ACCEPTED
02-16-00199-CR
SECOND COURT OF APPEALS
FORT WORTH, TEXAS
11/14/2016 2:59:03 PM
DEBRA SPISAK
CLERK
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FILED IN
2nd COURT OF APPEALS
JIM HARVEY OPRY, § FORT WORTH, TEXAS
APPELLANT § 11/14/2016 2:59:03 PM
§ DEBRA SPISAK
V. § 02-16-00199-CRClerk
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
APPELLEE §
APPEALED FROM CAUSE NUMBER 1399102D IN THE CRIMINAL
DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS; THE HONORABLE
ROBB CATALANO, PRESIDING.
§§§
STATE'S BRIEF
§§§
SHAREN WILSON
Criminal District Attorney
Tarrant County, Texas
DEBRA WINDSOR, Assistant
Criminal District Attorney
Chief, Post-Conviction
LANDON A. WADE
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center
Oral Argument is requested, 401 W. Belknap
but only if Appellant is Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201
also requesting argument. (817) 884-1687; FAX (817) 884-1672
State Bar No. 24098560
COAAppellateAlerts@tarrantcounty.com
DAVID ALEX and
ALLENNA BANGS, Assistant
Criminal District Attorneys
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................... iii
THE CASE IN BRIEF ...............................................................................................1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................2
SUMMARY OF STATE’S RESPONSES ................................................................ 5
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST POINT OF ERROR....................... 6
Appellant’s Contention ..............................................................................................6
State’s Reply ..............................................................................................................6
Argument and Authorities..........................................................................................6
I. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Appellant’s
extraneous bad acts because the evidence Appellant claims should
not have been admitted was not introduced during the State’s
case-in-chief. .........................................................................................6
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law ................................... 7
B. The evidence of extraneous acts Appellant claims should not
have been admitted were not introduced in the State’s case-in-
chief. ............................................................................................8
C. Assuming without conceding there was error, any such error
was harmless. ............................................................................10
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SECOND POINT OF ERROR ............... 12
Appellant’s Contention ............................................................................................12
i
State’s Reply ............................................................................................................12
Argument and Authorities........................................................................................12
I. The trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion for new
trial because conflicting evidence was presented during the hearing
on Appellant’s motion. ........................................................................12
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law .................................13
B. Conflicting evidence was presented during the hearing on
Appellant’s motion; therefore, the trial court did not err.......... 14
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .............................................................................17
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .......................................................................17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................18
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGES
Avila v. State,
18 S.W.3d 736 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.) ..................................10
Blackwelder v. State,
No. 2-05-042-CR, 2006 WL 3525383
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Dec. 7, 2006, pet. ref’d) ...........................................8, 9
Hernandez v. State,
176 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ............................................................. 8
Herring v. State,
147 S.W.3d 390 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) .....................................................10, 11
Jaubert v. State,
74 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ...............................................................8, 9
Lewis v. State,
911 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ...................................................13, 15, 16
Magee v. State,
994 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref’d) .......................................10
Martin v. State,
176 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)...................................10
Patrick v. State,
906 S.W.2d 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1106 (1996) ....................................................................................14, 16
Quinn v. State,
958 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ...........................................................13
Rich v. State,
160 S.W.3d 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ...........................................................10
Russell v. State,
155 S.W.3d 176 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ...........................................................10
iii
Salazar v. State,
38 S.W.3d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) .............................................................13
Sanders v. State,
422 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d) ................................. 7
Sandone v. State,
394 S.W.3d 788 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.)..................................... 7
Rules, Codes and Statutes
TEX. CODE CRIM PROC. art. 36.22 ............................................................................13
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art 37.07 § 3, § 3(a)(1), § 3(g) ....................................7, 8, 9
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) .............................................................................................10
TEX. R. EVID. 404(b) ..............................................................................................8, 9
iv
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JIM HARVEY OPRY, §
APPELLANT §
V. § NO. 02-16-00199-CR
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, §
APPELLEE §
APPEALED FROM CAUSE NUMBER 1399102D IN THE CRIMINAL
DISTRICT COURT NO. 3 OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS; THE HONORABLE
ROBB CATALANO, PRESIDING.
