J-S83030-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: L.R.P., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
APPEAL OF: A.P., NATURAL MOTHER
No. 980 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree June 17, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 30A-2016 O.C.
IN RE: E.P.P., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
APPEAL OF: A.P., NATURAL MOTHER
No. 981 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree June 17, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 31A-2016 O.C.
IN RE: A.T.P., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
APPEAL OF: A.P., NATURAL MOTHER
No. 982 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree June 17, 2016
J-S83030-16
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 32A-2016 O.C.
IN RE: T.M.J.P., IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
APPEAL OF: A.P., NATURAL MOTHER
No. 983 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree June 17, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
Orphans’ Court at No(s): 29A-2016 O.C.
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED: December 16, 2016
A.P. (“Mother”) appeals from the decree entered on June 17, 2016,
terminating her parental rights to her children, T.M.J.P., born in September
of 2013; L.R.P., born in May of 2012; E.P.P., born in May of 2015; and
A.T.P., born in September of 2010, (collectively, “the Children”), under 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).1 We affirm.
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The trial court also held an evidentiary hearing on CYS’s petition for
involuntary termination of the parental rights of the Children’s father
(“Father”), along with the hearing on the petition to terminate Mother’s
parental rights. In the same decree entered June 17, 2016, the trial court
terminated the parental rights of Father. In its opinion entered on June 17,
2016, the trial court makes clear that the termination of both parents’ rights
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The trial court accurately and aptly set forth the factual background of
this case as follows:
CYS personnel entered the [] home on October 31, 2014 to
investigate a report that the oldest child, [A.T.P.], had sustained
a suspicious orbital fracture whose origins the [parents] could
not explain. [CYS] also found the home to be cluttered and dirty,
with dishes stacked in the sink and visible mold. They took
emergency custody of [A.T.P.] and his two siblings, [L.R.P.] and
[T.M.J.P.], at that time and placed them with [Foster Parents].
Adjudicated dependent at a subsequent shelter hearing, [the
Children] have been with the [Foster Parents] ever since.
As they completed an initial assessment, CYS personnel
also discovered that [A.T.P.] was suffering from scabies and that
[L.R.P.] had not received all of the medication his doctor had
prescribed following his tonsillectomy. In addition, Mother and
Father regularly missed the children’s medical appointments and
had failed to address [A.T.P.’s] vision problem, for which he
received corrective eye surgery after being placed with the
[Foster Parents]. Though [T.M.J.P.] also evidenced vision
problems and was born with a hole in her heart, moreover, the
[parents] had failed to address either condition, while [L.R.P.],
though not exhibiting any identifiable medical problems, was
underweight and malnourished.
In addition to presenting with an array of medical needs,
the children suffered from severe physical delays that Mother
and Father failed to adequately address. At four years of age,
[A.T.P.’s] speech was limited to a few isolated words that were
difficult to understand, while [L.R.P.] and [T.M.J.P.] only made
noises, some of which included identifiable vowel and consonant
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
was under section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b), and not subsection (a)(1).
Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/16, at 6-7. On July 15, 2016, Father filed separate
appeals from the decree, assigned Superior Court Docket Numbers 1074
WDA 2016, 1075 WDA 2016, 1076 WDA 2016, and 1077 WDA 2016. This
Court consolidated Father’s appeals on August 9, 2016. Because of the
disparate timing of the filing of Mother’s and Father’s appeals, a different
panel of this Court will address Father’s appeals in a separate Memorandum.
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sounds. In addition, [A.T.P.’s] motor skills were underdeveloped
and his gait unsteady, and [T.M.J.P.], at eleven months old,
could not crawl, roll over, or even sit up on her own.
Mother and Father’s neglect, it seems, stemmed from a
lack of parental capacity, not necessarily a lack of concern. They
did not understand their children’s needs or basic parenting
principles. As a result, they neglected to provide the mental,
physical, and emotional stimulation that was essential to their
children’s development.
