J-A26037-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
LANCELOT ROBERTSON, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
PETER BALFE AND MICHELLE BALFE : No. 242 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order entered January 29, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Civil Division, No(s): AR-14-004923
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., RANSOM and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 15, 2016
Lancelot Robertson (“Robertson”) appeals, pro se, from the Order
denying his Post-trial Motion, which he filed following a jury verdict against
him and in favor of Michelle Balfe and Peter Balfe (collectively “the Balfes”).1
We affirm.
The trial court concisely summarized the relevant history underlying
this appeal as follows:
[Robertson] commenced this action by filing a [pro se
C]omplaint with the [M]agisterial [D]istrict [J]udge [(“MDJ”) in
the Brookline section of Pittsburgh] against his backdoor
neighbors, … the []Balfes[]. The essence of Robertson’s claim is
1
The trial court’s docket reflects that on March 1, 2016, judgment was
entered against Robertson and in favor of the Balfes. Because the trial
court’s January 29, 2016 Order denying Robertson’s Post-trial Motion was
later reduced to judgment, and was the court’s final pronouncement on the
matter, it is properly appealable. See Johnston the Florist, Inc. v.
TEDCO Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 513 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc)
(holding that, although the appeal was taken from an order denying post-
trial relief, “jurisdiction in appellate courts may be perfected after an appeal
notice has been filed upon the docketing of a final judgment.”).
J-A26037-16
that the Balfes have a large dog that barks continuously and the
dog’s barking constitutes a nuisance. On November 10, 2014,
the [MDJ] dismissed the case without prejudice.
Robertson filed an appeal to the Allegheny County Court of
Common Pleas on November 19, 2014. In his Complaint,
Robertson claims the dog barking constitutes a nuisance
pursuant to § 633.09 of the City of Pittsburgh Code of
Ordinances.
The ordinance in question reads as follows:
§ 633.09 Harboring a Nuisance; Exceptions.
(a) No person shall keep or harbor any dog, cat or
other animal in the City so as to create offensive
odors, excessive noise or unsanitary conditions
which are a menace to the health, comfort or safety
of the public, or otherwise permit the commission or
existence of a nuisance as defined herein.
(b) Any dog, cat or other animal, which by frequent
and habitual barking, howling, screeching, yelping or
baying, or in any way or manner disturbs the quiet
of any person or the community, or which disturbs or
endangers the comfort, repose or health of persons,
is hereby declared to be committing a nuisance. No
owner or person having custody of the animal shall
harbor or permit it to commit a nuisance.
Robertson claimed the barking disturbs his quiet and
endangers his health and comfort, and he sought damages
against the Balfes in the amount of $3,000. Following an
arbitration hearing, a board of arbitrators entered an award in
favor of the Balfes and against Robertson on February 2, 2015.
On February 9, 2015, Robertson filed an appeal from the award
of the Board of Arbitrators and demanded a jury trial in this
matter.[2]
2
The trial court additionally observed that “this [c]ourt offered [] Robertson
a bench trial prior to the jury trial commencing and, even though the Balfes
were willing to consent to a bench trial, Robertson was adamant that he
wanted a jury trial.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/16, at 2 (unnumbered).
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J-A26037-16
Following a … trial, the jury entered a verdict on November
16, 2015[,] finding the barking of the Balfes’ dog did not
constitute a nuisance. Robertson filed a [M]otion for post[-]trial
relief on or about December 1, 2015[,] asking for a new trial
before a judge and not a jury.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/13/16, at 1-2 (unnumbered; emphasis and footnote
added).
By an Order dated January 29, 2016, the trial court denied Robertson’s
Post-trial Motion. Robertson timely filed a pro se Notice of Appeal on
February 17, 2016. On March 1, 2016, Robertson filed a Praecipe for the
entry of judgment on the jury’s verdict against him and in favor of the
Balfes.
Robertson now presents the following issues for our review:
1. [Whether the trial court erred in ruling that Robertson] can’t
[] show [the jury] pictures of the Balfe[s’] dog barking in the
direction of [Robertson’s] house?
2. [Whether the trial court erred in fashioning the verdict slip,
wherein the jury was asked to decide whether] … the barking
of [the Balfes’] dog [was] a nuisance, when the words “[t]o
the plaintiff[”] were omitted on the verdict slip?
Brief for Appellant at 4 (unnumbered; issues rephrased for clarity).
We initially observe that Robertson’s pro se brief fails to comply with
the Rules of Appellate Procedure in several ways, including a lack of any
citation to legal authority. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a); see also Pa.R.A.P.
2111(a). Nevertheless, we decline to find waiver and will briefly address
Robertson’s claims.
-3-
J-A26037-16
In his sparse Argument section,3 Robertson seeks to have the jury
verdict against him overturned, and the case remanded back to the trial
court for a non-jury trial. Brief for Appellant at 8 (unnumbered). Robertson
additionally avers that the judge who presided over the jury trial, the
Honorable Michael Marmo, improperly influenced the jury in their decision.
Id. at 7 (unnumbered) (asserting that “[t]he jury[,] influenced by [the
Balfes] and Judge Ma[r]mo, decided in favor of [the Balfes], not according to
the law [under Ordinance] 633.09 ….”).
Robertson’s claims do not entitle him to relief. Robertson, having been
unsuccessful before a MDJ, an arbitration panel, and a jury (all of whom
determined that the Balfes’ dog barking does not constitute a nuisance
under Ordinance 633.09), now seeks “another bite at the apple” to have his
case retried in a non-jury trial. Robertson, however, was previously offered
a non-jury trial, but demanded a jury trial. Robertson was provided with
ample due process to have his grievance addressed. He is not entitled to
retry his case in a bench trial merely because he is dissatisfied with the
3
Robertson’s Argument section does not develop, in any fashion, the two
above-mentioned issues set forth in his Statement of Questions Presented
section. This Court will not act as counsel, and will not develop arguments
on behalf of an appellant. See Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088-
89 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that mere issue spotting without analysis or
legal citation to support an assertion precludes appellate review of a
matter).
-4-
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jury’s verdict. Moreover, Robertson offers nothing in support of his bald,
single-sentence allegation of impropriety by Judge Marmo.4
Accordingly, we affirm the Order denying Robertson’s Post-trial Motion,
and rule that the judgment entered against Robertson is proper.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/15/2016
4
The certified record does not contain a transcript from the jury trial.
Robertson indicated in his Notice of Appeal that the trial was not transcribed.
-5-