In re Detention of King

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Appellate Court Date: 2016.11.21
10:50:05 -06'00'

In re Detention of King, 2016 IL App (1st) 150041

Appellate Court In re DETENTION OF JONATHAN KING (The People of the State
Caption of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Jonathan King, Respondent-
Appellant).

District & No. First District, Second Division
Docket Nos. 1-15-0041, 1-15-0645 cons.

Filed September 13, 2016

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 11-CR-800002,
Review HCC-14-000201; the Hon. Thomas J. Byrne, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on J. Nicholas Albukerk, of Albukerk & Associates, of Chicago, for
Appeal appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael M. Glick and
Daniel Lewin, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel), for the
People.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Pierce and Simon concurred in the judgment and opinion.
 OPINION

¶1 In 2011, while in prison on two counts of predatory sexual assault of a child, Jonathan King
stipulated he was a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment
Act (Act) (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2014)). The trial court ordered King committed to the
Illinois Department of Human Services (Department) for institutional care in a secure facility.
In 2014, King filed petition for a writ of habeas corpus arguing he should be immediately
released from Department custody after the State failed to timely file his annual reexamination
report as required by the Act. (The reexamination had been completed but was not filed with
the court.) The trial court struck the habeas corpus petition, finding the State’s delay in filing
the annual report did not constitute a valid ground for King’s release.
¶2 While the habeas corpus petition was pending, the State filed the reexamination report
along with a motion for a probable cause finding that King was still a sexually violent person.
King filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court denied. King filed a notice of appeal. A
few months later, the trial court granted the State’s motion for a probable cause finding, from
which King did not file a notice of appeal.
¶3 King now argues (1) the trial court erred in striking his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
because the State’s failure to timely file a reexamination report required his immediate release
and (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss. The State counters that this court
does not have jurisdiction to address King’s motion to dismiss since the order was not a final
and appealable order and that the trial court properly struck King’s habeas corpus petition as
the delay in filing the reexamination report could not be a ground for his immediate dismissal
from custody. We agree with the State on both issues.

¶4 BACKGROUND
¶5 In 2001, Jonathan King was convicted on two counts of predatory sexual assault of a child
and sentenced to 12 years in prison. On August 2, 2011, he stipulated to the State’s allegations
that he was a sexually violent person under the Act. 725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 2014). King
was committed to the custody of the Department of Human Services under section 40(a) of the
Act, which provides that a sexually violent person shall “be committed to the custody of the
Department for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually
violent person.” 725 ILCS 207/40(a) (West 2014).
¶6 Under section 55 of the Act, after a person has been committed to Department custody,
“the Department shall submit a written report to the court on his or her mental condition at least
once every 12 months *** for the purpose of determining whether: (1) the person has made
sufficient progress in treatment to be conditionally released and (2) the person’s condition has
so changed since the most recent periodic reexamination (or initial commitment if there has not
yet been a periodic reexamination) that he or she is no longer a sexually violent person.” 725
ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2014). The examiner “shall prepare a written report of the examination
no later than 30 days after the date of the examination” and “shall place a copy of the report in
the person’s health care records and shall provide a copy of the report to the court that
committed the person under Section 40.” 725 ILCS 207/55(b) (West 2014).
¶7 On May 2, 2014, Dr. Richard Travis performed the required annual reexamination and
concluded, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, that King remained a sexually