It is impossible for one to remedy an unrecognized
problem, though, and the Court questions whether Mother and
Father even recognized their children’s deficiencies. As Mother
testified, it was Dr. Fatula who suggested in 2011 that [Mother]
contact Amazing Kids to initiate services that would address
[A.T.P.’s] delays and Early Headstart that contacted her and
offered additional services. It was not that Mother or Father
observed and appreciated their son’s deficits and took steps to
address them. That is not to discount their willingness to follow
up and accept help, which they did, but to clarify that their
decision to contact Amazing Kids was not unprompted.
By the time CYS took custody of [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], and
[T.M.J.P.], Amazing Kids was also providing services for the
younger children, speech therapy and special instruction for
[L.R.P.] and occupational therapy and special instruction for
[T.M.J.P.]. Visits occurred weekly and lasted approximately one
hour, meaning that Amazing Kids had therapists in the home for
five or six hours per week. Ranging from skeptical to accepting
and cooperative, Mother and Father complied with that regimen
such that in-home services, which also incorporated limited
parenting training, went uninterrupted from the time they
started in 2011 until the children were placed with the [Foster
Parents] in 2014. Upon Mother’s request, CYS continued using
Amazing Kids’ services to facilitate a level of continuity for the
children, and under the same service providers’ tutelage, the
children have made greater strides in the [Foster Parents’] home
than they did in Mother and Father’s home.
Unlike [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], and [T.M.J.P.], [E.P.P.] never
lived with the [parents]; he has been with the [Foster Parents]
since he was born and has consistently received appropriate care
his entire life. Consequently, his physical, emotional, and mental
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skills have developed at a normal rate. He is appropriately verbal
for his age and has adequate muscle control are age-
appropriate [sic], is alert and responsive to outside stimuli, and
appears to be emotionally healthy.
While some of [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], and [T.M.J.P.’s]
developmental issues may be intractable, the [Foster Parents]
have also made every effort to meet [the Children’s] individual
needs. [A.T.P.], for instance, has undergone corrective surgery
for his eye condition and is now wearing leg braces, while
[T.M.J.P.] is being monitored for possible eye surgery and will be
receiving her own leg braces this month.1 In light of the
children’s therapeutic progress, moreover, the Court can only
assume that the [Foster Parents] are actively working to help
them improve their motor, verbal, and other skills rather than
just allowing the therapists access and being satisfied with the
few hours of services the children receive from third-party
providers.
1
Mother and Father have participated in securing
medical appointments for their children, but only to a
very limited extent.
Since losing custody of their children, Mother and Father
have undergone a substantial amount of parenting training. They
began with an unspecified number of classes with a local pastor
and, when CYS caseworker determined that they needed more
intensive, hands-on program, began Community Action’s
“Nurturing Parenting Program.” They participated in that
program for a total of three hundred days and were taught a
variety of skills, some of which they were able to implement
during supervised visits with their children. Their progress,
however, has been slow, limited, and of questionable
permanence. Community Action’s court summaries, submitted as
Exhibit 1, are exemplary in that regard.
In reports drafted September 17, 2015 and March 18,
2016, respectively, Susie Reed and Lisa Doty proffered positive
and optimistic evaluations of Mother and Father’s parenting
achievements. [However,] [t]hey also reported both parents’
scores from their respective administrations of the “Adult-
Adolescent Parenting Inventory,” the results of which belied the
women’s subjective evaluations and indicated that Mother and
Father still had moderate to severe parenting deficits. After three
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hundred days in the program, for instance, Father scored only
two out of ten and Mother one out of ten in the “Developing
Empathy” category, while both managed only a three out of ten
for “Appropriate Discipline” and one out of ten for “Empowering
Children.” The highest score either of them achieved in any
category was six out of ten, which was still two points shy of the
established goal. Of serious concern, moreover, was that some
of Mother and Father’s scores actually declined between testing
dates. Those objective scores, divorced from the biases of the
evaluators who were personally invested and wanted to see
Mother and Father succeed, tended to confirm the caseworkers’
and Dr. Ryen’s observations about the [parents’] capacity to
implement the parenting skills they had been taught and
appropriately care for [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], [T.M.J.P.], and [E.P.P.]
Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/16, at 1-4.
On April 11, 2016, Jefferson County Children and Youth Services
(“CYS” or the “Agency”) filed petitions to terminate Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights with regard to each of the Children. On June 8, 2016, the
trial court held a hearing on the petitions. At the hearing, CYS presented
the testimony of the Children’s caseworker and Allen Ryen, Ph.D., a licensed
psychologist specializing in children and families. Father presented the
testimony of Laura M. Hertel, the owner of Amazing Kids, L.L.C., an early
intervention provider contracted by Jefferson County, as an expert in early
intervention. N.T., 6/8/16, at 76-78. Ms. Hertel testified that she is familiar
with the family in this matter, as she provided services to A.T.P. beginning in
March of 2011, speech therapy for L.R.P., and special instruction for T.M.J.P.
Id. at 78-79. Father then presented the testimony of Susan M. Reed, who
holds a bachelor’s degree in crisis and trauma counseling and Christian
counseling, and is working on her master’s degree. Id. at 98. Ms. Reed
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also holds a certificate in parenting from Family Developmental Resources,
and worked with Nurturing Parent program. Id. She worked with Mother
and Father every week, sometimes as many as three times, between June of
2015 and January of 2016. Id. at 98-99. Father testified on his own behalf,
as did Mother.
On June 17, 2016, the trial court entered its decree involuntarily
terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).
In its opinion accompanying its decree, the trial court stated the
following:
The Court would emphasize that it does not question that
Mother and Father love their children and have demonstrated
their commitment to being reunited as a family. They attended
every one of the sixty-eight, two-and-a-half hour visits CYS
offered them in 2015 and have maintained that pattern thus far
in 2016. Mother likewise took advantage of the five visits she
was afforded in 2014. Both have also complied with the agency’s
mental health requirements; Father participated in an evaluation
from which no follow-up treatment was recommended, and
Mother continues to receive mental health services consonant
with her provider’s recommendations. In addition, Mother and
Father have recently acquired a suitable residence.2 More than a
year-and-a-half after having [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.], and [T.M.J.P.]
removed from their home, though, they are still unable or
unwilling to keep up with their children’s medical needs, which
was one of CYS’s primary concerns in the first place and, given
the children’s known conditions, is also a serious concern for the
Court. They also have not yet advanced beyond supervised visits
in a home-like environment and have failed to demonstrate that
they are ready to assume greater responsibility.
2
Insofar as that only occurred on May 31, 2016 and
is a month-to-month lease, however, it is far from
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certain that their housing situation will become
stable in the near future.
Once again, it is not that Mother and Father are unwilling
to develop acceptable parenting skills; it is that they are unable
to do so within any reasonable timeframe. Their children were
removed from their care approximately nineteen months ago,
and despite their consistent efforts and access to relevant
service providers, Mother and Father have made only modest
improvements in their parenting skills and are nowhere near
ready to parent four children on a full-time basis. Given what
little progress they have made in the last nineteen months, in
fact, the Court wonders whether they would ever be ready for
that.
Contributing to the Court’s uncertainty was the [parents’]
own testimony. Prompted by their attorneys, they agreed that
they would need continuing services as they transitioned to
being a family of six and indicated that they would solicit help if
they needed it. They demonstrated no awareness, however, that
taking complete responsibility for raising four children was vastly
different than implementing learned parenting skills for a few
hours in a home-like environment. It was telling, moreover, that
Father saw no irony in asserting that he could support four
children while also explaining how he had quit his job in favor of
increased social security income and that Mother deemed herself
ready to assume the challenges of parenting four children when
she could not even accept being challenged by a person whose
goal was to help her become a better mother and preserve her
family.