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
THE CASE IN BRIEF
THE CHARGE ............................................. MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER;
(CR 1: 6-7)
THE PLEA ........................................................... GUILTY TO MANSLAUGHTER
(RR 2: 5)
THE VERDICT (Jury) .................................................................................. GUILTY
(CR 1: 81)
THE PUNISHMENT (Jury) .......................................................85 YEARS IDTDCJ
(CR 1: 81)
1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 1, 2015, Brittany Eylar (“Eylar”), the victim in this case, called
and texted her friend Brandon Peterson (“Peterson”) and asked him for a ride. RR
5: 166-167. Peterson agreed and arrived at the location provided by Eylar. RR 5:
168. Based on Peterson’s conversation with Eylar, Peterson believed Eylar wanted
to leave before someone returned to her location. RR 5: 170, When Peterson
arrived, however, he realized someone was already there. Id. Peterson heard
arguing, and saw Eylar come out to meet him. RR 5: 171. Eylar told Peterson to
“hold on”, briefly exited Peterson’s vehicle, and then returned to his vehicle with
her bags. RR 5: 171, 175.
As Peterson helped Eylar load her bags into his car, Peterson heard Eylar
and another person yelling at each other. RR 5: 174. Peterson identified the other
person as Jim Opry (“Appellant”). RR 5: 175. The yelling between Eylar and
Appellant continued to escalate as Peterson helped Eylar. RR 5: 176. After
Peterson helped Eylar load two bags into his car, he turned around and saw Eylar
lying on the ground. RR 5: 177. Peterson knew immediately that Eylar had been
badly injured. RR 5: 180. Unbeknownst to Peterson, Appellant had struck Eylar’s
head from behind with a caulk gun. RR 6: 143-144. Peterson told Appellant that
2
they needed to call 911, but Appellant told Peterson not to call the police. RR 5:
180-181. Peterson then left the scene and called 911 anonymously. RR 5: 189.
When the responding officers arrived at the scene, they believed Eylar had
been shot in the head due to the appearance of her injury. RR 5: 70. Eylar was
found lying on a staircase, unresponsive, with blood leaking from hear head
wound. RR 4: 140. Eylar was then transported by ambulance to John Peter Smith
Hospital (“JPS”) for treatment. RR 4: 141. Eylar died eight days later. RR 5: 91.
The cause of death as determined by the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s
Office was penetrating blunt trauma of the head. RR 6: 12. Law enforcement
eventually located and arrested Appellant in Parker County on January 12, 2015.
RR 5: 260, 269.
Appellant was subsequently charged with the murder of Brittany Eylar. CR
1: 6. In count two of the indictment, Appellant was charged with manslaughter. Id.
Appellant pled guilty to manslaughter, waived his right to a jury on the
guilt/innocence portion of the trial, and elected to have a jury assess his
punishment. CR 1: 4-5. The punishment evidence presented by the State included
but was not limited to evidence showing that: (1) Appellant committed the crime to
which he pled guilty—the manslaughter of Brittany Eylar; (2) Appellant killed a
14-year old girl when he was a juvenile and subsequently hid her body; (3)
3
Appellant was a member of the Aryan Circle, a violent white-supremacist gang; (4)
Appellant had previously committed aggravated assault with a deadly weapon
against his ex-girlfriend; and (5) Appellant had additional prior convictions for
prohibited weapons, unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, and evading
arrest/detention by vehicle. RR 4: 46-74, 80-133; RR 5: 237-238; RR 8: 263. At
the conclusion of the punishment phase of trial, the jury assessed Appellant’s
punishment at 85 years’ confinement. CR 1: 81.
4
SUMMARY OF STATE’S RESPONSES
State’s Reply to Appellant’s First Point of Error
The trial court did not err in admitting extraneous bad acts because the
extraneous acts Appellant claims were erroneously admitted were not introduced
during the State’s case-in-chief. Alternatively, assuming without conceding there
was error, any such error was harmless.
State’s Reply to Appellant’s Second Point of Error
The trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion for new trial
because conflicting evidence was presented during the hearing on Appellant’s
motion.
5
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST POINT OF ERROR
Appellant’s Contention
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of extraneous bad acts without
giving proper notice to Appellant in violation of Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of
Evidence and in violation of due process.
