In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 15‐3574
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
KENNETH J. RANEY,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 12‐cr‐00100 — William M. Conley, Chief Judge.
____________________
ARGUED NOVEMBER 3, 2016 — DECIDED DECEMBER 1, 2016
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Before BAUER, MANION, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
MANION, Circuit Judge. Kenneth Raney appeals for the sec‐
ond time the district court’s decision to impose an additional
two‐year term of supervised release after revoking his previ‐
ous release term. We vacated Raney’s initial sentence because
the district court did not provide any justification for the
length of the supervised release term. On remand, the court
has adequately explained its decision. Raney has also waived
2 No. 15‐3574
his challenge to the supervised release condition to which he
objects. Therefore, we affirm.
I. Background1
In 2001, Kenneth Raney was convicted of transportation of
a minor with intent to engage in a sexual act and attempt to
manufacture child pornography. The district court sentenced
him to a term of 145 months’ imprisonment, which ended on
February 10, 2012. Thereafter, he began serving three years of
supervised release.
However, midway through his release term, the district
court found that he had violated the terms of that release by
possessing a memory stick and maintaining contact with a
convicted felon without his probation officer’s consent. The
court warned Raney that any future violations would result
in revocation of his supervised release.
Raney was back in court a year later. At this revocation
hearing, the district court found that he had violated his su‐
pervised release conditions in several ways. These included
taking several unauthorized day trips with a female acquaint‐
ance and her two minor children. All told, Raney had about
four months of access to minors without the knowledge of his
probation officer. This time, the district court revoked his su‐
pervised release and sentenced him to nine months’ impris‐
onment followed by another two years of supervised release.
On appeal, we affirmed the district court’s revocation de‐
cision, but vacated the sentence. Because the district court did
1 We provided a more detailed recitation of the facts of Raney’s case
in his first appeal. See United States v. Raney, 797 F.3d 454 (7th Cir. 2015)
(Raney I).
No. 15‐3574 3
not explain its decision to impose two years of supervised re‐
lease, we were “unable to review the propriety of the district
court’s decision.” Raney I, 797 F.3d at 467. Although we found
that the district court had “arguably justified its selection of
the nine month term of imprisonment,” we vacated the entire
sentence and remanded for resentencing in light of our opin‐
ion. Id.
On remand, the district court imposed the same sentence.
Because Raney’s term of imprisonment had already ended by
the time of his resentencing hearing, the sole effect of the re‐
sentencing was to reinstate the two years of supervised re‐
lease under the same conditions as before. Raney once again
challenges the procedural soundness of his sentence. He also
appeals the imposition of a condition of supervised release
that requires him to “notify third parties of risks that may be
occasioned by [his] criminal record or personal history or
characteristics.”
II. Discussion
A. Procedural Soundness
“Our review of a sentence for violating a term of super‐
vised release is highly deferential, and we will uphold that
term unless it is ‘plainly unreasonable.’” United States v. Jones,
774 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Ki‐
zeart, 505 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2007)). We require only that
the district court “say something that enables [us] to infer that
[it] considered” the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines policy state‐
ments and the 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) & 3583(e) sentencing fac‐
tors. United States v. Ford, 798 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States v. Robertson, 648 F.3d 858, 859‐60 (7th
Cir. 2011)). The district court “need not consider the Section
4 No. 15‐3574
3553 factors in check‐list form.” Id. (quoting Jones, 774 F.3d at
404). Nor must it make specific factual findings on each sen‐
tencing factor, as long as the overall record reveals that the
court considered the factors. United States v. Carter, 408 F.3d
852, 854 (7th Cir. 2005).
The statutory sentencing factors are: (1) the nature and cir‐
cumstances of the offense; (2) the defendant’s history and
characteristics; (3) the need to deter future crime, protect the
public, and provide the criminal with necessary services such
as education and medical treatment; (4) Sentencing Commis‐
sion recommendations regarding sentencing range; (5) Sen‐
tencing Commission policy; and (6) sentence consistency for
similar violations. See id. The policy statements provide rec‐
ommended sentencing ranges for supervised release viola‐
tions that are non‐binding and meant to “inform[] rather than
cabin[] the exercise of the judge’s discretion.” Id. (quoting
United States v. Salinas, 365 F.3d 582, 588 (7th Cir. 2004)).
The sentencing transcript indicates that the district court
considered the heinous nature of Raney’s initial offenses; his
history and characteristics (particularly his status as a sex of‐
fender); the need for deterrence; the need to protect the pub‐
lic; and the need to provide for Raney’s rehabilitation. The
court further noted that two years of supervised release was
appropriate because Raney had failed to heed the terms of his
release before and had not shown he was not a threat to do so
again. It also hoped that the two‐year term would help reduce
his risk of recidivism. Finally, the court confirmed that it had
considered the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements.
Simply put, the district court said more than enough to make
it certain that it considered the relevant factors. We will not
disturb the supervised release term.
No. 15‐3574 5
B. Supervised Release Condition
Raney also challenges Supervised Release Condition 11.
As noted above, the condition requires him to “notify third
parties of risks that may be occasioned by [his] criminal rec‐
ord or personal history or characteristics.” The government
concedes that under our decision in United States v. Bickart, 825
F.3d 832, 841–42 (7th Cir. 2016), the condition is impermissibly
vague. However, the government argues that Raney waived
any objection to this condition by failing to raise it at the re‐
sentencing hearing.
As we recently explained, a purposeful decision to object
to some conditions but not challenge others is the “touchstone
of waiver” because it indicates “a knowing and intentional
decision.” United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862, 873 (7th Cir.
2016) (quoting United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 865 (7th
Cir. 2015)). When the district court allows the defendant an
opportunity to challenge conditions of supervised release, the
defendant waives any objection to conditions to which he fails
to object. See United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 (7th Cir.
2016). Waiver “works to ‘extinguish[] any error and precludes
appellate review.’” Bloch, 825 F.3d at 873 (quoting Armour, 804
F.3d at 865).
That is precisely what happened here. The sentencing
transcript shows that the district court considered objections
to several proposed conditions of supervised release. But
Raney never raised an objection to the third‐party notification
condition. If he had concerns about that condition, “he should
have brought them to the district court’s attention rather than
waiting until appeal to complain for the first time.” Gabriel,
831 F.3d at 814. We hold that Raney waived his objection to
Supervised Release Condition 11.
6 No. 15‐3574
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the dis‐
trict court adequately explained its choice of a two‐year term
of supervised release and that Raney waived his challenge to
the third‐party notification condition by not raising it at his
resentencing.
AFFIRMED.