Testifying about her tenure with Family Preservation, a
service provider that seeks to improve parenting and family
functioning, Mother affirmed that she had [not] cooperated with
its program until the end. She quit, she said, because she was
being pushed. “And I’m not someone who likes to get pushed,”
she defiantly announced. Her attorney attempted to rehabilitate
her with a series of leading questions about her willingness to
cooperate with the same provider in the future. In light of her
initial, spontaneous averments, however, her subsequent
assurances were unconvincing. She had already informed the
Court that she was unwilling to be confronted and challenged.
While content to comply with services when the providers were
friendly and encouraging, she rebelled when she deemed their
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demands to be unreasonable and “pushy.” Parenthood, though,
is full of confrontation and challenges, and Mother is apparently
not equipped to handle them.
The [Foster Parents], on the other hand, are well equipped
to handle the challenges of raising four children, three of whom
have special needs. They have proven as much in the last year-
and-a-half. They have loved the children, attended to their
medical and therapeutic needs, and in every other way acted as
concerned and supportive parents, and [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.],
[T.M.J.P.], and [E.P.P.] have responded accordingly. As
evidenced by their delight at being reunited and going home with
[Foster Mother] at the end of visits with Mother and Father, each
implicitly recognizes the love and stability these foster parents
have provided, and each has flourished under their supervision.
Conversely, three of the children show little or no
attachment to their biological parents. [E.P.P.] has never known
them as his primary caretakers, and their interactions with him
during visits have been too superficial to foster a bond, while
[A.T.P.] and [T.M.J.P.] generally prefer playing by themselves
even when Mother and Father are present. [L.R.P.] is the
exception, as he demonstrates a stronger connection with
Mother. His affection for [Foster Mother] is equally strong,
though, which is why he, like his siblings, is happy to be reunited
with her after visits. All of the children, while they may indeed
enjoy certain structured activities with Mother and Father,
implicitly recognize the [Foster Parents] as their source of love
and support. Mother and Father, they silently communicate, are
merely peripheral figures in their lives.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/16, at 4-6.
On July 1, 2016, following the termination of Mother’s parental rights
to the Children, Mother timely filed notices of appeal. Both Mother and the
trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. This Court, sua sponte,
consolidated Mother’s appeals on July 28, 2016.
On appeal, Mother raises the following issues:
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I. Whether the lower court erred in terminating Mother’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2)[?]
II. Whether the lower court erred in terminating Mother’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(5)[?]
III. Whether the lower court erred in terminating Mother’s
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(8)[?]
IV. Whether the lower court erred in determining that
termination of parental rights was in the child’s best interest in
accordance with 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(8)[?]
Mother’s Brief at 4.2
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36
A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)]. As has been often
stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because
the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc.,
____________________________________________
2
It appears that Mother made a clerical error in her brief, as issue IV
duplicates issue III regarding section 2511(a)(8). As the fourth issue in
Mother’s concise statement related to section 2511(b), and Mother’s brief
discusses section 2511(b) as her fourth issue, we will consider her challenge
to section 2511(b) preserved for our review. Mother’s Brief, at 8-9, 17. Cf.
Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797
(Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not
raised in both his concise statement of errors complained of on appeal and
the Statement of Questions Involved in his brief on appeal).
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613 Pa. 371, 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely,
838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.
Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are
not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at
1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-827 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained:
The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section
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2511(a). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
We will focus on section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
* * *
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence regarding the following
elements: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or
mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
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refusal cannot or will not be remedied. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d
1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003). The grounds for termination of parental
rights under section 2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be
remedied, are not limited to affirmative misconduct; to the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that CYS presented
sufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights under
section 2511(a)(2) because she has demonstrated that, although the case
has been lengthy, she has remedied, and continues to remedy, her
incapacity to parent and her neglect of the Children that she demonstrated
early on in the case. Mother’s Brief, at 8. Mother does not dispute that CYS
alleged she had a serious incapacity which led to the neglect of the Children
and neglect of the family home. Id. at 12. Mother adamantly disputes,
however, that the incapacity and neglect cannot be remedied. In support of
her argument, Mother relies on In re Quick, 559 A.2d 42 (Pa. Super.
