MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as Dec 06 2016, 6:42 am
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Anthony C. Lawrence Gregory F. Zoeller
Anderson, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Kelly A. Loy
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Amber Lee Ryle, December 6, 2016
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
48A02-1603-CR-594
v. Appeal from the Madison Circuit
Court.
The Honorable Mark Dudley, Judge.
State of Indiana, Cause No. 48D01-0808-FC-220
Appellee-Plaintiff.
Barteau, Senior Judge
Statement of the Case
[1] Amber Lee Ryle appeals the revocation of her probation. We affirm.
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Issue
[2] Ryle raises one issue, which we restate as: whether there is sufficient evidence
to support the determination that she violated a condition of probation.
Factual and Procedural History
[3] In 2009, Ryle pleaded guilty to two counts of receiving stolen property and one
count of forgery, all felonies. The trial court sentenced her to seven years, with
five years to be suspended and served on probation.
[4] After Ryle began serving her term of probation, she violated several conditions
of her probation. On September 17, 2013, the trial court revoked her five-year
suspended sentence and ordered her to serve two years. The court agreed to
stay the imposition of the remaining three years if Ryle reported to the
probation office on a monthly basis for one year and did not commit any new
violations of the law for one year, among other requirements.
[5] After she was released from her two-year sentence and began serving the one-
year probationary period, the State filed several notices alleging that Ryle had
violated the conditions of her probation. The court held a series of evidentiary
hearings. On February 10, 2016, the State filed an amended notice, dismissing
all allegations except a claim that Ryle had violated a condition of probation by
committing a new criminal offense, specifically theft, on June 17, 2015.
[6] On February 16, 2016, the trial court held a final evidentiary hearing. After the
hearing, the court issued an order stating, in relevant part: “Court finds by
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preponderance of evidence defendant violated her stayed sentence as alleged in
paragraph 3(a) [the theft allegation]. Court orders the 3-year stay lifted and
defendant to serve the executed time at the Indiana Department of Correction.”
Appellant’s App. p. 12. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Probation is an alternative to commitment at the Indiana Department of
Correction. Luke v. State, 51 N.E.3d 401, 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.
A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence on probation. Id. A trial court
may revoke a defendant’s probation if the person has violated a condition of
probation during the probationary period. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3 (2015). A
probation revocation proceeding is civil in nature, and the State must prove the
alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d
752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). If the court determines the defendant has
violated a condition of probation, the court has a variety of options for
imposing sanctions, up to and including ordering the defendant to serve all of
the sentence that had been suspended. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3.
[8] When we review the sufficiency of the evidence in a probation revocation case,
we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Pierce, 44 N.E.3d at 755. Instead, we look only at the evidence favorable to the
judgment and all reasonable inferences therefrom. Id. If the trial court’s finding
of a violation is supported by substantial evidence of probative value, then we
will affirm. Id. When the alleged probation violation is the commission of a
new crime, conviction of the new crime is not required. Id.
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[9] The State alleged Ryle violated the conditions of her probation by committing a
new crime, theft. In order to prevail, the State was required to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that Ryle (1) knowingly or intentionally (2)
exerted unauthorized control (3) over property of Walmart (4) with intent to
deprive Walmart of any part of its value or use. Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (2014).
We also note that a person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or
causes another person to commit an offense also commits that offense. Ind.
Code § 35-41-2-4 (1977).
[10] On June 17, 2015, Amanda McIlwain was working at Walmart, performing her
duties as a loss prevention officer. As she monitored the security system, she
saw two women, later identified as Ryle and Holly Craver, in the women’s
clothing department. McIlwain noticed them because they had picked up
clothing items without looking at the prices, which seemed unusual to her.
[11] McIlwain watched Ryle and Craver go to the dressing rooms and enter separate
rooms. Ryle carried the clothing, and Craver carried nothing but a purse.
McIlwain left the monitoring room and went to the dressing rooms. Upon
arriving, she saw that Ryle had entered Craver’s dressing room.
[12] When Ryle and Craver left the dressing room, neither of them were carrying
any of the clothes they had picked up. McIlwain confirmed with the dressing
room attendant that she had previously cleaned out the dressing rooms, and
when McIlwain looked into the room Ryle and Craver had just left, there was
no clothing there.
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[13] Next, McIlwain followed the women to the shoe department, where they each
picked up a pair of sandals. They went to the checkout area, where they paid
for the sandals but nothing else. As Ryle and Craver approached the exit,
McIlwain stopped them, identified herself, and asked them to go to the security
room. When they arrived in the room, McIlwain looked in Craver’s purse and
found several items of clothing still bearing Walmart price tags. McIlwain
asked Ryle if she knew the merchandise was in Craver’s purse, and Ryle
admitted she did. Ryle further admitted that she had picked out the items and
had given them to Craver in the dressing room.
[14] This evidence is sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
Ryle committed the offense of theft, either as a principal or an accomplice,
thereby violating a condition of her probation. See Pierce, 44 N.E.3d at 755-56
(eyewitness testimony sufficient to establish defendant violated probation by
committing theft). Ryle points to the absence of any security camera recordings
and cites her own testimony, in which she stated that she did not know Craver
was stealing clothes. These arguments are, in substance, a request to reweigh
the evidence, which our standard of review forbids.
Conclusion
[15] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[16] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Barnes, J., concur.
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