DLD-056 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 16-3628
___________
NATHANIEL JACKSON,
Appellant
v.
SUPERINTENDENT GREENE SCI; JOHN DOE #1;
LT. JOHN DOE #2; WEXFORD MEDICAL CORRECTIONAL;
JOHN & JANE DOES #3; JOHN & JANE DOES #4;
JOHN & JANE DOES #5; BYANAHAK JIN, M.D.;
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER CARTER; LT. JOHN DOE #6
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-00457)
District Judge: Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 1, 2016
Before: CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 13, 2016)
_________
OPINION *
_________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Nathaniel Jackson appeals the District Court’s order granting Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment and motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissing his
claims. Jackson is an inmate at S.C.I. Greene and is proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis. Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.
Jackson filed an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against prison staff, administrators, and a doctor, and a negligence claim
under Pennsylvania state law against a doctor and health service provider after allegedly
receiving inadequate medical treatment for a broken finger. Defendants moved for
summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim, arguing that Jackson failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies, and moved for judgment on the pleadings on the
negligence claim. The Magistrate Judge recommended that both motions be granted.
After considering Jackson’s objection, the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s
report and recommendation and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and
motion for judgment on the pleadings. Jackson timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s decision to grant summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings.
Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998); Ehrheart v. Verizon
Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 593 n.2 (3d Cir. 2010). A grant of summary judgment will be
affirmed if our review reveals that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
2
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Judgment
on the pleadings is appropriate if “the movant clearly establishes that no material issue of
fact remains to be resolved and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Jablonski v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 863 F.2d 289, 290 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal
quotations omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). We review the facts in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party. Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10
F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).
The motion for summary judgment was properly granted as to Jackson’s Eighth
Amendment claims because he failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies.
An inmate must exhaust all available administrative remedies before seeking relief under
§ 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). “Proper
exhaustion demands compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural
rules.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 (2006). Prison grievance procedures are
administrative remedies for this purpose. Concepcion v. Morton, 306 F.3d 1347, 1348-
49 (3d Cir. 2002). “Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is an affirmative defense
that must be pled and proven by the defendant[s].” Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109, 111
(3d Cir. 2002).
Defendants asserted that Jackson failed to exhaust his available administrative
remedies because he did not provide complete documentation for his grievances upon
request, as required by S.C.I. Greene’s grievance policy. In support, Defendants
submitted the entire file relating to Jackson’s grievances. These submissions show that
3
Jackson did not submit a copy of his initial grievance during his appeal and that he was
informed that he could request a copy through the facility grievance coordinator. Jackson
failed to do so, and therefore did not properly comply with the procedural deadlines and
rules. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 90. Accordingly, Defendants have demonstrated that
Jackson failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and summary judgment was
therefore properly granted.
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Jackson’s negligence
claims was also properly granted. Jackson had to file a certificate of merit within sixty
days of filing his medical negligence claim. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.3(a). Jackson did
not file the certificate, despite being notified by Defendants of the requirement. See
Schmigel v. Uchal, 800 F.3d 113, 124-25 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding plaintiff must receive
thirty days’ notice of the Rule 1042.3(a) certificate of merit requirement before the right
to dismiss an action for medical negligence vests). In his objections below, Jackson
attempted to excuse his failure to file the certificate of merit by noting that the Magistrate
Judge ordered that Defendants’ separate motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim be
held in abeyance pending outcome of the motion for summary judgment. While Jackson
is correct in this regard, the order to hold in abeyance is irrelevant and does not excuse
his failure to file the certificate because (1) Defendants filed a separate motion for
judgment on the pleadings well after this order, which is what the District Court
considered and (2) the order that Jackson attempts to use as excusing his failure to file
4
was still entered well after the sixty-day time frame to file the certificate of merit had
passed. Therefore, the negligence claim was properly dismissed on the pleadings.
5