1989). Mother’s Brief at 12.
In Quick, the mother had been convicted of endangering the welfare
of her children pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4304. Although services were
available and the mother was made aware of those services, she failed to
follow through with any recommended treatment and counseling. Quick,
559 A.2d at 45-46. This Court ruled that the trial court properly held that
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the mother had not remedied the situation leading to the removal of the
children, and that termination would meet their needs and welfare and
would best accommodate their special needs. Id. at 46. We affirmed the
trial court order terminating her parental rights. Id. at 50.
Mother asserts that, although the mother in Quick had not remedied
the situations that led to the removal of her children, the mother had not
undergone counseling and continued to act under the belief that she was not
responsible for the maltreatment of her children. Mother contends that the
present case differs significantly, as the trial court nolle prossed the charges
of endangering the welfare of children against her. Mother’s Brief at 12
(citing the notes of testimony from the June 8, 2016 hearing regarding the
cross-examination of the Childrens’ caseworker, Ms. Lopez, by her counsel).
Moreover, Mother alleges that she was aware of the services available to
her, and that she followed CYS’s recommendations and actively participated
with services offered and suggested. Id. Mother acknowledges CYS and
Dr. Ryen had concerns about her parenting abilities, but contends that
Ms. Lopez testified, during cross-examination by her counsel, that Mother
had progressed in her parenting abilities. Id.
Mother also contends that two service providers, Ms. Hertel and
Ms. Reed, testified as to their involvement with Mother. Mother’s Brief at
13. Mother states that, unlike Dr. Ryen, who performed three evaluations in
single sessions at the Agency, Ms. Hertel and Ms. Reed observed Mother
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interact with the Children in Mother’s home and another more comfortable
setting. Id.
Mother admits that Ms. Hertel and Ms. Reed did not completely
disagree with Dr. Ryen’s conclusion regarding Mother’s inability to parent the
Children, but she asserts that their testimony was in opposition to that of Dr.
Ryen’s. Mother’s Brief at 13. Specifically, Mother alleges that she made
improvements during counseling. Id. Mother states that both Ms. Hertel
and Ms. Reed observed interaction between Mother and the Children and
offered testimony that contradicted Dr. Ryen’s observation that the Children
were not engaged with Mother. Id. Mother cites the direct examination of
Ms. Hertel and the cross-examination of Ms. Reed by her counsel in support
of this allegation. Id. Mother argues that she can remedy, has remedied,
and will continue to remedy any causes of the removal of the Children. Id.
She states that, although Dr. Ryen’s evaluation and report was harsh, it was
limited to three small segments of time relating to family involvement. Id.
Thus, Mother claims that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating
her parental rights under section 2511(a)(2).
Importantly, Mother neglects to mention that the trial court found as
follows:
To the extent it is not implicit from the above findings, the
Court would specify that it did not find Ms. Hertel and Ms. Reed
to be credible in their assessments of Mother and Father’s
parenting skills and family interactions. Unlike Dr. Ryen and the
caseworker, they did not have dedicated training in psychology
or child development or experience assessing familial needs from
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the parents’ and the children’s perspectives. Their roles were
instead to be helpers and advocates for the clients they served,
and it was apparent from their testimony that their predisposed
bias was to emphasize areas of improvement while overlooking
or discounting those that were problematic. Given the obvious
deficits in both parents and children as of October 31, 2014,
moreover, it is nearly impossible to otherwise understand why
Ms. Hertel and her staff did not deem conditions at the [family]
home to be of particular concern. They did not, though, and that
fact alone makes Ms. Hertel’s observations and opinions suspect.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/16, at 6.