State’s Reply
The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Appellant’s extraneous
bad acts because the evidence Appellant claims should not have been admitted was
not introduced during the State’s case-in-chief. Alternatively, assuming without
conceding there was error, any such error was harmless.
Argument and Authorities
I. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence of Appellant’s
extraneous bad acts because the evidence Appellant claims should not
have been admitted was not introduced during the State’s case-in-chief.
In his first point of error, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence of certain extraneous bad acts alleged to have been committed
by Appellant because the State did not provide Appellant notice of its intent to use
them at trial. See Appellant’s Brief at 7. Specifically, Appellant complains of
testimony elicited during Appellant’s cross examination regarding: (1) Appellant’s
killing of his neighbor’s family pet with a compound bow; and (2) Appellant’s
6
attempts to set a girl’s hair on fire when he rode the school bus as a child. See
Appellant’s Brief at 11-12.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A trial court’s admission of evidence over a defendant’s objection is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Sanders v. State, 422 S.W.3d 809,
812 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2014, pet. ref’d); Sandone v. State, 394 S.W.3d 788,
791 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.). An abuse of discretion occurs when a
trial court’s decision is so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement. Sanders, 422 S.W.3d at 812–13; Sandone, 394 S.W.3d at 791.
Article 37.07, section 3 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs
the admissibility of evidence presented by the State during the punishment phase
of a criminal trial. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art 37.07 § 3(a)(1). Regarding the
introduction of extraneous crimes or bad acts during punishment, Article 37.07,
section 3(g) provides that: “[o]n timely request of the defendant, notice of intent to
introduce evidence under this article shall be given in the same manner required by
Rule 404(b), Texas Rules of Evidence.” Id. § 3(g). Rule 404(b) provides in
pertinent part as follows:
Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible
to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character . . . . On timely request by a defendant in a
7
criminal case, the prosecutor must provide reasonable
notice before trial that the prosecution intends to
introduce such evidence—other than that arising in the
same transaction—in its case-in-chief.
TEX. R. EVID. 404(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, both article 37.07, section 3(g)
and rule 404(b) condition the admissibility of extraneous offense evidence on the
State’s compliance with rule 404(b)’s notice provision. Id.; Hernandez v. State,
176 S.W.3d 821, 824 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). This notice provision, however,
applies only to evidence introduced in the State’s case-in-chief. Jaubert v. State, 74
S.W.3d 1, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). When the State introduces extraneous offense
evidence in rebuttal or during cross examination, the defendant is not entitled to
notice of the State’s intent to present evidence of those extraneous offenses. Id. at
4; Blackwelder v. State, No. 2-05-042-CR, 2006 WL 3525383, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Dec. 7, 2006, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
B. The evidence of extraneous acts Appellant claims should not have
been admitted were not introduced in the State’s case-in-chief.
Appellant complains that he was not provided notice of the State’s intent to
introduce evidence related to two separate extraneous acts—Appellant’s killing of
his neighbor’s family pet and Appellant’s attempts to light a girl’s hair on fire. See
Appellant’s Brief at 10-11.
8
During the State’s cross examination of Appellant, the prosecutor asked
Appellant if he recalled stealing his neighbors’ compound bow and killing their
family pet when Appellant was growing up. RR 6: 227. The prosecutor then asked
Appellant if he remembered trying to light a girl’s hair on fire when Appellant rode
the school bus as a child. RR 6: 228. Appellant’s trial counsel then objected on
grounds that the State did not provide extraneous notices related to those inquiries.
Id. The trial court overruled Appellant’s objection. Id.
The State filed its State’s Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence Pursuant to
Articles 37.07 and Articles 609(F) and 404(B) T.R.C.E. on March 24, 2016. CR 1:
32. That document did not give notice of the State’s intention to introduce
evidence related to the extraneous acts Appellant claims should not have been
admitted. CR 1: 32-33. Evidence of those particular extraneous acts, however, was
presented during the State’s cross examination of Appellant—not the State’s case-
in-chief. RR 6: 153, 227-228. Thus, because the evidence related to those
extraneous acts was not presented during the State’s case-in-chief, Appellant was
not entitled to notice under 37.07, section 3(g) with respect to those particular
extraneous acts. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07 § 3(g); TEX. R. EVID. 404(b);
Jaubert, 74 S.W.3d at 3; Blackwelder, 2006 WL 3525383 at *2. Accordingly, the
9
trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s objection. Appellant’s first point of
error should be overruled.
