UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1711
CHONG SU YI,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE; REPUBLICAN NATIONAL
COMMITTEE,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:16-cv-01172-RWT)
Submitted: November 7, 2016 Decided: December 9, 2016
Before KEENAN and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chong Su Yi, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Chong Su Yi appeals from the district court’s order
dismissing his civil complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
(2012). On appeal, Yi contends first that § 1915(e)(2) is
unconstitutionally broad and vague and that it violates his
rights to due process and access to courts. He further asserts
that his complaint stated a claim on which relief may be
granted.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the established
principle that a patently frivolous complaint may be dismissed
for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 n.6 (1989); see also Mallard v. U.S.
Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (“Section 1915[(e)]
. . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious’
action, but there is little doubt they would have the power to
do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”).
Regarding the district court’s authority under the statute to
sua sponte dismiss in forma pauperis complaints that fail to
state a claim, Yi has not specified what process he was due, but
denied. Because dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B) should be
without prejudice, Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 258 (4th
Cir. 2004), Yi is free to refile an amended complaint, and thus,
the dismissal of his complaint has not barred his right to seek
relief under a valid cause of action. See White v. White, 886
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F.2d 721, 724 (4th Cir. 1989) (dismissal without prejudice
permits plaintiff “to cure any deficiencies in his pleading”).
In addition, while Yi claims the statute’s standards are vague
and too broad, the standards for stating a claim and for finding
frivolousness, discussed below, are longstanding and well
understood. Yi’s claim that § 1915(e) is unconstitutional thus
is without merit. However, because the district court did not
specify whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, we
modify the dismissal order to show that the dismissal was
without prejudice.
Turning to the merits of Yi’s complaint, we review for
abuse of discretion a district court’s dismissal of a complaint
as frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Nagy, 376 F.3d at 254.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s dismissal for
failure to state a claim under § 1915, applying the same
standards as those for reviewing a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
dismissal. See De’Lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 524 (4th Cir.
2013). The complaint must contain sufficient factual
allegations to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. De’Lonta, 708 F.3d at 524 (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
A federal court is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis
case at any time the court determines the action is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be
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granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Dismissal of an
action as frivolous is appropriate when the action lacks an
arguable basis in law or fact. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325.
The district court accurately noted that Yi’s complaint was
difficult to decipher. Yi appears to allege that his right to
vote in the Maryland primary elections was improperly denied
based on his status as a registered independent. However, he
also mentions the Fifteenth Amendment and his status as a person
of color, * although he does not claim that persons of certain
races are more likely to register as independents.
Affording Yi liberal construction, we conclude that Yi
alleged that his constitutional rights were, or will be,
violated when he is barred from voting in the primary elections
in Maryland due to his failure to align with either the
Democratic National Committee or the Republican National
* The Fifteenth Amendment as applied through The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) provides the basis for a claim of voter
disenfranchisement. The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits the
states from denying or abridging the right to vote based upon
race, color or previous condition of servitude. The VRA, as
amended in 1982, was originally enacted to work in tandem with
the Fifteenth Amendment to “rid the country of racial
discrimination in voting.” See South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 315 (1966) (abrogated on other grounds). The VRA
prohibits any state practice that results in the “denial or
abridgement of the right . . . to vote on account of race or
color.” See 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (2012).
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Committee. However, there is no constitutional right “in
selecting the candidate of a group to which one does not
belong.” California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567,
573 n.5 (2000) (“Selecting a candidate [to be nominated] is
quite different from voting for the candidate of one’s choice
[who could take office].”). Accordingly, Yi’s bare allegations
that, as an independent, he was excluded by the DNC and the RNC
from voting in their primary elections fail to state a claim.
Accordingly, we modify the district court’s order to show
that the dismissal was without prejudice and affirm the order as
modified. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
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