In analyzing section 2511(a)(2), the trial court concluded:
Termination is warranted pursuant to subsection (a)(2),
however, as Mother and Father plainly lack parental capacity,
and their history clearly indicates that they are unable to remedy
that situation within a reasonable period of time, if ever.3
3
Under subsection (a)(2), a parent’s repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal to
parent is cause for termination where it has left the
child without essential parental care, control, or
subsistence and is not likely to be remedied by the
parent.
As the [c]ourt has already detailed, Mother and Father
displayed severe parenting deficits that, as of October 31, 2014,
had left their children without proper medical care and produced
substantial and perhaps irreversible developmental delays in
[A.T.P.], [L.R.P.] and [T.M.J.P.]. Such was the case even though
service providers had been in the home since 2011. Basic
parenting classes, parenting help through Amazing Kids and
Family Preservation, three hundred days in the “Nurturing
Parenting Program,” and ongoing mental health services for
Mother were only moderately successful in improving their
parenting skills.
Nineteen months after losing custody of their children,
Mother and Father were still far from being ready to assume the
responsibility of raising four children, three of whom had been
identified as having special needs. Yes they were able to attend
to certain basic physical needs, like changing diapers and
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preparing meals, and had made progress - Mother more than
Father - in the way they interacted with their children. They had
only gotten that far after extended and intensive parenting
training, though, and, while testifying on June 8, 2016,
evidenced a disconcerting lack of awareness about their
persisting parental deficits and the skills and fortitude necessary
to raise four children. Whether additional parenting training and
mental health services could remedy those issues is questionable
and, at the very least, would be an extensive process that would
leave the children in CYS’s custody for an unacceptable length of
time. Pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), however, [A.T.P.], [L.R.P.],
[T.M.J.P.], and [E.P.P.] do not have to continue waiting
indefinitely to see whether Mother and Father can acquire the
capacity to appropriately care for them and meet their unique
medical and developmental needs on a full-time basis and with
only limited help from social service providers. Pursuant to
§ 2511(a)(2), Mother and Father’s rights may be terminated so
that the [Foster Parents] may adopt the siblings and guarantee
them a permanent home.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/16, at 7-8. As there is competent evidence in the
record that supports the trial court’s findings and credibility determinations,
we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
Mother’s parental rights should be terminated under section 2511(a)(2). 3
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827.
Next, Mother argues that CYS failed to satisfy its burden of proof
under section 2511(b). She contends that, although the Children have
undeniably done well in foster care, based on her improvements and learned
skills, it would be detrimental to the Children to terminate the bond between
____________________________________________
3
Because we affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the termination of
Mother’s parental rights under section 2511(a)(2), we need not address
section 2511(a)(5) and (8). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.
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her and them. See Mother’s Brief at 16-17. Moreover, Mother states that
she is mentally challenged, that she cannot drive, and she is dependent on
others for transportation. Id. at 9. Mother asserts that these are
environmental factors that are out of her control, and that she has made
efforts, and continues to make efforts, to overcome these barriers. Id.
We have explained that the focus in terminating parental rights under
section 2511(a) is on the parent, but it is on the child under section
2511(b). In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa. Super 2008)
(en banc). In reviewing the evidence in support of termination under section
2511(b), our Supreme Court stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “intangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781,
791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa.
1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013).
When evaluating a parental bond “the court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (internal
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citations omitted). Although it is often wise to have a bonding evaluation
and make it part of the certified record, “[t]here are some
instances . . . where direct observation of the interaction between the parent
and the child is not necessary and may even be detrimental to the child.” In
re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762 (Pa. Super. 2008).
A parent’s abuse and neglect are likewise a relevant part of this
analysis:
[C]oncluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply
because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only
dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were the
dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis would be
reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the rare child who,
after being subject to neglect and abuse, is able to sift through
the emotional wreckage and completely disavow a parent . . .
