This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
A15-1907
State of Minnesota,
Respondent,
vs.
Paul Harvey McGee,
Appellant.
Filed November 28, 2016
Affirmed
Bjorkman, Judge
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-CR-14-6346
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Susan L. Segal, Minneapolis City Attorney, Paula Kruchowski Barrette, Assistant City
Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Robert Paule, Robert M. Paule, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Bjorkman, Judge; and
Reilly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
BJORKMAN, Judge
Appellant challenges his driving-while-impaired (DWI) conviction, arguing that the
evidence of his alcohol concentration should have been suppressed because the stop of his
vehicle was not justified by reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. We affirm.
FACTS
On March 7, 2014, at approximately 10:45 p.m., Minnesota State Trooper Nicholas
Otterson observed a dark-colored SUV heading southbound on Washington Avenue in
Minneapolis. Trooper Otterson observed the vehicle drive in the center of the two
southbound lanes, weave back and forth, and change lanes without signaling. He initiated
a traffic stop. After identifying appellant Paul Harvey McGee as the driver, Trooper
Otterson observed several indicia of intoxication. McGee also failed field sobriety tests
and a preliminary breath test. Trooper Otterson arrested McGee, transported him to the
Hennepin County Jail, and read him the implied-consent advisory. McGee consented to a
breath test, which revealed an alcohol concentration of 0.13.
Respondent State of Minnesota charged McGee with two DWI offenses. McGee
moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop, arguing that Trooper
Otterson did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop his vehicle. Following an
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion. McGee waived his right to a jury
trial and stipulated to the prosecution’s case pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4,
to preserve appellate review of the pretrial ruling. The district court found McGee guilty
of misdemeanor DWI, stayed execution of a 30-day jail sentence, and dismissed the
remaining DWI count. McGee appeals.
DECISION
When reviewing a district court’s pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence,
we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal determinations
de novo. State v. Gauster, 752 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Minn. 2008). We review questions of
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reasonable suspicion de novo, considering the totality of the circumstances in determining
whether a stop is justified. State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).
An investigatory stop of a vehicle is valid if an officer has “specific and articulable
facts establishing reasonable suspicion of a motor vehicle violation or criminal activity.”
State v. Duesterhoeft, 311 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 1981) (quotation omitted). Suspicion
must be based on more than a “mere hunch.” State v. Battleson, 567 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn.
App. 1997). “[I]f an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant,
the officer has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle.” State v. George, 557 N.W.2d
575, 578 (Minn. 1997).
McGee argues that the stop of his vehicle was not warranted because Trooper
Otterson did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion that he had violated a traffic law.
He asserts that the squad-car video clearly shows that he did not commit a traffic violation.
In the alternative, he argues that even if he drove in the middle of the two southbound lanes,
it was necessary because of the buildup of snow and parked cars along the right-hand lane.
We are not persuaded.
First we observe, as did the district court, that the squad-car video is very dark; the
lighting makes it difficult to tell which lane McGee was traveling in. In short, the video
does not, in and of itself, conclusively establish whether McGee committed any traffic
violations. But that is not the only evidence before the district court. Trooper Otterson
testified that he observed multiple traffic violations, and the district court determined that
any one of the violations observed would justify a traffic stop. We defer to the district
court’s credibility determinations. State v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 691 (Minn. App.
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2012). And an officer’s testimony that he actually observed traffic violations creates
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify a traffic stop. See State v. Kvam, 336 N.W.2d
525, 528 (Minn. 1983) (noting that when a district court credits an officer’s testimony that
he observed a traffic violation or weaving, then the stop is valid). Because the record
supports the district court’s finding that McGee committed a traffic violation, the district
court did not err by denying McGee’s suppression motion.
Affirmed.
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