FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 13 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LARRY J. CRAFT, No. 14-35436
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01976-BJR
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 5, 2016**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, TALLMAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Larry Craft appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income. The administrative law judge (ALJ)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
found that Craft was not disabled because he had the residual functional capacity
(RFC) to perform his past relevant work as a production poultry cutter. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The ALJ identified “specific, clear and convincing reasons” to justify
discounting Craft’s testimony. See Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775
F.3d 1090, 1102 (9th Cir. 2014). The ALJ reasonably concluded that Craft’s
descriptions of his limitations were inconsistent with the record.
2. The ALJ gave discounted weight to Dr. Haines’s and Dr. Kwon’s
opinions because the opinions were inadequately supported or inconsistent with the
objective findings. These are “specific and legitimate reasons ” that are supported
by substantial evidence in the record. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31
(9th Cir. 1995). The ALJ did not err by considering Craft’s physician’s assistant’s
opinions as “evidence about the severity of [Craft’s] impairment(s) and how it
affects [his] ability to work.” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1013–14 (9th Cir.
2014); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d); see also SSR 06-03p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *6
(Aug. 9, 2006) (stating that the opinion of a medical “other source” may outweigh
that of an “acceptable medical source” if the “other source” has seen the individual
more often).
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3. The ALJ assigned little weight to several providers’ opinions about
Craft’s cognitive functioning because the opinions were based on invalid test
scores and Craft’s subjective reports, and were inconsistent with the overall record.
Substantial evidence supported the weight given to these opinions, and the
conflicting opinions of several nonexamining physicians. See Thomas v. Barnhart,
278 F.3d 947, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The opinions of non-treating or non-
examining physicians may also serve as substantial evidence when the opinions are
consistent with independent clinical findings or other evidence in the record.”).
4. Craft’s argument that the ALJ improperly formulated his RFC is
unavailing. The ALJ properly evaluated the evidence, and substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s determination that Craft is not disabled.
Costs on appeal are awarded to the appellee.
AFFIRMED.
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