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 violent person and had not made sufficient progress in treatment to be conditionally released.
Although Dr. Travis’s reexamination and report were timely completed, the State did not file
Dr. Travis’s report with the trial court. More than five months later, on October 31, 2014, King
filed an emergency petition for writ of habeas corpus. King argued that because Dr. Travis’s
report was not filed with the court by September 11, 2014, which he asserts is 12 months from
the filing of the last reexamination report, the State lost jurisdiction, and he was entitled to
immediate release from custody. On December 1, 2014, after argument, the trial court struck
King’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court stated that “[t]here’s nothing in the
statute that says [the State] lose[s] jurisdiction, it’s just the requirements of the statute.” Thus,
the court concluded the State’s failure to comply with the one year reporting requirement is
“not a habeas matter.” On December 9, 2014, King filed a notice of appeal from the December
1 order.
¶8 Meanwhile, on November 19, 2014, the State filed its motion for a finding of no probable
cause in King’s sexually violent person case, based on Dr. Travis’s reexamination report,
which the State also filed. In response, King filed a motion to dismiss, which is not dated. On
January 7, 2015, the State filed a response, and on January 28, 2015, the trial court denied
King’s motion to dismiss. On February 6, 2015, King filed a notice of appeal from the January
28 order.
¶9 On March 30, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting the State’s motion for a
finding of no probable cause based on its review of Dr. Travis’s reexamination report. King did
not file a notice of appeal from the March 23 order.
¶ 10 On August 28, 2015, we consolidated King’s appeal of the order striking his petition for
writ of habeas corpus and his appeal of the denial of his motion to dismiss. On April 8, 2016,
King filed his brief, arguing that the trial court erred in striking his habeas corpus petition and
in denying his motion to dismiss the State’s motion for a finding of no probable cause and
granting the State’s motion. King asserted that this court has jurisdiction over both issues
because his notice of appeal on the trial court’s decision to strike his habeas corpus petition
was filed nine days after the court’s order and his February 6, 2015, notice of appeal from the
trial court’s dismissal of his motion to dismiss constituted a timely appeal of “the finding of
[the] no probabl[e] cause issue.”
¶ 11 The State filed a reply brief on May 11, 2016, and, on that same date, also filed a motion to
dismiss King’s notice of appeal of the trial court’s ruling on the probable cause issue. The State
argued that in the probable cause proceeding, King filed a notice of appeal on February 6,
2015, after the trial court denied his motion to dismiss, which is not a final order, but before the
trial court entered its finding of no probable cause, and thus, the appellate court lacks
jurisdiction. King filed a reply asserting that his motion to dismiss was directed not at the
State’s motion for a finding of no probable cause but at the August 2, 2011, order adjudicating
him a sexually violent person, which is a final order. We agreed to take the motion with the
case.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Jurisdiction Over No Probable Cause Finding
¶ 14 The State contends King prematurely filed a notice of appeal after the trial court denied his
motion to dismiss and did not again file a notice of appeal within 30 days following the trial
court’s final March 30, 2015, order. We agree.

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¶ 15 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1), a party may perfect appeal by filing a notice
of appeal “within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely
posttrial motion directed against the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or a nonjury case,
within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion
directed against that judgment or order.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015). An appeal
may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims only if
the trial court makes an express written finding of no just reason to delay either enforcement,
appeal, or both. Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). Without a Rule 304(a) finding, a final
order disposing of fewer than all the claims is not appealable and does not become appealable
until all of the claims are resolved. Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138
Ill. 2d 458, 464 (1990). A premature notice of appeal does not confer jurisdiction on the
appellate court. See id. at 469.
¶ 16 King’s February 6, 2015, notice of appeal was premature as the trial court had neither ruled
on the State’s motion for a finding of no probable cause nor made a Rule 304(a) finding. The
denial of a motion to dismiss, itself, is not a final and appealable order but an interlocutory
order, which does not give this court jurisdiction. Mund v. Brown, 393 Ill. App. 3d 994, 996
(2009). Moreover, consolidation of the two appeals does not confer jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Charles v. Gore, 248 Ill. App. 3d 441, 445 (1993) (“A consolidation does not operate to
establish jurisdiction where there was none before.”). Because King did not file a timely notice
of appeal, we lack jurisdiction over the trial court’s order finding no probable cause. This
ruling does not affect this court’s ability to address King’s appeal of the trial court order
striking his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

