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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-14366
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket Nos. 5:14-cv-00397-MTT-CHW,
5:10-cr-00046-MTT-CHW-3
MICHAEL MCSHUN REEVES,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(December 8, 2016)
Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Reeves, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing. We granted a certificate
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of appealability on the issue of “[w]hether the district court erred in denying,
without an evidentiary hearing, Mr. Reeves’s claim that counsel was
constitutionally ineffective for failing to adequately advise him regarding a plea
offer or plea offers from the government.” On appeal, Reeves argues that an
evidentiary hearing was necessary to ascertain relevant facts and make credibility
determinations concerning his claim that his two trial attorneys were ineffective for
inadequately advising him about a plea offer, particularly because the government
did not provide any evidence refuting his claims. After careful review, we affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing in a § 2255 case
for abuse of discretion. Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1215
(11th Cir. 2014). “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect
legal standard, applies the law in an unreasonable or incorrect manner, follows
improper procedures in making a determination, or makes findings of fact that are
clearly erroneous.” Id. (quotation omitted).
An evidentiary hearing must be held on a motion to vacate “[u]nless the
motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is
entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). The prisoner is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing if he alleges facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief.
Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1216. However, the district court does not have to
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hold a hearing if the allegations are patently frivolous, based upon unsupported
generalizations, or affirmatively contradicted by the record. Id.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to effective
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). The
two-part Strickland test applies to a defendant’s allegations of ineffective
assistance during plea negotiations, and the defendant must show that: (1) his trial
counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) trial counsel’s deficient performance
prejudiced the defense. Rosin v. United States, 786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 429 (2015). If the movant fails to establish either prong, the
reviewing court need not address the other prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
Generally, defense counsel has a duty to communicate formal offers from the
government that may be favorable to their client. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct.
1399, 1408 (2012). In the context of a rejected plea agreement or failed plea
bargaining, the prejudice prong requires that the defendant show that:
but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that
the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e., that the defendant
would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn
it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted
its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer’s terms
would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in
fact were imposed.
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012).
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Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied, without an
evidentiary hearing, Reeves’s claim that his trial attorneys were ineffective for
their alleged failure to adequately advise him about a plea offer. As for his first
counsel, Charles Mathis, Mathis’s performance (even if shown to be deficient)
could not have prejudiced Reeves. Rather, the record reveals that no codefendant
pleaded guilty until more than two months after Reeves’s second counsel, John
Fox, took over, and more than eight months after Mathis died. Thus, the record
conclusively shows that Mathis’s performance could not have affected Reeves’s
ability to accept a plea deal, and Reeves was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing
concerning Mathis.
As for his second counsel, even if Reeves could show that Fox failed to
present to him an alleged potential deal of 210 to 264 months’ imprisonment,
Reeves was not prejudiced by this failure either. The record conclusively shows
that Reeves already had rejected a deal with a lower term of imprisonment. Reeves
submitted a letter from Fox providing that he informed Reeves of a potential plea
deal for 14 to 17 years’ imprisonment, which Reeves rejected because of the
stipulated drug quantity proposed by the government. Although the letter was
unsworn and dated two years after sentencing, its contents are verified by
contemporaneous events -- for example, the government also referenced that
specific potential agreement at sentencing, and Fox acknowledged on the record
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that negotiations had not worked out. Reeves noted at the sentencing hearing that,
in hindsight, taking a plea would have been a better course of action, but he never
disputed the accuracy of the government’s account of the plea negotiations. Nor
did he ever indicate that he had not heard of the government’s 14-to-17-year offer.
In addition, the government earlier noted at a January 2011 pretrial status hearing,
which Reeves attended, that it would be offering plea deals to everyone. While
Reeves argues that the January 2011 status hearing was continued and did not
occur, the existence of the hearing transcript conclusively shows that the hearing
did occur. Thus, because the record conclusively shows that Reeves already had
rejected a better deal, he is unable to meet his burden of showing a reasonable
probability that he would have taken the alleged 210-to-264 month offer under the
circumstances. See Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385 (holding that the defendant must
show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the deal).
Finally, as for Reeves’s argument that his attorneys never discussed his
sentencing exposure and should have advised him more strongly to take a plea
deal, Reeves was aware of his potential exposure to a sentencing range of 360-
months’-to-life imprisonment as early as his initial appearance and arraignment.
He even signed a form acknowledging as much. As a result, the record and
Reeves’s submitted evidence conclusively show that he knew his sentencing
exposure and nonetheless rejected a potential plea agreement for 14-to-17 years’
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imprisonment. He, therefore, could not have been prejudiced by their performance
concerning a later, and less favorable, deal. Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion by denying Reeves’s § 2255 motion without an evidentiary
hearing.
AFFIRMED.
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