C. Assuming without conceding there was error, any such error was
harmless.
The erroneous admission of extraneous offense evidence is nonconstitutional
error. Martin v. State, 176 S.W.3d 887, 888 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no
pet.); Avila v. State, 18 S.W.3d 736, 741–42 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no
pet.). Any nonconstitutional error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not
affect substantial rights must be disregarded. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). A substantial
right is affected when the error has a substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict. Rich v. State, 160 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2005); Russell v. State, 155 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Thus, a
criminal conviction should not be overturned for nonconstitutional error if the
reviewing court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the
error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect. Herring v. State, 147
S.W.3d 390, 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
Assuming without conceding the trial court erred in overruling Appellant’s
objection, any such error was harmless because it could not have reasonably had
any effect on the jury’s decision. Id.; Magee v. State, 994 S.W.2d 878, 888 (Tex.
App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref’d). In addition to facts substantiating appellant’s guilt
10
of committing the manslaughter of Eylar, the State presented voluminous evidence
relevant to Appellant’s violent tendencies. That evidence included, but was not
limited to evidence showing that: (1) Appellant killed a fourteen-year-old girl
when he was a juvenile and subsequently hid her body; (2) Appellant was a
member of a violent white-supremacist gang; and (3) Appellant had anger
problems and that he had committed other acts of violence against women,
including aggravated assault with a deadly weapon against his ex-girlfriend. RR 4:
46-74, 80-133; RR 5: 237-238.
In light of all the punishment evidence introduced by the State, the brief
mention of the extraneous acts Appellant claims should not have been admitted—
killing a pet and attempting to set a girl’s hair on fire—would not have had any
effect on the jury’s decision. Herring, 147 S.W.3d at 396. At best, it had but slight
effect. Id. Accordingly, assuming without conceding there was error, any such
error was harmless. Id. Appellant’s first point of error should be overruled.
11
STATE’S REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SECOND POINT OF ERROR
Appellant’s Contention
The trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant Appellant’s motion for
new trial based on alleged impermissible communications between jurors and
persons interested in the outcome of the trial.
State’s Reply
The trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion for new trial
because conflicting evidence was presented during the hearing on Appellant’s
motion.
Argument and Authorities
I. The trial court did not err in overruling Appellant’s motion for new
trial because conflicting evidence was presented during the hearing on
Appellant’s motion.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling Appellant’s motion
for new trial because the jury had improper communications with persons
interested in the outcome of the trial at some point during the trial. See Appellant’s
Brief at 14. Appellant argues that the jury members may have overheard improper
hearsay and may have been improperly influenced, and that they may have already
formed opinions as to Appellant’s proper punishment. Id. at 15. Appellant
12
contends that, in overruling his motion for new trial, the trial court limited his right
to receive a fair trial. Id. at 15-16.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
A trial court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for new trial is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. Salazar v. State, 38 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2001). A reviewing court does not substitute its own judgment for that of the
trial court; rather, it determines whether the trial court’s analysis was arbitrary or
unreasonable. Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The trial
court is the trier of fact and the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses at a
hearing on a motion for new trial. Id. Where there is conflicting evidence on an
issue of fact as to jury misconduct, the trial judge determines the issue, and there is
no abuse of discretion in overruling the motion for new trial. Id. (quoting Thomas
v. State, 699 S.W.2d 845, 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)).
Article 36.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides that: “[n]o
person shall be permitted to converse with a juror about the case on trial except in
the presence and by the permission of the court.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.
36.22. When a juror converses with an unauthorized person about the case, injury
to the accused is presumed, and a new trial may be warranted. Quinn v. State, 958
S.W.2d 395, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). However, the appellant has the burden
13
of proving the allegation of juror misconduct. Patrick v. State, 906 S.W.2d 481,
498 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1106 (1996).
B. Conflicting evidence was presented during the hearing on Appellant’s
motion; therefore, the trial court did not err.
