NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS DEC 12 2016
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
IDS PROPERTY CASUALTY No. 14-35358
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Wisconsin
corporation, D.C. No. 3:12-cv-05095-RBL
Plaintiff-Appellee,
MEMORANDUM*
v.
MARILYN CRAWFORD, individually,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 8, 2016**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, TALLMAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Marilyn Crawford appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
arising out of a tragic set of facts. We review de novo a district court’s summary
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
judgment ruling, Tremain v. Bell Indus., Inc., 196 F.3d 970, 975 (9th Cir. 1999),
and we affirm.
The district court did not err in granting summary judgment to IDS Property
Casualty Insurance Company (“IDS”) in its declaratory judgment action. IDS’s
insurance policy explicitly excluded an “[i]ntentional loss, meaning any loss
arising out of any act an insured person commits . . . with the intent to cause a
loss.” Exclusionary clauses are strictly construed against the insurer and
interpreted based on their ordinary meaning. Phil Schroeder, Inc. v. Royal Globe
Ins. Co., 659 P.2d 509, 511 (Wash. 1983).
IDS advances evidence that Crawford used gasoline to start a fire in the
garage of her house, which resulted in extensive damage. This evidence is
consistent with Crawford’s statement to the police. Although Crawford objects to
these facts, she has failed to advance “directly contradict[ory]” evidence that
creates a genuine issue as to any material fact. Marchisheck v. San Mateo Cty.,
199 F.3d 1068, 1078 (9th Cir. 1999). Although Crawford claims she had no
subjective intent to damage her insured property, the nature of her actions—setting
fire to her car and garage in order to commit suicide—is one “where the act is
indissolubly bound with the injury, [so] the law imputes the intent to injure to the
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insured, and the exclusion applies.” Safeco Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 817 P.2d 861,
863 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991); see also Rodriguez v. Williams, 729 P.2d 627, 630–31
(Wash. 1986).
The district court also did not err in granting summary judgment to IDS on
Crawford’s counterclaims for investigation into her insurance claim. Crawford
failed to establish that IDS’s actions were in bad faith or unreasonable, especially
in light of her statement to the police that she had set the fire intentionally.
Overton v. Consol. Ins. Co., 38 P.3d 322, 329 (Wash. 2002) (citation omitted)
(prohibiting bad faith actions unless the insurer’s actions were “unreasonable,
frivolous, or unfounded”); Wash. Admin. Code § 284-30-330(4) (creating liability
for insurance companies who “[r]efus[e] to pay claims without conducting a
reasonable investigation”).
Each party shall bear its own costs.
AFFIRMED.
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