Nor are we of the opinion that the biological connection between
[the parent] and the children is sufficient in of itself, or when
considered in connection with a child’s feeling toward a parent,
to establish a de facto beneficial bond exists. The psychological
aspect of parenthood is more important in terms of the
development of the child and [his or her] mental and emotional
health than the coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.
In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the court may emphasize the safety
needs of the child. See In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763-764 (Pa. Super.
2008) (affirming the involuntary termination of the mother’s parental rights,
despite the existence of some bond, where placement with the mother would
be contrary to the child’s best interests, and any bond with the mother
would be fairly attenuated when the child was separated from her, almost
constantly, for four years).
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In fact, our Supreme Court has observed that the mere existence of a
bond or attachment of a child to a parent will not necessarily result in the
denial of a termination petition, and that “[e]ven the most abused of
children will often harbor some positive emotion towards the abusive
parent.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (quoting K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d at 535). The
Supreme Court instructed, “[T]he continued attachment to the natural
parents, despite serious parental rejection through abuse and neglect, and
failure to correct parenting and behavior disorders which are harming the
children cannot be misconstrued as bonding.” Id. (citation omitted).
We have explained that a parent’s own feelings of love and affection
for a child, alone, do not prevent termination of parental rights. Z.P., 994
A.2d at 1121. Further, this Court has stated: “[A] parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of . . . her child is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill . . . her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of [the child’s] potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B.,N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super.
2004) (internal citations omitted). It is well settled that “we will not toll the
well-being and permanency of [a child] indefinitely.” Adoption of C.L.G.,
956 A.2d at 1007 (citing In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 732 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(noting that a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a
parent] will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of
parenting.”)).
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Regarding section 2511(b), the trial court found as follows:
Pursuant to subsection (b), the [c]ourt must give primary
consideration to the children’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare, and that analysis clearly favors
termination. While in Mother and Father’s care, [A.T.P.],
[L.R.P.], and [T.M.J.P.] suffered from severe neglect. Whether
through lack of understanding or lack of concern, both parents
failed to provide the physical, mental, and emotional stimuli
essential to their children’s proper development. As a result,
they experienced profound developmental delays and never
established primary bonds with either parent. Consequently, it
was no more meaningful for them to see Mother and Father at
CenClear or CYS’s offices than it was to see Dr. Ryen or their
service providers.
Conversely, the [Foster Parents] have gained a place of
importance in the children’s hearts, and it is thus [Foster
Mother] they are happy to see and go home with when parental
visits are over. As detailed above, moreover, it is the [Foster
Parents] who have attended to the children’s physical, mental,
emotional, and medical needs since they were removed from
their birth parents’ home, and it is because of them and their
willingness to attend to the children’s special needs that they
have made the progress they have.
[E.P.P.] is additional evidence, and perhaps the most
convincing of all, that termination is in the children’s best
interests. Having been placed with the [Foster Parents] as a
newborn, he was never exposed to the social and cultural
deprivation his siblings experienced and thus has not suffered
from the attendant developmental delays. Rather, he is
developing normally in every respect – a fact that is directly
attributable to his not having been exposed to Mother and
Father’s neglectful parenting habits.
Because CYS has proven clearly and convincingly that
termination is appropriate under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2),
(a)(5), and (a)(8) and that it will best meet the children’s needs
pursuant to subsection (b), therefore, the [c]ourt will enter a
decree terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father with
respect to [the] children.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/17/16, at 8-9.
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After careful review, we find the record supports the trial court’s
factual findings, and the court’s conclusions are not the result of an error of
law or an abuse of discretion. Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-827.
Accordingly, it was proper for the trial court to conclude that no bond exists
such that the Children would suffer permanent emotional harm if Mother’s
parental rights were terminated. This Court finds no abuse of discretion in
the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights to the Children
pursuant to section 2511(b). We, therefore, affirm the decree terminating
Mother’s parental rights to the Children under section 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/16/2016
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In Re: L.R.P., Appeal of: A.P., mother
Combined Opinion