At the hearing on Appellant’s motion for new trial, Amber Floyd, one of
Appellant’s friends, testified that she observed jury members in Appellant’s case
commingling with members of Brittany Eylar’s family before the trial began. RR
7: 6, 13. Floyd testified that she saw members of the jury and Eylar’s family
members sitting in close proximity to one another outside the courtroom. RR 7: 15.
She also testified that she saw a group of jurors and Eylar’s family members
walking laps around the hallway prior to the commencement of voir dire. RR 7:
15-16. Floyd testified that she observed the jurors speaking with Eylar’s family
members, but that she could not hear their conversations because Floyd was
situated at the other end of the hallway at the time of the alleged conversations. RR
7: 30.
Stephen Opry, Appellant’s brother, also testified at the hearing. RR 7: 44.
He testified that before the trial began, he also observed jury members and
members of Eylar’s family sitting closely together outside the courtroom and
speaking to one another. RR 7: 45-46. Opry testified that he could not hear what
the conversation was about. RR 7: 47. He further testified that Deputy Estrada, one
14
of the court’s bailiffs, eventually came out to the area where the jurors and family
members were sitting and escorted the jury back through the secured area of the
courtroom. RR 7: 49. Opry testified that Estrada later came out of the hallway once
again and guided Eylar’s family members into the courtroom. RR 7: 50.
Deputy Estrada was the third and final witness at the hearing on Appellant’s
motion for new trial. RR 7: 65. He testified that he never went outside the
courtroom and saw jurors commingling with members of Eylar’s family. RR 7: 70.
Estrada testified that on the particular date at issue, there were no family members
in the hallway at all. RR 7: 71. Estrada testified that he did not bring Eylar’s family
members into the courtroom; rather, they were escorted by victim assistance. Id.
The testimony of Amber Floyd and Stephen Opry clearly conflicts with the
testimony of Deputy Estrada. Floyd and Opry testified that they observed jurors
and Eylar’s family members sitting together in the hallway outside the courtroom
and speaking with one another. RR 7: 13-16, 44-47. Deputy Estrada, on the other
hand, testified that Eylar’s family members were never in the hallway outside the
courtroom at all, and that he never observed the jurors commingling with Eylar’s
family members on the date at issue. RR 7: 70. The trial court was the trier of fact
and sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Lewis, 911 S.W.2d at 7. It
resolved the conflicting testimony in favor of the prosecution and this Court should
15
defer to that resolution. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
overruling Appellant’s motion. Id. Appellant’s second point of error should be
overruled.1
1
Alternatively, the State would argue that even if there was no conflicting testimony as to the
alleged jury misconduct, Appellant did not meet his burden to show that jury misconduct
occurred. Patrick, 906 S.W.2d at 498. Neither witness for Appellant could testify as to the
content of the alleged conversations between the jurors and members of Eylar’s family. RR 7:
30, 47. In the absence of any affirmative evidence showing that the jury members spoke to
unauthorized persons about the case, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in
overruling Appellant’s motion for new trial. Id. (no abuse of discretion in overruling Appellant’s
motion for new trial when Appellant presented no affirmative evidence of jury misconduct).
16
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
Appellant suffered no reversible error. Therefore, the State prays that this
Court will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
SHAREN WILSON
Criminal District Attorney
Tarrant County, Texas
DEBRA WINDSOR
Chief, Post-Conviction
Tarrant County Criminal District Attorney’s
Office—Post-Conviction
/s/ Landon A. Wade
LANDON A. WADE
Assistant Criminal District Attorney
Tim Curry Criminal Justice Center
401 W. Belknap
Fort Worth, Texas 76196-0201
(817) 884-1687
FAX (817) 884-1672
State Bar No. 24098560
COAAppellateAlerts@tarrantcounty.com
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that this document contains 3,018 words per The Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4(e).
/s/ Landon A. Wade
LANDON A. WADE
17
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A true copy of the State's brief has been e-served to opposing counsel, the
Hon. Barry Alford, 1319 Ballinger Street, Fort Worth, Texas, 76102, on this, the
14th day of November, 2016.
/s/ Landon A. Wade
LANDON A. WADE
H:\WADE.W42\BRIEFS\Opry, Jim Harvey.BR.docx
18