J-S85002-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.A.J.F., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: M.T.F., FATHER
No. 1306 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered March 23, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): AP#: CP-51-AP-0000333-2015
DP#: CP-51-DP-0000623-2014
FID#: 51-FN-000592-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.A.-M.T., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: M.T.F., FATHER
No. 1307 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered March 23, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): AP#: CP-51-AP-0000416-2015
DP#: CP-51-DP-0000766-2014
FID#: 51-FN-000592-2014
IN THE INTEREST OF: M.T.F., JR., A IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: M.T.F., FATHER
No. 1308 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered March 23, 2016
J-S85002-16
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): AP#: CP-51-AP-0000334-2015
DP#: CP-51-DP-0000767-2014
FID#: 51-FN-000592-2014
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., RANSOM, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED DECEMBER 16, 2016
Appellant, M.T.F. (“Father”), appeals from the orders involuntarily
terminating his parental rights to his three children, M.A.J.F. (born August
2011), M.T.F., Jr. (born March 2013), and K.A.-M.T. (born March 2014).1
Father contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the trial
court’s decision. After careful review, we affirm.
On May 2, 2012, Mother entered a negotiated guilty plea to the charge
of corruption of minors, whereby several other sexual offense charges were
noll prossed. The victim in these charges was Father. Mother received a
probationary sentence of three years.
On March 7, 2014, a general protective services report was referred to
the Department of Human Services (“DHS”) alleging that K.A.-M.T. had
tested positive for marijuana at birth. It was later determined that Mother
had tested positive for marijuana during delivery. DHS had K.A.-M.T. taken
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K.T. (“Mother”), the mother of all three children, had her parental rights
involuntarily terminated at the same proceeding. Her appeals are docketed
at 1135, 1136, and 1137 EDA 2016.
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into protective custody and ultimately declared dependent and placed with a
foster family.
DHS visited Mother’s home, which consisted of two non-adjacent
rooms in a boarding house. Mother indicated that she locked the children
into separate rooms at night as a protective measure. Concerned with the
circumstances, DHS arranged for Mother to be admitted into a residential
treatment program where she could live with her two older children.
After a short time in the program, Mother was taken into custody for
violating her probation. DHS took M.A.J.F. and M.T.F., Jr. into protective
custody, as they could not remain at the treatment program in Mother’s
absence. Both children were ultimately declared dependent and placed with
the same foster family as K.A.-M.T.
Approximately nine months later, in January 2015, Father was
arrested and charged with aggravated assault, terroristic threats with the
intent to terrorize, stalking – intent to cause fear, simple assault and
recklessly endangering another person. Shortly thereafter, Mother submitted
herself to her first drug screen after her release from imprisonment for the
probation violation. She tested positive for marijuana.
Evidence was presented that, at the time of the termination hearing,
Father had never complied with drug and alcohol counseling and did not
participate in parenting classes. Furthermore, he had not located suitable
housing. Father’s compliance with his objectives was described as minimal.
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The trial court determined that termination was appropriate under 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a), subsections (1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as § 2511(b),
and entered orders terminating Father’s parental rights, and this timely
appeal followed.
On appeal Father raises five issues, but these merely consist of
challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s
findings under each of the above sections. Our standard of review regarding
orders terminating parental rights is as follows:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental
rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the
trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse
of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support
for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. Where a
trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate
parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s
decision the same deference that we would give to a jury
verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the
record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is
supported by competent evidence.
In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting In re C.S., 761
A.2d 1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2000)).
In termination cases, the burden is upon the petitioner to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the
termination of parental rights are valid. See id., at 806. The standard of
clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so “clear,
direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a
clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
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In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003). The trial court is free
to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to
make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. See
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004).
In terminating Father’s parental rights, the trial court relied upon §
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption Act, which provide as
follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
…
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child within a
reasonable period of time and termination of the
parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of
the child.
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…
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
and termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
...
(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the
basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
This Court “need only agree with [the trial court’s] decision as to any one
subsection in order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In re
B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
With respect to § 2511(a)(2), termination of parental rights due to
parental incapacity that cannot be remedied, the grounds are not limited to
affirmative misconduct; “to the contrary, those grounds may include acts of
refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797
A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Parents are required to
make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full
parental responsibilities. See id., at 340. A child’s life “simply cannot be put
on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
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responsibilities of parenting.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super.
2008) (citations omitted). Rather, “a parent’s basic constitutional right to the
custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or
her parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and
fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent, healthy, safe
environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(citation omitted).
At the termination hearing, DHS social worker Lynn Speight testified
that Father never attended drug and alcohol counseling. See N.T.,
Termination Hearing, 3/23/16, at 27. Furthermore, he had never attended
parenting classes that DHS provided to him. See id. Nor had he ever located
appropriate housing in which to have to custody of the children. See id.
In addition, Father had two troubling incidents while he had
unsupervised visitation with the children. In the first, he took K.A.-M.T. to
get a treat. See id., at 29-30. Approximately 3 hours later, Father’s uncle
contacted the person with physical custody to inform her that Father had
dropped the child off and disappeared. See id., at 30.
In the second incident, Father purported to take all three children to a
local mall. See id., at 31. He was not prepared to take the children on such
an outing; among other reasons, he did not have a stroller. See id., at 30.
When DHS suggested a more appropriate destination, Father refused and
insisted on taking the children to the mall. See id., at 31. However, an
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interview with the children after the outing revealed that Father had not
gone to the mall, but met with Mother and took the children to Mother’s
parents’ home. See id. This was a violation of the visitation plan, as
Mother’s visits were to be supervised, and her father had an offense that
disqualified him from visitation. See id. After this incident, Father’s visitation
was modified to supervised. See id., at 32.
On appeal Father complains that DHS did not provide enough
opportunities or assistance to achieve his goals. This Court has stated that a
parent is required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt
assumption of full parental responsibilities. See In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326,
337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of
uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may
properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. See id., at 340.
Here, evidence at trial established that Father had not availed himself
of the opportunities and services that DHS provided him. After our careful
review of the record in this matter, we find that the trial court’s credibility
and weight determinations are supported by competent evidence in the
record. Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s determinations regarding §
2511(a)(2) are supported by sufficient, competent evidence in the record.
When termination is found to be appropriate under subsection (a), the
trial court must still consider whether termination of parental rights would
best serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs of the child.
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See In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Pa. Super. 2005). “Intangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into
the needs and welfare of the child.” Id. at 1287 (citation omitted). We have
instructed that the court must also discern the nature and status of the
parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of
permanently severing that bond. See id.
At the termination hearing, social worker Speight testified that after
the children had been removed, Father had not regularly attended visitation
sessions with the children after his visitation was modified to supervised.
See N.T., Termination Hearing, 3/23/16, at 32. Social worker Akia Butts
testified that the children look to the foster mother to have their needs met.
See id., at 76-77. Furthermore, she testified that she did not believe that
the children would suffer irreparable harm if their biological parents’ rights
were terminated. See id., at 78.
After careful review of the record, we find that competent evidence in
the record supports the trial court’s determination that the children would
not suffer harm from termination of Father’s parental rights, and that the
termination would best serve the needs and welfare of the children. The
testimony at the hearing established that the children had been placed for
approximately 24 months and had established an appropriate bond with the
foster mother. We therefore find no basis upon which to disturb the trial
court’s orders.
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We affirm the orders terminating Father’s parental rights on the basis
of § 2511(a)(2) and (b) of the Adoption Act.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/16/2016
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