¶ 17 Habeas Corpus
¶ 18 A writ of habeas corpus is “ ‘available only to obtain the release of a prisoner who has been
incarcerated under a judgment of a court that lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or the
person of the petitioner, or where there has been some occurrence subsequent to the prisoner’s
conviction [that] entitle[s] him [or her] to release.’ ”Hennings v. Chandler, 229 Ill. 2d 18, 30
(2008) (quoting Barney v. Prisoner Review Board, 184 Ill. 2d 428, 430 (1998)). We review
dismissal of a habeas corpus petition de novo. Id. at 24.
¶ 19 King contends that a postconviction occurrence, namely, the State’s failure to timely file a
reexamination report within 12 months after his last reexamination report (required under 725
ILCS 207/55(a) (West 2014)), confers a basis for granting him immediate release, and thus, the
trial court erred in striking his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We disagree. Under the Act
a person is entitled to discharge from Department custody only after a court finding that he or
she is no longer a sexually violent person. Specifically, section 40(a) of the Act states that a
person committed as a sexually violent person shall be “committed to the custody of the
Department for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is no longer a sexually
violent person.” (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 207/40(a) (West 2014). Section 65 of the Act
lays out the procedures for obtaining an order of discharge. Specifically, section 65 provides,
in part, that “[i]f the Secretary determines at any time that a person committed under this Act is
no longer a sexually violent person, the Secretary shall authorize the person to petition the
committing court for discharge.” 725 ILCS 207/65(a)(1) (West 2014). Section 65 further
provides that once the Department’s evaluator opines that the committed person is no longer a
sexually violent person, the Secretary or designee has 30 days from receipt of the evaluator’s

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 report to “file with the committing court notice of his or her determination whether or not to
authorize the committed person to petition the committing court for discharge.” Id. A
petitioner will be discharged from the custody or supervision of the Department where the
State fails to meet its burden of proving a petitioner to be a sexually violent person. 725 ILCS
207/65(a)(3) (West 2014).
¶ 20 Dr. Travis concluded, to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty, that King
remained a sexually violent person and had not made sufficient progress in treatment to be
conditionally released. Although the reexamination report was filed more than 12 months after
the previous reexamination report, the delay is not grounds for discharge under the Act. King
will be released only when he has been found to no longer be a sexually violent person. King
has not shown nor has he offered any evidence that he is no longer a sexually violent person.
Thus, because he has no grounds for immediate release from detention under the Act, the trial
court did not err in striking his habeas corpus petition. See Barney v. Prisoner Review Board,
184 Ill. 2d 428, 431 (1998) (“Habeas corpus does not lie if the person is in custody by virtue of
a final judgment of any circuit court, or of any proceeding for the enforcement of such
judgment, unless the time during which such party may be legally detained has expired.”).
¶ 21 Moreover, although the Act requires an annual reexamination report, it does not mandate
discharge if the State fails to do so or it files late. Whether a statutory command is mandatory
or directory poses a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. People v.
Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43, 54 (2005). “[T]he mandatory-directory dichotomy *** concerns the
consequences of a failure to fulfill an obligation.” Id. at 52. It “ ‘denotes whether the failure to
comply with a particular procedural step will or will not have the effect of invalidating the
governmental action to which the procedural requirement relates.’ ” Id. at 51-52 (quoting
Morris v. County of Marin, 559 P.2d 606, 611 (Cal. 1977)). To be mandatory, the legislature
must have dictated a particular consequence for failure to comply with the provision. Pullen v.
Mulligan, 138 Ill. 2d 21, 46 (1990). Otherwise, the statute is directory, “and no particular
consequence flows from noncompliance.” People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 515 (2009).
Under the mandatory/directory dichotomy, language issuing a procedural command to a
government official presupposes intent that the statute is directory. This presumption can be
overcome where (1) negative language prohibits further action in the case of noncompliance or
(2) the right the provision is designed to protect would generally be injured under a directory
reading. Id. at 517.
¶ 22 Section 55 provides that the Department “shall submit a written report to the court on his or
her mental condition at least once every 12 months.” This is directory. The Act has no negative
language prohibiting further action in the event the State does not comply. Further, the right to
annual reexamination as a method for obtaining discharge is not injured by a filing delay
because the Act provides alternative methods to petition for discharge. A petitioner may seek
other remedies, including a show-cause order or a mandamus action under section 14-101 of
the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/14-101 et seq. (West 2014)), compelling the
Department to file the report. Thus, King was not entitled to immediate release and the trial
court correctly dismissed his petition.

¶ 23 Affirmed.

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