FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
DEC 14 2016
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOHN M. VAN ORSDOL, No. 14-35220
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:13-cv-00601-RSL
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Robert S. Lasnik, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted December 5, 2016
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, TALLMAN, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
John Van Orsdol appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income. The administrative law judge (ALJ)
found that Van Orsdol was not disabled because he had the residual functional
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
capacity (RFC) to perform work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512(f), 404.1520(g), 404.1560(c). We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. The ALJ gave “specific, clear and convincing reasons” justifying his
decision to discount Van Orsdol’s testimony and reasonably concluded that Van
Orsdol’s testimony about the severity of his symptoms conflicted with the record.
See Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations
omitted).
2. The ALJ did not err when incorporating the medical opinion evidence into
Van Orsdol’s RFC. First, the ALJ gave “specific and legitimate reasons that are
supported by substantial evidence in the record” for discounting certain medical
opinions. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830–31 (9th Cir. 1996). The ALJ
discounted the opinions of Dr. Floyd and physician’s assistant Kenneth Wiscomb
because they were contradicted by later medical opinions or were unexplained and
unsupported by evidence. See Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir.
2001) (concluding the “most recent medical reports are highly probative” where a
condition has changed); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir. 1995)
(stating that ALJs may reject a medical opinion for being “conclusory and
unsubstantiated by relevant medical documentation”).
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Second, the ALJ did not reject Dr. Kiefer’s medical opinion, but instead
gave it “significant weight” and incorporated restrictions from the opinion into the
hypotheticals presented to the vocational expert during his testimony. The
vocational expert was able to identify four jobs classified in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles as “light work” that someone with such restrictions could
perform. See Johnson, 60 F.3d at 1435 (“[T]he expert testimony may properly be
used to show that the particular jobs, whether classified as light or sedentary, may
be ones that a particular claimant can perform.”). None of the authorities cited by
Van Orsdol mandate a finding that someone with his limitations could only
perform sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567, 416.967; SSR 83–10, 1983
WL 31251, at *5–6 (1983). The ALJ’s evaluation of Van Orsdol’s RFC was not
erroneous.
3. The ALJ gave “germane reasons” for discounting the testimony of lay
witness Stanley Hofmann by finding that his testimony was inconsistent with the
record. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1114 (9th Cir. 2012).
The ALJ gave appropriate reasons for discounting certain opinions and did
not otherwise err in evaluating Van Orsdol’s RFC. Because substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s determination that Van Orsdol is not disabled, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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