IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED
GALVIN ANTONIO GALLARDO,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D16-1399
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
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Opinion filed December 2, 2016
Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Orange County,
Renee A. Roche, Judge.
John C. Notari, of Sigman, Sigman, Notari &
Sigman, Orlando, for Appellant.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Deborah A. Cheesman,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach,
for Appellee.
EVANDER, J.
After the denial of his dispositive motion to suppress, Galvin Gallardo entered a
nolo contendere plea to possession of cannabis with intent to sell or deliver, possession
of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. On appeal, he contends
that the discovery of the illegal contraband was the result of an unlawful traffic stop. We
disagree, and accordingly, affirm.
In the instant case, Deputy Tucker testified that Gallardo’s traffic stop was initiated
after she observed him traveling approximately sixty miles per hour in a forty-mile-per-
hour speed zone. The court accepted Deputy Tucker’s testimony, stating:
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court
concludes that Deputy Tucker had reasonable suspicion to
believe that the Defendant committed one or more traffic
offenses, to wit, speeding and/or careless driving.
A law enforcement officer may stop a motor vehicle if he or she has a well-founded,
articulable suspicion that the driver has committed a traffic offense. State v. Allen, 978
So. 2d 254, 255 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). It is well established in Florida that a vehicle may
be stopped for a speeding violation based on an officer’s visual observations.
Accordingly, actual speed need not be verified by the use of radar equipment or clocking.
See Young v. State, 33 So. 3d 151, 153 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding that officer’s trained
observation of defendant’s speeding sufficed to provide probable cause for the stop);
Allen, 978 So. 2d at 255-56 (concluding that trial court erred in finding that there must be
evidence of vehicle’s actual speed to provide probable cause to stop vehicle; officer may
stop vehicle for speeding violation based on officer’s visual perceptions; verification of
actual speed by use of radar equipment or clocking not necessary to justify stop); State
v. Joy, 637 So. 2d 946, 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (“The fact that the patrol car’s
speedometer was not calibrated is of no moment because an officer may stop a vehicle
suspected of speeding based on the officer’s visual and aural perceptions.”); State v.
Eady, 538 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (holding that where officer observed
defendant driving at “a high rate of speed” and “heard a tire screeching and like a passing
gear kicking in,” officer had reasonable suspicion of speeding violation).
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Gallardo argued below that our decision in Department of Highway Safety and
Motor Vehicles v. Roberts, 938 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006), stands for the proposition
that an officer’s visual observation of speeding is insufficient, by itself, to justify a traffic
stop. That argument is unfounded. In Roberts, we reviewed a petition for second-tier
certiorari where the circuit court had determined the evidence before the hearing officer
was insufficient to establish the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the driver for
speeding. 938 So. 2d at 514. The only evidence that was presented to establish
speeding in the Roberts case was the officer’s affidavit, in which he stated that he had
observed the driver “traveling at 71 mph in a 45 mph speed limit area.” Id. The officer’s
affidavit provided little or no specifics about the officer’s vantage point when he reached
the conclusion that Roberts was speeding. Id. Roberts does not stand for the proposition
that an officer’s visual observation of speeding, uncorroborated by speed detection
equipment, is insufficient to justify a traffic stop. Rather, the Roberts opinion focused on
the dearth of evidence regarding the circumstances surrounding the stop. In the present
case, by contrast, Deputy Tucker testified in substantial detail as to her vantage point and
her opportunity to observe Gallardo driving at an excessive speed.
AFFIRMED.
BERGER and EDWARDS, JJ., concur.
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