Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1325
VALERIE PAGE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
AMTRAK, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. D. Brock Hornby, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges,
and Barbadoro, District Judge.
Anthony J. Sineni III, with whom Law Offices of Anthony J.
Sineni III was on brief, for appellant.
John J. Bonistalli, with whom Jennifer Lee Sage and Law
Offices of John J. Bonistalli were on brief, for appellee.
November 18, 2016
Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. This wrongful death case
arises from the death of Sean Page, who was struck by Amtrak's
Downeaster train on April 16, 2012, while he was crossing railroad
tracks in Biddeford, Maine. Faced with a lawsuit filed by Valerie
Page ("Page"), decedent's wife and personal representative, Amtrak
moved for summary judgment. Although Page labored to convince us
-- and the district court -- otherwise, the legal issues are
straightforward, and the district court appropriately granted
summary judgment in favor of Amtrak because Amtrak did not owe a
duty to this pedestrian.
Page appealed the district court's grant of summary
judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Sean Page had a superior right
to use the area in which the accident occurred ("the premises")
regardless of who owned it, and that there are material disputes
of fact regarding negligence.
But having carefully reviewed the papers and Maine's
old, but still controlling, case law and statutes, we see no reason
to disturb the district court judge's well-reasoned and thorough
decision. And "when lower courts have supportably found the facts,
applied the appropriate legal standards, articulated their
reasoning clearly, and reached a correct result, a reviewing court
ought not to write at length merely to hear its own words
resonate." In re Brady-Zell, 756 F.3d 69, 71 (1st Cir. 2014)
(citing cases). We therefore affirm the entry of summary judgment
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substantially on the basis of Judge Hornby's comprehensive opinion
with respect to the lack of a duty owed, adding only a few of our
own thoughts for good measure.
In our view, this case begins and ends with the first
principle of negligence: there must be "a duty of care owed to
the plaintiff." Bell ex rel. Bell v. Dawson, 82 A.3d 827, 831–32
(Me. 2013). Here, Amtrak owed no such duty: Maine law explains
that "[a] person may not, without right, stand or walk on a
railroad track . . . except by railroad conveyance."1 Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 23, § 7007(1) (2015). Page tells us that § 7007
does not apply because Amtrak has not established ownership of the
premises, but § 7007 does not require Amtrak to prove ownership.
Moreover, as Judge Hornby well explained, Page failed to show any
right on the part of Sean Page to cross, stand, or walk on the
premises. So it does not matter whether Amtrak owned the premises
-- under § 7007, Amtrak did not owe Sean Page a duty.
Like the district court, we think it is "unnecessary to
make th[e] distinction" between trespasser, licensee, or invitee;
even if Amtrak was the owner of the premises, Maine case law makes
it plain that Amtrak is not obligated to stop trains to accommodate
pedestrians crossing the tracks, especially at undesignated
crossings. "It is the duty of the traveler on the highway to wait
1 "Conveyance" here means some mechanism that would carry an
individual.
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for the train. The train has the preference and the right of way."
Smith v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 32 A. 967, 970 (Me. 1895) (citations
omitted). A traveler or would-be traverser of the tracks "should
not venture upon the track or crossing until it is made reasonably
plain that he can go over without risk of collision." Hesseltine
v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 154 A. 264, 266 (Me. 1931); see also Ham v.
Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 116 A. 261, 263 (Me. 1922) ("It is the duty of
the traveler on the highway to wait for the train."). And "[i]t
is common knowledge that people frequently walk on railroad tracks,
and, if locomotive engineers were bound to stop or decrease speed
every time they saw a person on the track, the operation of the
railroad would be greatly hindered, to the detriment of the
public." Copp v. Me. Cent. R.R. Co., 62 A. 735, 736 (Me. 1905).
We need not address Page's other arguments -- that Amtrak
created an unreasonable hazard and had a duty to warn, or that
Amtrak operates its trains so fast that they cannot stop for
pedestrians -- because Judge Hornby's analysis correctly disposed
of each.
Meanwhile, we decline to address Page's implied-invitee
argument because it was not raised below.2 See McCoy v. Mass.
Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d 13, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (citing cases)
2 As Judge Hornby observed, "[t]he plaintiff has taken the
definitive position that this is not a case of an implied invitee."
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(“It is hornbook law that theories not raised squarely in the
district court cannot be surfaced for the first time on appeal.”).
Finally, we do not weigh in on the topic of a duty being
owed by Sean Page, which the district court took as established.
True, "[a] collision at a railroad crossing is prima facie evidence
of negligence on the part of the traveler[,]" Hooper v. Bos. & Me.
R.R. Co., 17 A. 64, 65 (Me. 1889), but this component of the
analysis is of no moment because Amtrak owed no duty in the first
instance.
Affirmed, and each party shall bear its own costs.
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