quotations and

citations omitted).

[10] If the trial court grants summary judgment to the moving party, the non-moving

party has the burden on appeal to demonstrate to us that the grant of summary

judgment was in error. Id. During our review, “we carefully assess the trial

court’s decision to ensure that the [non-moving party] was not improperly

denied his day in court.” Id. Furthermore, we will only consider the

evidentiary matter that the parties have designated to the trial court and will

construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id.

[11] Summary judgment is not intended to be a summary trial. Id. at 1003-04.

Consequently, Indiana has a relatively high bar for summary judgment and

“consciously errs on the side of letting marginal cases proceed to trial on the

merits, rather than risk short-circuiting meritorious claims.” Id.

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 I. Intentional Interference with an Economic
Relationship
[12] In Count II of his complaint, Morford alleged that Indy Expediting had caused

“intentional interference with [an] economic relationship” between Towne Air

Freight and him. The elements of tortious interference with a business or

economic relationship are: “(1) the existence of a valid relationship; (2) the

defendant’s knowledge of the existence of the relationship; (3) the defendant’s

intentional interference with that relationship; (4) the absence of justification;

and (5) damages resulting from defendant’s wrongful interference with the

relationship.” Levee v. Beeching, 729 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)

(citing Bradley v. Hall, 720 N.E.2d 747, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). Illegal

conduct by the alleged wrongdoer is an essential element of tortious

interference with a business relationship. Id. Further, the lack of justification is

established “only if the interferer acted intentionally, without a legitimate

business purpose, and the breach is malicious and exclusively directed to the

injury and damage of another. Bilimoria Computer Sys., LLC v. Am. Online, Inc.,

829 N.E.2d 150, 156-57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). However, “[t]he existence of a

legitimate reason for the defendant’s actions provides the necessary justification

to avoid liability.” Id. at 157.

[13] Morford alleges that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on a

claim not brought by him. Specifically, Morford argues that his claim is

contractual in nature because “[h]e began working for Towne Air Freight in

April 2013” and therefore, the existence of a contractual relationship should

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 have been inferred by the trial court. App. Vol. 2, p. 70; Appellant’s Br. p. 9.

Nevertheless, Morford did not claim intentional interference with a contractual

relationship in his complaint. Moreover, the mere existence of a prospective or

actual employment relationship does not alter the claim that Morford himself

chose to bring in his complaint. The trial court did not err when it did not infer

a contractual relationship at summary judgment. Indeed, the trial court did

nothing more or less than rule on the claim that Morford himself brought in his

complaint.

[14] As discussed below in the blacklisting claim, there is evidence to support a

finding that Indy Expediting was justified in its disclosures to Towne Air

Freight. Indy Expediting did not initiate contact with Morford’s subsequent

employer. There is also no evidence that that Indy Expediting responded to the

Performance Request with the intent to be malicious or to injure Morford. The

pertinent information disclosed by Indy Expediting in the Performance Request

had been admitted to by Morford. Consequently, Indy Expediting was justified

in its disclosures which Morford claims to have caused interference with his

economic relationship with Towne Air Freight. Because the trial court granted

summary judgment on a claim that Morford himself made and uncontradicted

designated evidence indicates that Indy Expediting was justified in its actions,

we affirm the trial court’s ruling in this regard.

II. Blacklisting
[15] Under Indiana Code section 22-5-3-1(b),

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 An employer that discloses information about a current or former
employee is immune from civil liability for the disclosure and the
consequences proximately caused by the disclosure, unless it is
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
disclosed was known to be false at the time the disclosure was
made.

Additionally, the statute “does not prohibit a person from informing, in writing,

any other person to whom the discharged employee has applied for

employment a truthful statement of the reason for the discharge.” Ind. Code. §

22-5-3-1(a). Moreover, when interpreting this statute in the past, we have

recognized that “[e]mployers and their agents are immune from civil liability

for the disclosure of truthful information to subsequent and potential

employers.” Steele v. McDonald’s Corp., 686 N.E.2d 137, 142 (Ind. Ct. App.

1997).

[16] In the present case, Morford had the burden of proof by a preponderance of the

evidence on his blacklisting claim. Consequently, Morford had to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that the information disclosed by Indy

Expediting to Towne Air Freight was known to be false at the time the

disclosure was made.

[17] The disclosures at issue were made on or about August 5, 2013, in response to a

Safety Performance History Records Request. App. Vol. 2, p. 44. Specifically,

among other things, Indy Expediting disclosed Morford’s failed drug test. Indy

Expediting was required to make such disclosure under 49 C.F.R. Section

40.25(h) because his failed drug test was the reason for his termination.

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 Moreover, Morford himself admitted to failing the drug test in the letter he sent

to Indy Expediting on June 21, 2013. App. Vol. 2, p. 42. In that same letter,

Morford indicated that he “wanted to get even” and therefore “convinced

Emily [Reeves] to file charges” against Indy Expediting. App. Vol. 2, p. 42.

However, Morford went on to explain that he “just became a Christian” and

that he “[did not] want to be a part of any deception anymore.” App. Vol. 2, p.

42. Based on the evidence, Indy Expediting did not violate the Blacklisting

Statute when it disclosed a truthful statement involving Morford’s discharge,

nor was it a violation to disclose statements that Morford himself admitted to.

Such statements were not “known to be false” by Indy Expediting. Morford

did not meet his burden at the summary judgment phase and the trial court did

not err when it granted Indy Expediting’s request for summary judgment on the

Blacklisting claim, Count III of Morford’s complaint.

[18] We affirm.

Pyle, J., and Altice, J., concur.

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